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INTRODUCTION

Plainly, one need not be an absolutist about justice in order to accept that
sometimes justice, perhaps even cosmopolitan "justice[,]' has to be
sacrificed ... for the sake of certain political considerations, including the
avoidance of a nation's disintegration." 2 At the same time, even a nonabsolutist
must realize that the United States has made progress toward the realization of a
therapeutic culture and the creation of what Philip Rieff calls the "psychological
man," who is indifferent to the ancient question of legitimate authority so long as
the powers that be preserve social order and manage an economy of abundance.3
Within the boundaries of such a milieu, terms like racial progress, affirmative
action, and racial preferences are increasingly explained in practice by the
rationale of diversity.4
This move displaces the previously ascendant
justification of race-conscious decision making as a form of remediation. This

1.

CHANTAL DELSOL, UNJUST JUSTICE: AGAINST THE TYRANNY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

7 (Paul Seaton trans., ISI Books 2008) (opposing cosmopolitan justice because it undermines
politics and, more generally, human diversity).
2.
Id. at 25.
3.

PHILIP RIEFF, THE TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC: USES OF FAITH AFTER FREUD 20

(40th Anniversary ed. 2006). Indifference to authority so long as the social order is preserved and
the economy grows nicely may be consistent with detachment liberalism, which attempts to tame
divisiveness by keeping the public sphere detached from strong belief and relegates such beliefs,
including strong truth claims, to the private sphere in favor of a spirit of reasonableness. See Steven
D. Smith, Educatingfor Liberalism, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039, 1042-43 (2009).
4.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) ("The Law School's educational
judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.").
5.
See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2152, 2161-62 (2013)
(quoting U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 2 (1977),
available at http://www.usccr.gov/aaction/state77.pdf) (observing that the concept of affirmative
action emerged gradually, and that diversity was not always its express or implied rationale); see
also Robert A. Sedler, Racial Preference, Reality and the Constitution: Bakke v. Regents of the
University of California, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329 (1977) (supporting race-conscious
affirmative action designed to alleviate the shortage of minority lawyers and as a vehicle to ensure
the equal participation of African Americans and other racial minorities in all important areas of
American life).
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does not signify that as the concept of diversity marches across the undulating
terrain of higher education, it is always and everywhere, incompatible with
remediation.
However, it does mean that not all forms of diversity are
necessarily compatible with the goal of compensation or correction. That claim
seems particularly true when diversity operates as part of a calculus designed to
encourage students to adopt a stance of detached neutrality that produces
"hollow" 6 and highly standardized graduates, as opposed to an approach that
encourages graduates to be highly conscious of the particularities of their birth as
well as where they are situated in a particular history.
In our current epoch, evolving beyond the idea of correcting or
compensating for past, present, or perhaps future discrimination, affirmative
action is linked inescapably to much of the language and sentiments expressed
by the Supreme Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.'
Conjuring up notions of academic freedom and deferring to the expertise of
university administrators, Justice Powell imagined the nation's classrooms
teeming with individuals of different races, and, thus, conducive to a robust
exchange of ideas. 9 Guided by this deduction, Justice Powell identified
diversity's worthy contribution to higher education and the nation as a
substantial factoro that could outweigh Equal Protection Clause challenges.
Thus, characterized and premised on contemporary conceptions of academic
freedom," diversity satisfied Justice Powell, and later the Supreme Court, as a
compelling interest. Despite the fact that neither the principal nor amicus briefs
justified the University of California's program on the basis of educational
diversity,1 2 Justice Powell's identification of the pursuit of a diverse population
as a defendable element of a university's educational mission became part of a
lengthy process that legitimized affirmative action and diversity as institutions of
higher education.13
Institutions, following Douglass North, refer to the
"humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social
interaction." 14 They consist of both informal constraints such as sanctions,
taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct, as well as formal rules such as

6.
Smith, supra note 3, at 1044 (citing Steven D. Smith, "Hollow Men"?: Law and the
Declension of Belief in CIVILIZING AUTHORITY: SOCIETY, STATE, AND CHURCH 197, 197-99

(Patrick McKinley Brennan ed., 2007)).
7.
Id. at 1047.
8. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
9.
Id. at 313 (plurality opinion).
10. See id. at 310-15; see also Leong, supra note 5, at 2162 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 30614) (discussing how Justice Powell's opinion specified that the educational benefits of diversity
could justify race-conscious admission programs).

11.

See infra Part II.C.

12. 1 am indebted to Professor Sedler for this observation. E-mail from Rober A. Sedler, Prof.
of Law, Wayne State Univ. Law Sch., to Harry G. Hutchison, Prof. of Law, George Mason Univ.

Sch. of Law (Aug. 12, 2014) (on file with the author).
13.
14.

Leong, supra note 5, at 2163.
Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97 (Winter 1991).
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Whether the Bakke opinion, which
constitutions, laws, and property rights."
gave rise to formal or informal codes of conduct, has or has not dimmed the
fervor of the debate over race-conscious admissions, any tempered discussion of
the wisdom and efficacy of the establishment of affirmative action and racial
preferences as institutions of the late modem world 6 likely requires an
agreement on a common language and the ability to settle certain facts, coupled
with some common notion of the good. Equally true, the intensity of this debate
is unlikely to diminish unless and until the nation accepts some commonly
agreed upon view that a particular people (African Americans) have a desire for
justice.
The debate is made more problematic due to the presence of a few awkward
facts.
First, although the pursuit of diversity has been lauded by both
universities and the Supreme Court as a compelling interest, the nation's public
schools are increasingly characterized by de facto segregation.' 7
Second,
although talk of equality, including epistemic equality," and rights permeates the
West,' 9 evidence surfaced showing that "inequality in America at the start of the
twenty-first century is greater than in the slave-based economy of imperial Rome

15.

Id.
&

16. JAMES DAVIDSON HUNTER, To CHANGE THE WORLD: THE IRONY, TRAGEDY,
POSSIBILITY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE LATE MODERN WORLD 200-12 (2010) (suggesting that for

most of human history communities and societies existed in relative isolation and were thus
insulated from exogenous social and cultural influences, but that pluralism exists in America today
without a dominant culture).
17. Gary Orfield et al., Sorting Out Deepening Confusion on Segregation Trends, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS PROJECT, Mar. 13, 2014, available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12education/integration-and-diversity/sorting-out-deepening-confusion-on-segregation-trends/Segreg
ation-Trends-Dispute-CRP-Researchers.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2014) (reaffirming findings that de
facto segregation has increased in public schools in recent decades).
18. See, e.g., Boaz Miller & Meital Pinto, Epistemic Equality 3 (Dec. 9, 2013) (working
paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2365541 (asserting, among
other things, that the social position, including race, gender, or economic power, of an individual or
group in a community should not determine who or what perspectives are taken seriously in the
community in question and accordingly the problem of epistemic equality is regarded as a
distributive one that may be solved by encouraging participation according to the principle of
"tempered equality of intellectual authority," meaning that participation in the knowledgegenerating discourse should be allocated according to members" relevant expertise in the subject at
hand, irrespective of social power, which is influenced by properties such as gender, race, and
class).
19. See, e.g., JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 14 (1993)
[hereinafter GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM] (suggesting that talk of anti-discrimination policy and
minority rights only incidentally concerns remedies for past injustices but, in reality, has become a
project of collective self-assertion); Nancy E. Dowd, UnfinishedEquality: The Case ofBlack Boys,
2 IND. J.L. & Soc. EQUALITY 36, 36 (2013) (asserting that the most powerful way to achieve social
justice is vulnerabilities analysis, which moves us away from a hierarchy of disadvantage and
requires the state to explain and correct structural inequalities); Lia Epperson, The Promise and
Pitfalls of Empiricism in Educational Equality Jurisprudence, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 489, 489
(2013) (stating that, during "the last half-century[ ]there [was] a growing national support for racial
equality").
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in the second century." 20 Third, while human rights are all the rage within the
hallowed halls of academia, the forces of xenophobia are on the march
throughout much of the Western world.2'
Finally, "[i]f belief in human
rationality was a scientific theory[,] it would long since have been abandoned." 22
John Gray amplifies the paradox of contemporary confidence in the notion of
rationality:
The evidence of science and history is that humans are only ever partly
and intermittently rational, but for modem humanists the solution is
simple: human beings must in [the] future be more reasonable. These
enthusiasts for reason have not noticed that the idea that humans may
one day be more rational requires a greater leap of faith than anything in
religion. 23
With this claim in view, a careful inspection of what is dead and what is
living in liberalism indicates that doctrinal liberalism's pursuit of a unique set of
basic principles with universal prescriptive authority may have difficulty
withstanding the force of strong indeterminacy and radical incommensurability
among values, leaving us with only the hopeful prospect of a civil society24 as
we confront the value-pluralism that defies philosophical attempts to arbitrate
deep conflicts about ultimate values. 25 Affirmative action is an exemplar of the
deep conflicts that plague postmodern society, a society that toils to attain the
good without necessarily committing to the true.26 The postmodem society is
fittingly cognized as one where an individual is repelled by the notion of making
contact with something larger and more enduring than oneself.27 Against this
backdrop, even a tempered conversation regarding the often intractable issues
surrounding affirmative action is likely to produce a rather fragile ecosystem.
While ecological fragility may be partially alleviated by pondering the impact of
similar policies outside of the comfort of one's own country, perhaps as part of
an inquiry that is necessary to understand an increasingly interlocking world, 28 it

20. JOHN GRAY, THE SILENCE OF ANIMALS: ON PROGRESS AND OTHER MODERN MYTHS 68
(2013) [hereinafter GRAY, SILENCE OF ANIMALS].

21.
22.
23.
"religion
[that] the
24.

Id. at 70.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 75. Of possible importance, Gray later shows that while Freud believed that
was the primary example of the human need for illusion, . . . [he] later . .. came to realize
illusions of religion contain truths that cannot be conveyed in other ways." Id. at 98.
GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM, supra note 19, at 287.

25.

Id. at 288.

26.

Harry G. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest: Infusing the Labor Union Dues Dispute

with FirstAmendment Values, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1309, 1309 (2006).
27. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 29 (1989).
28. Paul Schiff Berman, Conflict of Laws, Globalization, and Cosmopolitan Pluralism, 51
WAYNE L. REV. 1105, 1106-12 (2005) (citations omitted) (conceiving an expanded vision of
community and citizenship that takes us beyond the nation-state, fixed attributes like geographical
proximity, shared history, or face-to-face interaction and toward a community composed of
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is equally likely that the pursuit of universalizing insights and values induces
29
fracture when such explorations give way to moral superiority.
Conceding that value-pluralism is in the postmodem air, this essay has two
overlapping goals. First, to review Sander and Taylor's book, Mismatch: How
Affirmative Action Hurts Students It's Intended to Help, and Why Universities
Won 't Admit It (hereinafter Mismatch),30 and second, to situate the authors'
claims in context. Context is supplied by concentrating on three things: (1) the
contradictions embedded in the history of race relations in the modem world, 3 a
volatile coda that makes few things clear except that "race-blind" conservatives
have thus far failed to make a moral case against allowing race to play some
limited, but perhaps direct role in preferential programs,32 and that affirmative
action supporters have failed to make the case that black Americans still live in
an overtly racist purgatory patrolled by "white supremacy";33 (2) the paradoxes
of Supreme Court jurisprudence;3 4 and (3) the gulf between, the cosmopolitan
ideal predicated on appeals to Americans as citizens of the world who are
provoked by reason and love of humanity and bounded only by universal moral
obligations, and on the other hand, a vision that sees citizens as individuals who
are constrained by the primacy of their commitment to the nostos composed of
the local community of one's birth and the particularities of family and nation.35
An examination of modem contradictions, judicial or otherwise, coupled with a
somewhat speculative balancing of opposite views within the gulf that divides
the cosmos from the oikos will neither settle the still simmering debate that
surrounds affirmative action and its accompanying diversity rationale nor resolve
all of the conflicting claims that originate with the publication of Mismatch.
This review, however tentative its conclusions, may or may not succeed in
lowering the temperature by encouraging a pursuit of deliberation that is shorn of
the obfuscation and appeals to whimsy that surface when commentators
endeavor to instantiate an ideal society predicated on an over reliance on Kantian
abstractions that continue to bedevil commentators and jurists. Similarly, it is

symbolic identification and social psychology, which may give rise to the notion that jurisdiction is
simply the articulation of a norm, thus empowering any community, including a supranational one
that uses the language of law to articulate a norm as a basis to exercise authority).
29. Michael W. McConnell, Don't Neglect the Little Platoons, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY
78, 83 (Joshua Cohen ed., 2002).
30. RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: How AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
HURTS STUDENTS IT'S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON'T ADMIT IT (2012).
31. See infra Part II.A.
32. On this point, see J.L.A. Garcia et al., Race & Inequality: An Exchange, FIRST THINGS,
May 2002, available at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/race-amp-inequality-anexchange (Garcia agreeing with Loury's position) (online pagination retained).
33. Id.
34. See infra Part II.C.
35. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF
COUNTRY, supra note 29, at 6-11 (discussing how individuals are bound by the concentric circles
of family, local groups, and an overall universal origin).
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doubtful that Mismatch's reliance on empirics and pursuit of abundantly
available empirical evidence can solve America's affirmative action wrangle.
Several reasons spark this review of Mismatch. First, the authors contend
they have "demonstrated that the present system of racial admissions preferences
has grave problems and has shown a remarkable incapacity to heal itself,"3 6 a
thesis that is made all the more puzzling given their corresponding claim that the
"U[nited] S[tates] Supreme Court seems to be the only hope for serious and
stable reform" of our current affirmative action system.3 7 Second, William
Kidder" and others have raised a number of serious issues indicating that Sander
and Taylor have too often relied on either questionable data or incomplete data
analysis. Although an examination of the data may be helpful in the same sense
that Herder believed empirical results usefully benefit philosophic inquiry more
so than apriorism,3 9 it is far from clear that the issues infecting the affirmative
40
action debate can be sorted out solely or largely on the basis of empirics.
Third, the Court recently upheld Michigan's ban on racial preferences.4' Fourth,
and finally, there is a possibility that diversity as practiced within leading
American universities has been transmuted, whether defendable or not, into a
42
potentially duplicitous form of commodification
as part of the modem
surrender to the power of racial branding and marketing. These factors, taken
together, suggest that it is a propitious time to situate the authors' scholarship in
context.
Part II places the concepts of affirmative action and diversity in context by
examining modem contradictions, which include government policy volatility on
issues of race, as well as the paradoxes that infect Supreme Court jurisprudence,
particularly within the domain of the Equal Protection Clause. Part III inspects
diversity, cosmopolitanism, and the pursuit of universal norms.
Part IV
considers the perspectives of commentators committed to the primacy of the

36. SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 273.
37. Id.
38. See William Kidder, A High Targetfor "Mismatch": Bogus Arguments About Affirmative
Action, L.A. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Feb. 7, 2013), available at http://lareviewofbooks.org/review/ahigh-target-for-mismatch-bogus-arguments-about-affirmative-action.
39. Michael N. Forster, Introduction, in JOHANN GOTTFRIED VON HERDER, PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS vii, xi (Michael N. Forster ed. & trans., 2002).
40. See Kidder, supra note 38.
41. Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1624 (2014)
(reversing the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and upholding Michigan's racial preference ban). See
also Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 470
(6th Cir. 2012) (declining to address the Grutter Court's opinion allowing universities to continue to
consider race or ethnicity flexibly within the context of individualized consideration, and holding
that article 1, section 26, proposal 2 of the Michigan Constitution, which eliminated the
consideration of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in individualized admissions decisions,
was unconstitutional pursuant to a strict scrutiny test because it deprives plaintiffs of equal
protection under the political process doctrine by placing special burdens on the ability of minority
groups to achieve beneficial legislation).
42. See, e.g., Leong, supra note 5, at 2206 (suggesting that the focus on acquiring,
monetizing, and displaying diversity may preempt conversations about past racial injustice).
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oikos. In Part V, notions of academic freedom, diversity and the First
Amendment are considered. In Part VI, Sander and Taylor's central claims and
contentions are set forth. Part VII supplies preliminary analysis of Mismatch, a
process that depends in part on an examination of the contours of the scholarly
response to the authors' empirical claims, and, also attempts to recouple the
nation's racial history with the contemporary demand for affirmative action,
43
which, simply put, is a demand that began more than a century and a half ago.
Part VIII deconstructs Mismatch, affirmative action, and diversity in a move that
builds on Professor Deneen's scholarship. Central to Part VIII's analysis is an
evaluation of the plea of the cosmopolitans and the Sirens on the one hand
calling us to become "citizen[s] of the world" 44 and the response from
commentators, on the other hand, calling for a return to nostos, to a particular
place and a people. A return to nostos, or alternatively put, a return to oikos,
implies boundaries in politics that of necessity "constrain the seemingly limitless
capacity for optimism in progress," 45 particularly progress led by hierarchs who
may or may not have exceptional insight into the interest of others. Part IX
places Mismatch, the Supreme Court and the prospect for racial healing in
context. This Article will show that a contextualized examination of Mismatch,
including a review of prevailing jurisprudential norms, provides ample room for
skepticism regarding both the nation's dependence on the diversity rationale as a
basis for affirmative action, and Sander and Taylor's appeal to the Supreme
Court to resolve the confounding idiosyncrasies and contradictions that infect
race-based decision making within the domain of higher education.
II.

SITUATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN CONTEXT

It seems clear that the pursuit of a proper contextual framework of analysis
gives rise to the intuition that there are different types of knowing and
understanding. Within such a framework, it is possible to conclude that
"[s]cience studies the repeatable; history studies the unrepeatable." 46 Consistent
with this conclusion, which hints at the importance of history, the Supreme Court

43. See RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE
LAW 23-26 (2013) (showing that both the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and postCivil War legislation can be seen as a form of affirmative action).
44. PATRICK J. DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY: THE POLITICS OF
DEPARTURE AND RETURN 219 (2000) [hereinafter DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY]
(observing that "the very concept of kosmou politis 'citizen of the world,' a phrase coined by
Diogenes the Cynic in the fourth century B.C. would have represented a contradiction in terms in
the Homeric world, inasmuch as a citizen . . . is necessarily a member of a city, orpolis.").
45. Id. at 15 (citing MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND LIMITS OF POLITICS (1982); JEAN
BETHKE ELSHTAIN, REAL POLITICS (1997) [hereinafter ELSHTAIN, REAL POLITICS]; JEAN BETHKE
ELSHTAIN, AUGUSTINE AND THE LIMITS OF POLITICS (1995) [hereinafter ELSHTAIN, AUGUSTINE];
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN (1995) [hereinafter LASCH, HEAVEN];
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES (1995) [hereinafter LASCH, REVOLT]).
46. N.T. WRIGHT, SURPRISED BY HOPE: RETHINKING HEAVEN, THE RESURRECTION, AND
THE MISSION OF THE CHURCH 64 (2008).
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maintains that "[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental
action under the Equal Protection Clause."47 The next two subsections offer
context by focusing on both the presence of conflict as part of the nation's racial
odyssey, an essential feature of modem debates, and on the history of
government volatility on matters of race. The final subsection offers a fairly
lengthy inspection of judicial activity in the domain of race relations in order to
advance a specific focus on diversity in its many guises as an essential
contemporary component of affirmative action. Diversity, which is critically
appreciated, is arguably a concept that undergirds the contest between Sander,
48
Taylor, and their critics.
Contextualization gives rise to doubts regarding
Sander and Taylor's hope that the Supreme Court has either the capacity or the
willingness to heal what centuries of volatile race-conscious policies have
combined to create.49
A.

Conflict or Consensus as Partof the Nation's Racial Odyssey?

Whichever jurisprudential or policy standard is selected by the Supreme
Court or by the public at large to assess the permissibility and wisdom of raceconscious decision making across the terrain of higher education, it seems clear
that any examination of affirmative action takes place within a roiling arena that
starts with a racial achievement gap in public elementary and secondary
education.50 It is possible that this achievement gap in public schools, perhaps
related to racial isolation, heralds a problem of seismic scope that contributes to
a corresponding achievement and performance gap in higher education.'
Equally true, these gaps increase society's appetite for turbulent conflict.
Consistent with the presence of turbulence in the affirmative action arena the
late Ronald Dworkin, exasperated by the nation's continuing racial isolation and
convinced that affirmative action was the correct solution to this persistent
problem, described the Supreme Court's failure to follow Justice O'Connor's
leadership on a number of equal protection questions as nothing less than an
alarming insurrection.52 It is argued that jurisprudential rebellion, ensues with a
breathtaking impatience that is aided and abetted by the Court's disdain for
tradition and precedent.53 Given society's persistent resort to irreconcilable
interpretations of the guarantee of equal protection and affirmative action, it is

47.

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).

48. See Kidder, supra note 38.
49. See SANDER & TAYLOR, supranote 30, at 273.
50. Harry G. Hutchison, Moving Forward?Diversity as a Paradox?A CriticalRace View, 57
CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 1059, 1060 (2008) [hereinafter Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox].
5 1. Id. (citing Katherine Kersten, Teach Character to Cut Racial Gap in School Results,

STARTRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), Feb. 22, 2007, at Bl).
52. RONALD DWORKIN, THE SUPREME COURT PHALANX: THE COURT'S NEW RIGHT-WING
BLOC 56 (2008) (describing Justice O'Connor's opinions as "increasingly sophisticated and

thoughtful").
53. Id.
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improbable that Dworkin's censure of the Court's decision to decline to permit
racial discrimination by government whenever the effects are seen as salutary5 4
is necessarily convincing. This observation is remarkably true in our modern
age as some, but not all, citizens have been captured by the ideal of authenticity
made perceptible by the claim that there is a certain way of being that is my way,
since to do otherwise means that individuals will "miss the point of [their]
li[ves]."
In contrast with Dworkin's unabashed certainty, a conviction that
persisted despite the fact that formal discrimination against blacks has become
marginal and readily prosecutable,56 philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre offers a
more balanced perspective. MacIntyre submits that a perpetually unsettled
character pertains to America's contemporary moral and philosophical debates,
a claim that clearly captures the current state of race relations in the nation.
Predictably, such disputes are fastened to incompatible notions of justice, are
embedded in irreconcilable conceptions of self-definition that exemplify the
friction between the idea of belonging to a particular place (oikos) and the notion
that we are all universally the objects of self-creation (the cosmos), and are
therefore at least potentially animated by the transformative capability that
emerges from a robust exchange of ideas.
Contestation is often linked to the debate over origins with some claiming
that the nation was founded uniquely on the basis of documents such as the
Constitution, while others point out the inherent weakness of the Constitution
and express doubt that the documents can represent any population in its
entirety. 59 In reality, Patrick Deneen shows the dispute over origins indicates
that the nation's Left-Right divide is somewhat mistaken, at least in its

54. Nelson Lund, Justice Kennedy's Stricter Scrutiny and the Future of Racial Diversity
Promotion, 9 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOCIETY 20, 20 (2008) (citing Parents Involved in Cmty.
Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2005)).
55. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 30 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994). See also Harry Hutchison, Book
Review, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 141, 142-43 (1997) (citing Taylor, supra, at 55-56)
(stating that society is asked to recognize the individuality and distinctiveness of everyone else).
56. Garcia et al., supra note 32, at 15-16.
57. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 235 (Am. ed.
1981). See also Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox, supra note 50, at 1061 (explaining MacIntyre's
perspective as balanced).
58. See infra Part III.
59. DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 1-6 (citations
omitted); see also Patrick J. Deneen, State of the Union: Tocqueville on the Individualist Roots of
Progressivism, THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.theamerican
conservative.com/tocqueville-on-the-individualist-roots-of-progressivism/
(showing
that
individualism is a distinctive phenomenon arising in liberal democracy and is tied to the social
contract tradition that conceives of human beings in their natural state as beings that transcend their
constitutive bonds, inherited roles, and given identities; whereas the idea of the individual is at least
as old as Christianity, in contrast with individualism, which is a new experience of self that arises
with being embedded in a familial, social religious, generational, or cultural setting that is largely
fixed and unchanging).
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60

foundational principles.
In postmodem debates regarding rights, preferences,
affirmative action, and diversity, it appears that the struggle to define ourselves
as human beings or on a complementary level as members of a group "is deeply
intertwined with commonly held stories about our respective beginnings as a
person, a culture, or a polity." 6 1

Whatever the Founders meant when they

created a nation characterized by liberty, it appears that in matters of race,
justice, and mercy, it is probable that the past influences the creation of the
62
present. Likewise, whether banal or revolutionary, just as "ripples from a stone
thrown in water" travel back to shore, so too does our perception of the present
influence our understanding of the past.63 This past includes the Framers'
conception of the Constitution itself as well as the nation's unstable racial
64
history, which taken together deepen the intensity of modem disagreements
consistent with Karl Marx's reflection that "conflict and not consensus [is] at the
heart of modem social structure." 65 The potency of Marx's remark is sharpened
by noting that "barbarism is not a primitive form of life .

.

. but [rather] a

pathological development of civilization." 66 Hence, in today's therapeutic
67
culture, amid a polity devoid of a binding public philosophy, it is imaginable
that modem disputes will not be resolved short of authoritarianism or oblivion
despite society's frequent invocation of the language of pluralism, democracy,
and antidiscrimination."68 The next two subsections show that language,
including the text of the Constitution and especially the Equal Protection Clause
guarantees, remains defeasible by reference to changeable majoritarian
69
preferences.
B. Race in the Mirrorof Government Volatility
An adequate understanding of the leading constitutional cases is advanced
by briefly considering government's role in either augmenting or shrinking the
status of minorities in the United States. It seems clear that a "stable framework
of behavioral expectations provided by government enables individuals to
interact with less fear of physical or economic harm from one another." 70 A
stable scaffold is constitutive of human flourishing, rather than the intrinsic

60. DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 1-8 (citations
omitted).

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 5.
Id.
See infra Parts II.B-C.

65. MACINTYRE, supra note 57, at 235.
66. See GRAY, SILENCE OF ANIMALS, supra note 20, at 9-10 (citing JOSEPH CONRAD,
HEART OF DARKNESS (1902)).
67. Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, Introduction, in RIEFF, supra note 3, at vii, xix.
68. Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox,supra note 50, at 1061.

69. See infra Parts II.B-C.
70.

THOMAS SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORITIES 104 (1981).
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merits and composition of the framework's specific provisions.71 The absence of
stability can be illustrated: "Africans brought to the United States in the early
seventeenth century became indentured servants, like most white immigrants,
and were freed at the end of a few years."72 The pattern then changed to one of
perpetual slavery for blacks. 73 "The post-Revolutionary War era led to abolition
of slavery in the [N]orth, and a relaxation of restrictions on 'free persons of
color.' But within a generation, new government restrictions began to be
imposed on the occupations,

mobility,

[and the]

legal status .

.

. of free

[blacks]."74 Governmental polic instability on issues of race at the state level
was equaled at the federal level. In the national government, perhaps exposing
the Constitution's inherent weakness, "the slow progress of black employees
over the decades was suddenly reversed by the Woodrow Wilson administration,
which introduced segregation among federal employees" 76 Woodrow Wilson, as
president of Princeton University, claimed to be governed by the philosophy of
equal opportunity rather than one that advanced privilege and exclusion.
However, as President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, like many
American citizens of his era, was prepared to ignore the Constitution whenever
he thought the policy at issue advanced the public good, even when it was clear
that the policy favored exclusion.
Representing a similar Wilsonian
inclination-one that is congruent with Progressive Era raceology, exclusion,
and Progressive labor legislation7 -it bears noting that during the War of 1812,
twenty-five percent of Commodore Perry's crew was African-American,
79
although there were no African-American sailors in the navy by the 1920s.

Consistent with the history of governmental instability on issues of race, a
history that reflects both the possibility of progress and the likelihood of
disappointment, America's first federal civil rights law, the Civil Rights Act of
1866, "declared all persons born in the United States to be citizens [and] clothed
all persons with the same rights as whites" for a variety of purposes.so Although
this was a welcome development, it would be foolish to forget that "[p]rior to
this legislation, the Supreme Court, pursuant to the notorious Dred Scott
decision, had ruled that blacks, whether free or enslaved, were not citizens of the

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 105.

75. See generally id. at 105-06 (discussing the volatility of government policy toward
minority groups).

76.

Id. at 105.

77.
78.

A. SCOTT BERG, WILSON 170 (2013).
See Harry G. Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit"? From Plessy v. Ferguson to New

Deal Labor Law, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 21-34 (2011) [hereinafter Hutchison, Waging War on
the "Unfit"] (citations omitted).
79. SOWELL, supra note 70, at 105.
80. KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 22.
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United States."si Coherent with both state and federal government instability on
issues of race, President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act.82 Perhaps
oblivious to the history of slavery and anesthetized to the fact that most, if not
all, slaves were born in the United States, President Johnson was incensed by
this so-called "special legislation" because it enabled blacks to immediately
become citizens, while European born immigrants had to wait several years in
order to qualify for citizenship via naturalization.8 3 Although President
Johnson's veto was eventually overridden, it bears observing that he
"characterized the Act of 1866 as illicitly race-sensitive insofar as it contained, in
his view, a 'distinction of race . . . made to operate in favor of the colored and

'

against the white race."'84 To be sure, as Randall Kennedy explains, "the [A]ct
is explicitly attentive to race, and its framers were moved primarily by a desire to
help a particular sector of the populace: colored Americans."" Accordingly
"[t]he Act of 1866 can thus be seen as a race-sensitive precursor of 'affirmative
action.'"86 More recently, the state of New York passed the first state law
87
banning racial discrimination in 1945.
This proposal was ironically and
predictably attacked as an attempt to instantiate the Hitlerian rule of quotas.
Similarly, when African Americans engaged in picketing for jobs in a
predominantly African American area, this activity was banned on grounds that
they had no First Amendment right to picket for proportional hiring.8 These
various maneuvers appear to represent the then-consensus view that, as a matter
of constitutional law, segregation was deemed consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause so long as the facilities were ostensibly equal. 90 The
commitment to this policy survived in stark contrast with the desegregation that
characterized Commodore Perry's naval crew during the War of 1812, an event
that occurred well before the onset of the civil rights revolution and the
corresponding upsurge in the charge that civil rights were nothing more than an
unmerited special benefit for blacks. 9
By and large, this brief exposition of government policy volatility is
consistent with Thomas Sowell's great claim that, "in broad historical terms,
government has changed the rules of the game for blacks in virtually every

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 23.
85. Id. at 23-24.
86. Id. at 24.
87. Id. at 27.
88. Id. at 27-28 (quoting Anthony S. Chen, "The Hitlerian Rule of Quotas ": Racial
Conservatism and the Politics of FairEmployment Legislation in New York State, 1941-1945, 92 J.
Am. HIST. 1238, 1257 (2006)).
89. Id. at 30 (quoting Mark Tushnet, Change and Continuity in the Concept of Civil Rights:
Thurgood Marshall and Affirmative Action, in REASSESSING CIVIL RIGHTS 151-52 (Ellen Frankel
Paul et al. eds., 1991).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 31.
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generation," a maneuver that is further reinforced by its similarly erratic
treatment of Native Americans, Japanese Americans, and others.92
Unsurprisingly, volatility also surfaces in the leading constitutional cases.
C.

The ConstitutionalBackground: The ParadoxesofEqualProtection

Consistent with the government's deliberate or inadvertent pursuit of policy
instability on issues of race, it has been argued that the nation is only one vote
away from a stance that would mirror Plessy v. Ferguson'sapproach, suggesting
that "virtually any discriminatory law that [the C]ourt believes was 'enacted in
good faith for the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance or
oppression of a particular class"' 93 is defensible. Before issuing its decision in
Plessy, the Supreme Court in the course of invalidating parts of what was
known as the Civil Rights Act of 1875-charged blacks with seeking
preferential legislation. 94 More specifically, in a series of cases known as the
Civil Rights Cases,95 the Court, infuriated by lepislation prohibiting
discrimination in the provision of public accommodations,9 stated:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation, when he takes
the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the
laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in
the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected. There
were thousands of free colored people in this country before the
abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of life, liberty and
property the same as white citizens; yet no one, at that time, thought that
it was any invasion of [their] personal status as freemen because they
were not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or
because [they were] subjected to discrimination[] . ...
Cleaving closely to the dominant voices of their generation and surrendering
to the all too human penchant for duplicitous linguistics, the Justices accepted
subordination as commonplace and permissible.98 Unequivocally contradicting
the nation's racial history, the Court observed that "[m]ere discriminations on
account of race or color were not regarded as badges of slavery." 99

92.

SOWELL, supra note 70, at 105.

93.

Lund, supra note 54, at 25 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896)).

94.

KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 24.

95.
96.
97.

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Id. at 25.
Id.

98.

See KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 24.

99.

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
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'

Constant with the tenor of the Civil Rights Cases and contrary to the thrust
of contemporary scholarship stating that the application of strict scrutiny
signifies the Court's devotion to the principle of racial reciprocity, meaning that
the "standard of review . .. is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
benefited,"' 00 the Court upheld de jure segregation in its Plessy v. Ferguson'0
decision in 1896. Plessy was issued in harmony with the Court's approval of
laws forbidding the intermarriage of the races, 02 as well as with the "broad
outlines of Progressivism and quasi-scientific racism"1 03 that became part of the
nation's smug war on the "weak."1 04 Apparently, Plessy's acceptance of racial
subordination reflected the majoritarian necessity of enforced racial isolation as
part of the Court's reification of the public good.'
Since majorities change
over time, it is not entirely clear that either contemporary conceptions of public
* 106*
choice originalism or any other theory of judicial review, even one inspired by
the claim that America has entered into a post-racial era with the election of
President Obama,1 07 is capable of ensuring a different outcome in the future. In
contrast to Plessy, the Buchanan v. Warley'os Court recognized that racial
prejudice that propels segregation by law also offends the Constitution.1 09
Following this welcome decision, wherein the Court relied on substantive due
process to invalidate a city ordinance mandating residential segregation, the
Court confirmed in Brown v. Board of Education"o that state sponsored
segregation is an impermissible weapon for enforcing racial subordination, an
opinion that is fairly consistent with its earlier decisions in the domain of higher
education."' Having disallowed invidious forms of racial subordination, the

100. James F. Blumstein, Grutter and Fisher: A Reassessment and a Preview, 65 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANc 57, 61 (2012) (quoting Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)).
101. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
102. Id. at 545 (citing State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871)).
103. See Harry G. Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit, " supra note 78, at 23.
104. See id. at 21-34 (citation omitted) (describing Plessy, Buck and New Deal Labor law as
part of a pernicious pantheon that successfully waged war on the "weak," a category that apparently
included women and members of minority groups).
105. See id. at 1-2.
106. For an excellent explication of the possibilities associated with public choice originalism,
see John 0. McGinnis, Public Choice Originalism: Bork, Buchanan and the Escape from the
ProgressiveParadigm(Nw. U. Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 14-02 & Nw. U.
Sch. of Law Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 14-06), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2391532 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2391532.
107. See, e.g., Brandon Paradise, Racially TranscendentDiversity, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV.
415, 415 (2012) (discussing whether the nation has entered a post-racial era).
108. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
109. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 749 & n.48 (7th
ed. 2004).
110. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
111. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (finding
impermissible the state's differential treatment of a black graduate student); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629, 633, 636 (1950) (reserving the question of whether separate but equal was valid, but
finding that the separate law school established for blacks was not substantially equal); Missouri ex
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'

Court subsequently tackled the question of whether affirmative action or benign
discrimination satisfies the commands of the Equal Protection Clause.112
Benign discrimination can be defended, on one account, as a statutory
modification that allows recipients of federal funds to "discriminate on the
ground of race, color, or national origin whenever a majority of the Supreme
Court concludes that the Constitution allows such discrimination."1 3 Whether
this startling remark is completely accurate or not, "[s]ince [the Supreme]
Court's splintered decision in Bakke"1 4 and its comment that a state "has a
substantial interest that may legitimately be served by a properly devised
admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic
origin,""' elite "[p]ublic and private universities across the Nation have modeled
their own admissions programs on Justice Powell's views on permissible raceconscious policies."1 6 They have done so despite Justice Powell's observation
that, as of 1978 at least, the Supreme Court had never "approved preferential
classifications in the absence of proved constitutional or statutory violations."" 7
Affirmative action in university admissions was facilitated by Justice Powell's
dual deduction that while all racial discrimination is forbidden unless "precisely
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest,""' a medical school's
interest in assembling a racially diverse student body is a compelling interest
because it serves the First Amendment goal of promoting a "robust exchange of
ideas."11 9 However persuasive Justice Powell's analysis may be, it is seems
clear that "Bakke settled almost nothing as a matter of constitutional doctrine,"1 20
a stasis that was continued by subsequent Burger and Rehnquist Court
decisions.' 2
Nonetheless, the daunting endeavor to cultivate a defendable foundation for
evaluating race-conscious decision making at elite schools has lingered for
several decades in the United States as a cultural and jurisprudential

rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938) (holding that the state's attempt to remedy the
denial of admission of an admittedly qualified student to the state school reserved for whites
through the payment of tuition to an out of state school did not satisfy equal protection). See also
Brent Rubin, Note, Buchanan v. Warley and the Limits of Substantive Due Process, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 477, 477-78 (2013) (citing Buchanan v. Warley, 265 U.S. 60 (1917) (discussing how the
Supreme Court first recognized segregation offended the Constitution in Buchanan v. Warley)).
112. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
113. Lund, supra note 54, at 20.
114. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003).
115. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978).
116. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323.
117. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302.
118. Id. at 299.
119. Id. at 312-13 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967)).
120. Lund, supra note 54, at 21.
121. Id.
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flashpoint.122 The fervor of this dispute has only intensified since Justice
O'Connor authored an enticing concurrence in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education specifying that the Court might uphold a race-conscious hiring
program designed to institute a racially diverse faculty.1 23 Although specific
Justices in Wygant offered a range of positions on the appropriate standard of
review regarding race-conscious layoffs, the Supreme Court invalidated the
Board's plan without supplying a majority opinion.124 Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Wygant foreshadowed her opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,125
wherein she deployed a strict scrutiny analysis to evaluate the University of
Michigan Law School's preferential admissions plan.126 Strict scrutiny, Justice
O'Connor argued, is necessary to "smoke out" illegitimate motives for racial
distinctions, such as notions of racial inferiority or racial politics disguised as
benign ones.127 "[T]he distinction between illegitimate notions and benign
policies remain[s] crucial . . . ."128
Hence, race-based action is allowable
"[w]hen necessary to further a compelling governmental interest."1 29 Replying
to the question of "[w]hether diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the
narrowly tailored use of race in selecting applicants for admission to public
universities,"1 30 the Court voiced "grave misgivings about racial preferences"
that manifest a university's pursuit of a specified percentage of any racial
group.131 Nonetheless, putting "an end to a quarter century of uncertainty about
the constitutionality of racial discrimination in university admissions"; 132
harnessing its understanding of Justice Powell's analytical framework in
Bakke;1 33 finding that racial diversity was a "permissible goal [that only]

122. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271 (assessing the legality of affirmative action, the Court
ruled without offering a majority opinion); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283-84
(1986) (invalidating a race-conscious system for laying teachers off without reaching a majority
opinion).
123. 476 U.S. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
124. See id. at 283-84 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 293 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 296
(Marshall, J. dissenting); id. at 320 (Stevens, J. dissenting); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 109, at 816-18 (discussing the various standards of review articulated in the five opinions).
125. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
126. Id. at 326 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
127. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1988)).
128. DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 56.
129. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
130. Id. at 322.
131. Id. at 329-30 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978);
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992); City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 507). See also SANDER
& TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 209.
132. Lund, supra note 54, at 21.
133. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323-24 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306-07, 310) (stating that
"Justice Powell rejected an interest in 'reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored
minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession' as an unlawful interest in racial
balancing . . . . Second, Justice Powell rejected an interest in remedying societal discrimination
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requires ... a good-faith effort ... to come within a range demarcated by the
goal itself';1 34 and snubbing the prudent claim that ' [a]ttaining diversity,'
whatever it means, is [merely] the mechanism by which the [University of
Michigan] Law School obtains educational benefits, not an end of itself,"13 the
Grutter Court ratified much, but apparently not all, of Justice Powell's
approach.136
Finding that the University of Michigan's Law School's
admissions program bears the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan, including
individualized consideration that ensures that race is used in a flexible,
nonmechanical way, the Grutter Court found that the University of Michigan
Law School could consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a "plus" factor in
the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant.1 37
Professor Lund summarizes the crucial elements of Grutter thusly:
First, the law school offered its desire for a "diverse student body" as
the compelling governmental interest that justified its policy of ensuring
the admission of a "critical mass" of blacks, certain selected Hispanics,
and American Indians. The Court deferred to what it accepted as the
state's educational judgment, alluding to "a special niche in our
constitutional tradition" occupied by universities and citing Powell's
reliance on the First Amendment.1 38
Although constitutional doctrine within the domain shaped by the
intersection of race and education policy is rather byzantine as a historical
matter,1 39 Grutter represents the end point of a three-fold process. First, "as the
Court incrementally established strict scrutiny as the standard [of review] in all
cases involving race-based affirmative action, remedial justifications became
increasingly unlikely to succeed, with [the] narrow exception for an entity's

because such measures would risk placing unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties 'who bear
no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought
to have suffered.' . . . . Third, Justice Powell rejected an interest in 'increasing the number of
physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved,' concluding that even if such an
interest could be compelling in some circumstances the program under review was not 'geared to
promote that goal."').
134. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495
(1986)).
135. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 354-55 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
136. Id. at 324 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12, 314) (stating that "Justice Powell approved
the university's use of race to further only one interest: 'the attainment of a diverse student body.'
With the important proviso that 'constitutional limitations protecting individual rights may not be
disregarded,' Justice Powell grounded his analysis in the academic freedom that 'long has been
viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment."'). But see SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30,
at 209 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333) (noting that the court "jettisoned Justice Powell's focus on
intellectual diversity as [a] compelling interest" and instead concentrated on the "unique experience
of being from a racial minority" as satisfying the compelling interest standard).
137. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18).
138. Lund, supra 54, at 21 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329).
139. See Epperson, supra note 19, at 490.
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implementation of remedial measures for its own past discrimination."1 40
Second, the focus shifted to educational diversity that presumably depends on
individualized consideration of race as a justification for affirmative action.141
Third, the Court accepted diversity as a compelling state interest despite its
existence within a framework that ineluctably advances the University of
Michigan Law School's pursuit of elite status.14 The Court's judgment ensued
despite the lack of any evidence to show the state's admissions policy was
mandated by public necessity requiring: (a) the presence of a law school within
the state;1 43 (b) the state of Michigan pursue the establishment and maintenance
of an elite law school;1 44 and (c) graduates of the University of Michigan Law
School actually serve the welfare of the people of Michigan, including, of
course, its disadvantaged population.1 45 Taken as a whole, the Supreme Court's
three-pronged move hoisted diversity's jurisprudential and political force beyond
its capacity to withstand skeptical scrutiny, a maneuver that threatens to vitiate
affirmative action's potential justification as a form of redress for the nation's
undeniable history of subordination, even if formal discrimination has now
ceased.1 46 Indeed, the Court's justification of diversity may serve the cause of
privilege rather than remediation.147
Although the Grutter Court's examination of the Equal Protection Clause
enabled diversity to withstand scrutiny,148 Samuel Estreicher, Nelson Lund, and
Randall Kennedy offer piercing replies that command attention. Estreicher, in
apparent sympathy with the Grutter Court's objectives, avers that "[a]s long as
analysis of racial classification cases turns on the familiar two-pronged inquiry
into whether government has a asserted a 'compelling interest' and, if so,
whether the challenged program reflects 'narrow tailoring,' the Supreme Court
jurisprudence in this area will prove deeply unsatisfying and difficult to
predict."1 49 This is so, he contends, because "[b]oth prongs have an 'in-the-eyeof-the-beholder' quality, particularly after the Grutter Court ... accepted as a
compelling interest race-based viewpoint diversity, and the concomitant
necessity of maintaining a 'critical mass' of the under-represented racial
viewpoint. Once that hurdle was cleared, insistence on narrow tailoring seems

140. Leong, supra note 5, at 2162-63 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 509 (1989)).
141. Id. at 2163.
142. Id. at 2163-64 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325).
143. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 357-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part)
(suggesting that since a significant number of states fail to operate a public law school at all, a
presumption surfaces that this enterprise is not a public necessity and that therefore diversity within
an unnecessary school cannot be a compelling state interest).

144. Id. at 358.
145. Id. at 360.
146. See Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox,supra note 50, at 1081.

147. Id.
148. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
149. Samuel Estreicher, The Non-Preferment Principle and the "Racial Tiebreaker" Cases,
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 239, 242-43 (2007), available at http://1sr.nellco.org/nyuplltwp/64/.
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almost churlish," 5 o which exposes the Court's analysis as weak at best. This is
particularly true if one notes that the canons of constitutional analysis allow
university officials to benefit from judicial deference "in determining that they
have a compelling interest in seeking diversity [but] they receive 'no deference'
when the courts review their policies to ensure narrow tailoring."' 5 Estreicher
shows that Supreme Court instability could be obviated and narrow tailoring
analysis could be avoided by noticing that "if racial diversity is what the state is
seeking (and can lawfully seek), racial preferences may be the best way to get
there." 52 Hence, a judicial requirement that a state refrain from using racial
preferences to achieve its compelling interest, racial diversity, means that a state
can only attain its "valid goal by the most circuitous route possible." 53 Unless
some form of clever postmodern evasion is in play, a judicial approach favoring
this kind of circuitousness seems bizarre.
Lund, in a somewhat similar albeit less sympathetic vein, argues that the
Grutter Court "create[d] a safe harbor for ... discrimination [against certain
races such as whites and Asians] that extends over the whole ocean, except for
one little cove that contains strictly unbending quotas and absolutely mechanical
preferences like those at issue in Bakke and Gratz."154 Lund further contends
that Grutter implies five things: (1) that strict scrutiny is "now less strict than
intermediate scrutiny had been only a few years before";15 5 (2) that strict scrutiny
as reshaped by the Court's "conception of a compelling governmental interest,
effectively reduces strict scrutiny to something like rational basis review";1 56 (3)
that "outright racial balancing" is defensible unless procured through explicit
quotas; 1 (4) that the Supreme Court's test mirrors Plessy v. Ferguson'spolice
power test for trumping the Fourteenth Amendment along with its obvious
concern for the adverse effects "that might flow from judicial interference with a
practice that was highly valued by politically powerful interests"; 5 5 and (5) that

150. Id. at 243.
151. David E. Bernstein, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action and the Failed

Attempt to Square a Circle, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & L1BERTY 210, 215 (2013) (citing Fisher v. University
of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013)).
152. Estreicher, supra note 149, at 243.

153. Id.
154. Lund, supra note 54, at 21.

155. Id. at 22.
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003)) (showing that over a period of
several years, the law school admitted favored minorities in an almost perfectly exact proportion to
their share of the applicant pool).

158. Id. (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896)) ("Plessy held that racial
segregation laws were constitutionally permissible if they pass the following test: 'Every exercise of
the police power must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for
the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class.'
This is essentially the same test deployed in Grutter, which treated the Michigan Law School's
diversity plan as a reasonable means toward the 'important and laudable' goal of promoting
classroom discussions that are 'livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and
interesting."' (citation omitted)).
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the Court appears willing to subordinate its jurisprudential gifts to "the dominant
opinion in contemporary elite culture." 5 9
Kennedy offers quite a different rejoinder. He argues that both the Court
and society found the diversity rationale alluring
because it facilitates the evasion of prickly subjects.1 60 It allows whites
to avoid grappling with their status as beneficiaries of past wrongs ...
[and] facilitates the evasion of a subject that makes many blacks
uncomfortable: the fact not the biased perception, but the sometimes
discouraging fact-that pursuant to affirmative action, blacks selected
for valued positions often have records that are inferior to those of white
competitors.161

Kennedy also notes that "[t]he diversity camp has long been dogged by
allegations of insincerity or outright duplicity."1 62 For example, "[w]hen Justice
Powell announced his diversity rationale, detractors complained that he
penalized the honesty of the University of California set-aside while valorizing
the Harvard policy that reached essentially the same result under cover of an
intentionally obfuscatory rhetoric." 63 Kennedy shows that many proponents of
affirmative action have reached the conclusion that "the diversity rationale is
[simply] pretextual."1 64 In response to perceived pretext, supporters of racebased preferences ask why diversity, as a compelling interest, is rarely practiced
on behalf of Republicans, fundamentalist Christians, Muslims, or Neo-Nazis.165
Lastly, Kennedy doubts the social science "proof' of diversity's value-an
acclaimed centerpiece of the Grutter Court's analysis because much of it
seems predetermined and exaggerated with litigation in mind.166 Taken together,
Kennedy's examination exposes the bifurcated nature of the Grutter Court's
analysis: (1) the pursuit of a "critical mass" of minority students, which is seen
by opponents of this policy as a quota, and which can be seen by supporters and
opponents as a disingenuous pursuit of racial equality sparked by an ostensible
attempt to remedy the nation's practice of racial subordination; and (2) the
emergence of diversity as a goal that remains defendable largely due to judicial
deference to an academic institution's pursuit of elite status, a move that is
fostered by wrapping the policy objective of institutional selectivity in the
language of the First Amendment, which legitimates the institutional quest for

159. Id. at 23.
160. KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 98.
161. Id. at 102 (citing Kingsley Brown, Affirmative Action: Policy Making By Deception, 22
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1291, 1291 (1996)).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 103.
165. Id. (citing Samuel Issacharoff, Law and Misdirection in the Debate Over Affirmative
Action, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 11, 18 (2002)).
166. Id.
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internal goals such as a robust exchange of ideas made tangible via increased
human sympathy and cross-racial understanding.1 67
Setting aside the correctness, honesty, and bifurcated nature of Grutter; the
possible disingenuousness of its diversity rationale; and the gnawing rejoinders
by Professors Estreicher, Lund, and Kennedy, it is worth noting that two
significant things have occurred since Grutter. First, in a subsequent and highly
fractured opinion, the Supreme Court held that when public elementary and
secondary schools develop racial classification plans directed toward the
achievement of racial balance, this objective is illegitimate and cannot be
defended by the educational and social benefits that flow from racial diversity
standing outside the notion of individualized treatment. 16 Second, echoing
successful anti-affirmative action ballot measures in a number of states,1 69and as
part of the continuation of a long-running battle,17 0 the citizens of Michigan
countered the Grutter Court's opinion by proposing a state-wide ban on racial
preferences in university admissions.
The proposal passed by a margin of
58% to 42% and took effect in December 2006.172 As a consequence of this
move, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action v. Regents of University of Michigan, considered whether the referendum
violated the Equal Protection Clause's guarantee that all citizens ought to have
equal access to the tools of political change.1 73 As enacted, "Proposal 2"174
banned precisely what the Supreme Court found permissible, but declined to
mandate in Grutter. Proposal 2 abolished consideration of race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in individualized admissions decisions, 1 thereby
constraining the discretion of university admissions officers at the state's three
leading public schools of higher education. Since outright quotas or racial
balancing had already been outlawed by the Supreme Court, the enactment of
Proposal 2 disallowed race-conscious decision making, including decision
making tied to diversity as an admissions criterion.176
Responding to this move, the Sixth Circuit invalidated Michigan's
constitutional amendment. The court relied on Washington v. Seattle School
District No. 1177 for the proposition that the "Equal Protection Clause

167. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003); KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 103-04.
168. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 726 (2007).
169. Darrell D. Jackson & Michele S. Moses, Understanding Public Perceptions of
Affirmative Action, 22 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205, 231 (2013) (listing successful anti-affirmative
action ballot initiatives in Arizona, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and California).
170. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466,
470 (6th Cir. 2012).
171. Id. at 471 (citing Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, 501 F.3d 584, 586 (6th Cir.
2007)).
172. Regents, 701 F.3d at 471.
173. Id. at 470.
174. Id. at 471.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 479.
177. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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'guarantees racial minorities the right to full participation in the political life of
the community. It is beyond dispute ... that given racial or ethnic groups may
not be denied the franchise, or precluded from entering into the political process
in a reliable and meaningful manner.'" 7 s The sole issue before the court was
whether Proposal 2 violates "the constitutional guarantee of equal protection by
removing the power of university officials to even consider using race as a factor
in admissions decisions."1 79 Offering a hypothetical that compared the plight of
an applicant pursuing legacy preference admission into one of Michigan's
esteemed public universities to the plight of a black student seeking a similar
advantage based on race, the Regents court advanced the following syllogism.s0
First, it stated that a student endeavoring to transform her family's alumni
connections into a legacy conscious preference "could lobby the admission
committee,

...

petition

the [school's]

leadership,

...

seek

to influence the

school's governing board, or . .. initiate a state-wide campaign to alter the state's
constitution."
On the other hand, a black student who pursued a raceconscious preference would have to engage in an arduous, lengthy, and
expensive process to amend Michigan's constitution. 8 2 Stated another way,
while the Grutter Court was consumed by the question of whether it was
permissible to allow the University of Michigan's Law School to grant
preferences as part of its pursuit of both elite status and a robust exchange of
ideas, the Sixth Circuit in Regents was animated by a black student's inability to
lobby for a racial preference.18 Given this rather dramatic difference in focus,
the Sixth Circuit found that Proposal 2 placed a distinct comparative structural
burden on black students that "undermine[d] the Equal Protection Clause's
guarantee that all citizens ought to have equal access to the tools of political
change." 84 The court accordingly reversed the judgment of the district court and
found Michigan's Proposal 2 unconstitutional
because the proposal required
minorities to surmount more formidable obstacles than those faced by other
groups.186 Further, the Court of Appeals established two necessary predicates for
its holding: first, it found that Proposal 2 had a racial focus because the state
constitutional amendment would deny benefits that primarily inure to the
advantage of minorities;8 7 and second, the court determined that, as a
consequence of the proposal, racial minorities would face obstacles in their

178. Regents, 701 F.3d at 474 (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457,
467 (1982)).
179. Id. at 473.
180. Id. at 470.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 485.
187. Id. at 478-79 (citing Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472, 474
(1982)).
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endeavor to procure beneficial legislation in the form of race-conscious
admissions,
a move that effectively reordered the state's political process in a
way that disadvantaged racial minorities.189
In order to find the first predicate, the Regents court engaged in analysis to
determine whether diversity, as allowed by the Supreme Court in Grutter, inures
primarily to the benefit of racial minorities.' 90 The Sixth Circuit was satisfied to
find that minorities may consider the repealed policy legislation to be in their
interest.' 9' This less than clear statement seems to make two additional
assumptions: first, a monolithic response to race-based action by minority group
members that implicates Kim Forde-Mazrui's understanding of racial
essentialism;192 and second, that in order to find the initial predicate-that the
race-conscious decision making engaged in by Michigan's universities inures
necessarily and primarily to the benefit of minorities-the court rejected what
the Supreme Court made clear in Grutter.193 The Grutter Court accepted the
contested admissions process on grounds that the school's policy provided
benefits that inured predominantly to the overall educational process,194 as
opposed to finding that the program benefited members of racial minority
groups. 1 95 Whether the Supreme Court's approach is an example of racial
exceptionalisml96 despite the bifurcated nature of its opinion, as suggested
elsewhere, the Grutter Court preserves affirmative action on cosmopolitan
grounds1 97 by declining to locate or even to require adducible evidence of the
institution's participation in racially discriminatory conduct, a finding that could
otherwise justify affirmative action as a remedy.' 98 In addition, the Grutter
Court refused to require the University of Michigan Law School to demonstrate
that members of minority groups are the primary beneficiaries of the state
policy.' 99 Stated differently, rather than offering a rationale that might legitimize
the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy as a form of
remedial justice tied to the state of Michigan's dreadful history in educating

188. Id. at 488.
189. Id. at 485.
190. Id. at 479 (citing Washington, 458 U.S. at 472).
191. Id. at 479 (quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 474).
192. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Learning Through the Lens of Race, 21 J.L. & POL. 1, 4 (2005)
(stating the tendency to overemphasize the relevance of race to the merits of law or policy, which
means that a law or policy's merits stand or fall on its racial implications regardless of its value in
serving other purposes).
193. Regents, 701 F.3d at 478-79 (quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 474).
194. See Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox, supra note 50, at 1081.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Forde-Mazrui, supra note 192, at 4 (describing racial exceptionalism as the
tendency of some to minimize the relevance of race to the merits of the law, doctrine, or policy by
viewing the law's relationship to race as aberrational).
197. See Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox, supra note 50, at 1081.
198. See id.
199. See id.
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200

African Americans,
or alternatively, taking up the challenge laid down by Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. and reminding the nation of its unpaid debt to African
201
202
Americans,
the Supreme Court's approach inverts this focus and tolerates
race-conscious admission largely because it provides direct benefits to the
institution itself. By contrast, in Regents, the Sixth Circuit Court found plausible
evidence of discrimination in the passage of Proposal 2 and accordingly
invalidated the referendum as a specific, if contestable, remedy for
discrimination that damaged African Americans' ability to pursue beneficial
203
policies.
In other words, discovering the need for remediation, the Sixth
Circuit found what the Supreme Court maintains is absolutely unnecessary
actual discrimination which seems to be a distinction that is more than a
distinction without a difference, particularly for those interested in racial
204
justice.
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit did not have the last word. In the fall of
2013, the Supreme Court heard arguments, and in the spring of 2014, the Court
205
issued its opinion reversing the Sixth Circuit.
The Supreme Court upheld
Proposal 2, now article I section 26 of the state constitution, which prohibits the
use of race-based preferences as part of the admissions process for state
206
universities.
Specifically, the Court held that "[t]his case is not about how the
debate about racial preferences should be resolved. It is about who may resolve
it."207 Finding "no authority in the Constitution of the United States or in this
Court's precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit this
policy determination to the voters," the Schuette Court determined that
"[d]emocracy does not presume that some subjects are either too divisive or too
profound for public debate." 208
Although this decision may disappoint
affirmative action proponents, rightly cognized, the Court neither changed the
rules of the game in the arena of racial preferences nor reexamined the merits of
race-conscious admissions, which means that "the Constitution permits, though
it does not require, the use of the kind of race-conscious programs that are now
barred by the Michigan Constitution." 209 The Court did "not address the
amendment insofar as it forbids the use of race-conscious admissions programs

200. Id. at 1086.
201. See, e.g., Jackson & Moses, supra note 169, at 231 ("King's [speech begins by
suggesting that] America still owes African Americans a debt a debt based upon a bad check
issued by America's founding fathers. King clearly dreams of the day when skin color will not
matter but states that America still has reparations to make to African Americans.").
202. Bernstein, supra note 151, at 212.
203. See Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d
466, 470 (6th Cir. 2012).
204. See id. (suggesting that actual discrimination is found in Proposal 2 and undermines
Equal Protection).
205. Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014).
206. See id. at 1629 (citing MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26).
207. Id. at 1638.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1649 (Breyer, J., concurring).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

25

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5
144

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 66: 119

designed to remedy past exclusionary racial discrimination or the direct effects
of that discrimination." 210

At the end of the day, race-conscious admissions are still permissible
pursuant to Supreme Court precedents. This means that Grutter is still the last
word on the viability of affirmative action in states that allow racial
211
preferences,
signifying that universities must still comply with strict scrutiny
when using race for purposes of admissions.212
Taken as a whole, the leading cases in responding to race-conscious decision
making by legislators, administrators, or others reveal the courts' wide-rangin
if inconsistent, appreciation for the language of the Equal Protection Clause.
At times offering decisions that mirror federal and state government volatility on
issues of race, and at other times representing conflicting conclusions arising
from somewhat similar facts, the courts-in particular the Supreme Court
appear to be a consistent source of puzzlement, if not duplicity, rather than a
venue that reliably safeguards rights for individuals and members of various
groups that have faced deprivation as a result of the nation's practice of enforced
214
subjugation.
III. THE COSMOS, UNIVERSALITY, AND DIVERSITY

Before scanning Mismatch, it is helpful to specify cosmopolitanism,
universality, and diversity. This specification will not be comprehensive.
Instead, it will serve as a frail plinth on which to later examine diversity more
closely and to consider whether diversity can sufficiently justify the affirmative
action policies that Sander and Taylor dispute. Recall Justice Powell's deduction
that affirmative action complies with the mandate of strict scrutiny by offering a
compelling interest, diversity,215 which is an interest that has become virtually
unassailable through its linkage to academic freedom. Diversity is, of course, a
multi-dimensional and difficult to define concept. Before sketching the concept

210. Id.
211. Id. at 1630 (stating that its decision in Fisher did not disturb the principle that the
consideration of race in admissions is permissible provided certain conditions are met).

212. See, e.g., Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013) (stating that
the Court of Appeals did not hold the University of Texas at Austin to the strict scrutiny burden
when considering race in the admissions process).

213. Compare Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (holding that a Michigan
undergraduate university violated the Equal Protection Clause by considering race as a factor for

admission), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that the University of
Michigan Law School did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by considering limited race-based
preferences in their admissions decisions).

214. Cf Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1654 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (commenting on
our Nation's regrettable history towards the political and judicial treatment of minorities and
voicing her disapproval of the plurality's refusal to accept guarantees put forth in the Equal
Protection Clause).

215. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss1/5

26

Hutchinson: Affirmative Action: Between the Oikos and Cosmos Review Essay: Ri
BETWEEN THE OIKOS AND THE COSMOS

2014]

145

of diversity more directly, it is useful to briefly plumb the endless depths of
cosmopolitanism.
A.

Cosmopolitanism's UniversalizingImpulse in the Mirror ofDiversity

Bruce Ackerman, in tackling the conflicts that infected Europe during the
early 1990s, stated "[i]f I were [a] European right now, I hope I would have the
guts to stand up for rootless cosmopolitanism: forget this nationalistic claptrap,
and let us build a world worthy of free and equal human beings."216 Since
building a "world worthy of free and equal human beings" has an eye of the
beholder quality, it is possible that Ackerman's form of liberalism correlates
with despotism enabling elites to impose a single vision of the good on everyone
else.217 Putting Ackerman's idealism and bluntness aside, cosmopolitanism does
218
not submit to easy categorization.
In the context of this Article, it is only
possible to provide an overview, one that hints at a range of views regarding
citizens' presumably cosmopolitan future.
Mihaela Czobor-Lupp's work
provides a reasonable place to start. Czobor-Lupp's orientation, as threnodic as
it is analytic, builds on the work of Habermas and Herder as she accepts the
necessity of cultural pluralism without abandoning belief in the unity of reason,
and without allowing the universality of reason to degenerate into
imperialism.219 On this view of the cathedral, the unity of reason is seen as
being "perceptible only in the diversity of its voices,"22 a claim that may yet

have to deal with the distinct possibility that "humans are as numinous and
fugitive as those that appear in [the] forest shade." 22 1 From this foundation, it is
possible to argue that political norms and principles, and even our conception of
patriotism and citizenship, "can be shaped through . .. reflective and deliberate
engagement of aesthetic creativity and imagination." 222 This account posits that
national communities and cultures are not homogenous, but ever-changing,
"constructing humanity out of the plurality of mankind's forms of life." 223 From
this perspective, "nations are first defined by mythology 'a philosophical essay

216. Bruce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, 104 ETHICS 516, 534 (1994).
217. But see DELSOL, supra note 1, at 7 ("Why, therefore should one oppose this beautiful and
generous idea, that of cosmopolitan justice? It should be opposed because it undermines politics
and, more generally, human diversity, both of which must be preserved.").
218. See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF
STRANGERS

xiii (2006).

219. Mihaela Czobor-Lupp, Herder on Aesthetic Imagination as a Source of Post-National
Democractic Solidarity:A Contribution to Habermas' ConstitutionalPatriotism 3 (Aug. 10, 2010)
(working paper), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656645.
220. Id. at 6.
221. GRAY, SILENCE OF THE ANIMALS, supra note 20, at 174.
222. Czobor-Lupp, supra note 219, at 2.
223. Id. at 8.
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of the human mind, which dreams before it is awake."' 224 Reason is thus
intertwined with narrative imagination, and through narrative imagination and
language, following Anthony Appiah, we can guide one another in the
cosmopolitan spirit to shared responses that climax in the possibility of
redrawing and expanding our horizons of understanding.225 Prescinding from
formulating a definitive choice between the universal and the particular aspects
of human life, 226 despite much evidence that the universal trumps all, 227 and

refraining from the corpus of religious and historical truth,228 the aesthetic
imagination as a source of post-national democratic solidarity furnishes us with
the materials to construct a global culture.229 The richness of an individual's
place in this transformed society relies on the communicative and coordinating
strength of one's reason, which depends on the creativity and interactivity of
one's imagination. 23 0 That is, "it depends on one's poetic capacity to create and
share images, symbols, and stories that enhance [one's ability] to understand
and, thus, [give rise to] the power to make and transform oneself." 231 Since the
"imaginative capacity to create language is constitutive to the act of self-making
and self-transformation, as well as the act of communicating with others" and
232
with one's inner self and ideas,
then in this multidimensional process that may
mimic Justice Powell's elevation of the robust exchange of ideas, it follows that
as people share more stories in ways that widen their sense and sympathy for
humanity as a whole, they deepen their sense of solidarity and loyalty to the
constitution they create without roots.23 Despite such cosmopolitan appeals to
234
universal norms23 and the corresponding pursuit of universal goods, and
notwithstanding continuing ambiguity about the meaning of cosmopolitanism
itself, it may be possible to argue that some forms of diversity aid this
transformative endeavor that is constant with Czobor-Lupp's suggestion that the
process of building solidarity and sympathy arises among people belonging to

224. Id. at 16 (citing JOHANN GOTTFRIED VON HERDER, Ideas for a Philosophy of the History
of Mankind, Book VIII, in J.G. HERDER ON SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CULTURE 300 (F. M. Barnard
ed. & trans. 2002)).
225. Id. at 13 (citing APPIAH, supranote 218, at 30).
226. Id at 11 (citing SANKAR MuTHu, ENLIGHTENMENT AGAINST EMPIRE 212 (2003)).
227. See, e.g., DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 215

(describing Martha Nussbaum's view, which apparently gives rise to a universal conception of
justice).
228. Czobor-Lupp, supra note 219, at 15.
229. See id. at 28.
230. Id. at 13.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 14.
234. See, e.g., DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 214-15
(describing David Hollinger and Nussbaum's views that appear to culminate in appeals to universal
norms).
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235

different national spaces.
However, deciding which forms of diversity are
justifiable is nonetheless problematic.
Examined more closely, the concept of diversity, which has produced an
anaphora of rhetoric, "is itself remarkably diverse-and dynamic. Like a
blastula of cells undergoing mitosis, American society constantly proliferates
new divisions and differentiations."23 6 Equally true, diversity, in its various
forms, cradles the dispute between those committed to the certainty supplied by
a cosmopolitan future wherein humankind flourishes under the reign of the Good
and True,237 and those commentators who assert the primacy of the oikos, a
viewpoint that neither perceives the world from a single perspective238 nor sees
progress as inevitable. Within this fissiparous arena, diversity239 appears to
survive as a resilient goal that functions as a lively and, unmoored component of
the new cosmopolitanism.240 At the same time, Deneen illuminates diversity as a
linguistic device that separates individuals into various group identities in pursuit
of recognition, acceptance, 24' and perhaps reparations,
a process that some
may see as more consistent with rectification, but one which some cosmopolitans
appreciate as nothing more than a simple fact.243 It appears that the deployment
of diversity on reparative grounds, for instance, enables this concept to function
very much like pluralism and to privilege already established groups.244 On this
view, diversity as a source of privilege, whether justified or not, operates in

235. Czobor-Lupp, supra note 219, at 15 (citing Craig Calhoun, ConstitutionalPatriotism and
the Public Sphere: Interests, Identity, and Solidarity in the Integration of Europe 18 INT'L J. POL.,
CULTURE, & Soc'Y 257, 258 (2005)).
236. PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA 3 (2003).
237. DELSOL, supra note 1, at 65.
238. Id.
239. Diversity, like cosmopolitanism, is difficult to define and keep separate from pluralism
and multiculturalism. See, e.g., DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at
214 (contrasting universalism, multiculturalism, pluralism, and cosmopolitanism, and suggesting
that universalists seek to find a common ground, multiculturalists would be inclined to find only
differences, cosmopolitans appreciate diversity and accept differing identities, and pluralists view
people primarily through their group identity).
240. See LARRY ALEXANDER, Is THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 169 (2005)
(noting that this "conception of liberalism admits to being itself a way of life," with "a diversity of
religions, associations, occupations, ideas, and so forth . . from which to choose").
241. See DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 214 (discussing the
ability of multiracial people to belong to and choose between differing racial identities).
242. See ROY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK
REPARATIONS 2-3 (2006) (citing PHILIP B. KUNHARDT, JR. ET AL., THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT 28
(1999)) (describing the two basic arguments of the black redress movement as (1) the quest for
redress tied to slavery and the slave-like conditions under which free blacks lived, which is
animated to recapture reparations for the loss of life and liberty (basic capital) as well as financial,
human, and social capital; and (2) the pursuit of redress because Jim Crow forced the descendants
of black slaves into the worst jobs, housing, and educational systems and thereby produced
consequences that remain today). Evidently, redress could be comprised of compensation through
the tort model or apology under the atonement model. Id. at 1.
243. DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 214.
244. Id. (citing DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC AMERICA 85 (1995)).
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contrast to an alternative, universalist245 view that sees diversity as simply a
component but not necessarily a determinative one-of the cosmopolitan
pursuit of human transcendence that can be attained through volition as
individuals and groups give their first allegiance to the moral community made
up by the humanity of all mankind.246 From this more universalist conception of
cosmopolitanism, which is tied inescapably to a capacious conception of the
Enlightenment sentiment, human volition gives rise to the contention that
humans possess a shared rationality that surfaces in the form of universal
morality.247 Forms of universal morality appear to be available in unconstrained
versions of Kantian logic,248 the French2 0"Declaration of the Rights of Man and

'

thought 1
Citizen,"
Marxist-Leninist thoughto,
or any other theory seeking the
improvement and limitless perfection of humans. 25
Although cosmopolitanism, in its many versions, may prioritize the
252
universal as a device that produces unity over the particular,
a move that
perhaps gives rise to a form of diversity without roots, or alternatively may
acknowledge the multiculturalists' pursuit of individual transcendence that
elevates identity in the form of race, ethnicity, or gender,253 it seems clear that
many cosmopolitan commentators view diversity as more of a disquieting
254
Cosmopolitanists appear reluctant to acknowledge that
problem than a fact.
the pursuit of unity may reflect a deep-seated desire that is potentially violent.255
Despite deep differences in cosmopolitan views, it appears that diversity's
interaction with the universal has coalesced around a few cosmopolitan
256
principles.
First, there is the cosmopolitan preference for universality that
eventually surfaces in the contention that humans ought to choose to transcend
the limitations of locality and place of birth.257 Second, it appears that
cosmopolitans "exhibit a confidence in science and technology to conquer
natural challenges to human penury and to break down physical barriers

245. Id.
246. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY supra note 29,
at 7.
247. See DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 217 (interpreting
Nussbaum).
248. DELSOL, supra note 1, at 9-15 (citations omitted) (distinguishing Kant's views favoring a
federation of states from an insistence on a cosmopolitan constitution that seeks universal peace,
which initiates and legitimizes despotism through Habermas's conception of cosmopolitan
democracy, one with a world parliament).
249. DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 7.
250. Id. at 6 (describing Marxism as historically aligned with universal truths).
251. See id. at 7 (describing other philosophers' theories regarding human perfection).

252. See id. at 214.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. DELSOL, supra note 1, at 62 (suggesting that this kind of "Promentheanism revealed itself
in the perversion of the Enlightenment thought found [in] the French Revolution").
256. See DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY, supranote 44, at 217.

257. Id.
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separating humans and a belief in progress, not only in the ability of science to
ameliorate humanity's material and political condition but also in its moral
capacities.258 Third, diversity, as a source of unease among some cosmopolitan
commentators, can be limited by the presumption that deep differences
whether racial, religious, or ideological-are, or at least, ought to be, trivial as
part of liberalism's prolepsis: the instantiation of a new way of life 25 9 that
reflects the global tribe we have or ought to become.260 It is this latter sense of
cosmopolitanism that this Article primarily deploys, but not always, for the
purposes of reviewing Mismatch. Given this framework, the question becomes
whether diversity, even if backed by social science data as a component of
cosmopolitanism, can successfully transform one's life 261 or withstand
constitutional scrutiny. Alternatively put, can diversity without roots and
proffered as a protean defense of affirmative action be reconciled with a thick
conception of cosmopolitanism beyond its rather obvious instrumental value in
making the case for citizenship of the world? Rather, does diversity without
roots find its defense in the oikos?
IV. THE OIKOS

Arguably defined by its opponents as nothing more than "nationalism" and
by its supporters more positively as "communitarianism" or "patriotism," the
262
oikos is largely about homecoming.
According to Deneen's account, the
Odyssey is an apt metaphor for the profound tension that lies between the
attractions of homecoming and the mysteries of the unknown, between
patriotism and cosmopolitanism.263 After all, Odysseus "is, in one guise, the
universal man wandering the world and encountering the varieties of gods,
beasts, and mankind above and below the earth.264 In his other guise, Odysseus
is the particularman: he is king, father, husband, son; his longing to return to the
tiny kingdom of Ithaca, his home, is the paramount goal that fuels the action of
the Odyssey." 265 Though the Odyssey may seem very far from contemporary
debates on affirmative action, diversity, and the accompanying dispute about the
capacity of social science to ease progress and to end debate on contested issues,
based on Deneen's telling, Homer's poem is at the center of the contest between
cosmopolitans like Martha Nussbaum and defenders of more local allegiances

258. Id. (footnote omitted).
259. See ALEXANDER, supra note 240, at 169.
260. APPIAH, supra note 218, at xiii.
261. See generally DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 211-18

(citations omitted) (discussing the difficulty of applying cosmopolitanism and other philosophies in
race and identity).
262. Id. at 218-19.
263. Id. at 219.
264. Id. at 13.
265. Id.
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like Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer.266 Defenders of the oikos, responding
to the seemingly unlimited recommendation of choice posed by the immoderate
267
Enlightenment position,
have argued for the very "'situatedness' of
individuals and on behalf of boundaries in politics and restraint on the seemingly
limitless capacity for optimism in progress."2 6 8 While cosmopolitans contend
that each of us is "born involuntarily as a citizen of a particular place,

. .

. our

more fundamental commonality demands that we devote our [energies] to
humanity at large."

269

Defenders

of the oikos respond by arguing that
270i

cosmopolitanism is not a real possibility for limited human beings.
It is into
this gulf that this Article hopes to situate Mismatch, affirmative action, and its
accompanying diversity rationale. This process is advanced by considering the
notion of academic freedom.
V.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND DIVERSITY?

Although it is clearly possible that academic freedom at public universities
cannot be derived from the First Amendment, 27' a claim that ultimately
destabilizes the diversity rationale, the Grutter Court, accepting Justice Powell's
analysis, stresses that academic freedom is grounded in the First Amendment.272
This observation inevitably elevates educational autonomy, including a
university's right to make its own udgments on its education practices such as
the selection of its student body.2
As specified by the Court, a university's
educational mission is advanced through the selection of students "who will
contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas"' 274 and, hence, enhance
humanity at large. A robust exchange, so the hopeful argument goes, flows from
a diverse student body, which thereby ensures "that public institutions are open

266. Id. at 14.
267. See DELSOL, supra note 1, at 34-36, 62 (suggesting a contrast between the thoughts of
Montesquieu, a defender of pluralism, tolerance, and the ability to think for one's self, as a
moderate form of the Enlightenment on the one hand, and the universalizing impulses of Condorcet,
who sought the pursuit of uniformization on the other; and further suggesting that the
Enlightenment in some of it various immoderate variations is, in reality, a perversion of
Enlightenment thought found at the time of the French Revolution).
268. DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 15 (citing SANDEL,
supra note 44; ELSHTAIN, REAL POLITICS, supra note 45; ELSHTAIN, AUGUSTINE, supra note 45;
LASCH, HEAVEN supra note 45; LASCH, REVOLT, supra note 45).

269. Id. (citing Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY,
supra note 29, at 14).
270. Id.
271. See Larry Alexander, Academic Freedom, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006)
[hereinafter Alexander, Academic Freedom].
272. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)).
273. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312).
274. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313).
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and available to all segments of American society," 275 a move that may
simultaneously expand the boundaries of human sympathy276 and protect the
277
institution's pursuit of elite status.
Although it seems clear that a diverse student body cannot guarantee that a
university will actually create educational benefits for such a grouping of
students, academic freedom as a constitutional concept originated in a
concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.278
Although there is reason to doubt that Justice Frankfurter thought about the
Constitution's ban on racial discrimination,279 he contends that a free society
depends on free universities. This conclusion apparently "warrants the exclusion
of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university." 28 0 Surely
such a broad and deferential approach, resting as it does on an ill-defined
2811
tradition of academic freedom,
could neither preclude the Supreme Court from
preventing invidious discrimination on the basis of race28 2 nor bar judicial
intervention when a state university mandates the denial of the Holocaust by
newly admitted students. 283 The question becomes whether the courts should be
excluded from intervening when and if academic freedom, in the form of a
robust exchange of ideas, is advanced by a critical mass of students who were
selected, at least in part, because of race. Alternatively, is academic freedom
skeptically seen as "the freedom to believe anything at all, provided you feel
better for it" 284 merely a convenient evasion that grants extensive deference to
the university for instrumental reasons that facilitate the avoidance of justice
based approaches, including rectification? 285 Examining the persistence of

275. Id. at 331-332 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 16, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241)).
276. See id. at 330 (adverting to diversity's contribution to improved cross-racial
understanding and more enlightening classroom discussions).
277. See id. at 331 (quoting Brief for Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 29, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241)) (evidently
accepting an institution's pursuit of selectivity as a constitutionally permissible goal).
278. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 256-67 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
279. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("I doubt
that when Justice Frankfurter spoke of governmental intrusions into independence of universities,
he was thinking of the Constitution's ban on racial discrimination.").
280. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
281. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 362-64 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(citations omitted) (explaining that Justice Powell's conception of academic freedom rests on only
two Supreme Court cases and apparently provides no answer to the question of whether the
Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions are relaxed when applied to public universities).
282. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma S. Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 638 (1950) (finding the
state's differential treatment of a black graduate student impermissible).
283. See, e.g., Kenneth Lasson, Holocaust Denial and the FirstAmendment: The Quest for
Truth in a Free Society, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 35, 85 (1997) (arguing that, even under the First
Amendment, demonstrably false ideas can be prohibited).
284. ROGER SCRUTON, THE USES OF PESSIMISM 5 (2010).
285. See Anita Bernstein, Diversity May Be Justified, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 252 (2012).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

33

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5
152

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 66: 119

gender inequality within the academy, scholar Scott Moss notes that "it is odd
that the academic deference doctrine has drawn such broad judicial adherence
yet so little judicial questioning. Courts treat it as generally accepted, even
though there are powerful arguments against it." 286
In a somewhat
complementary vein that moves analysis forward, Larry Alexander contends that
academic freedom facilitated by academic deference produces little actual
287
diversity.
Alexander states that:
the degree of political homogeneity in the academy is mind-boggling.
Usually, it seems to me that the same people who loudly extol the
virtues of diversity for the academy draw the line at the rather
superficial diversity markers of race, ethnicity, and gender and want to
have no truck with the more profound markers of diversity such as
politics and religion. The last thing these diversity proponents desire is
an actual diversity of views. Rather, they want people of different skin
tones who believe what they believe.288
This is an intuition that coheres with cosmopolitans' pursuit of unity, if not
unanimity, and may pave the way for realization of moral superiority.
Alexander's sharp critique of diversity as actually practiced in academia appears
congruous with the pursuit of institutional uniformity, an occurrence that is
steadfast with cosmopolitanism's universalizing impulse and may operate to
limit the ideas that can actually be exchanged within academia, thus diminishing
rather than advancing academic freedom. Even diversity defenders are troubled
289
by the notion that academic freedom actually produces real diversity.
Defending diversity, Professor Anita Bernstein, tracking Justice Powell's
analysis in Bakke, accepts his claim that "[b]ecause dialogue produced by a
diverse student body relates closely to what institutions teach even when it takes
place outside the classroom . .. choosing diversity in admissions is also a matter
of academic freedom, 'a special concern of the First Amendment."'

290

Still,

Bernstein admits that "[m]any empirical claims about diversity though by no
means all [claims]-rest on a shaky foundation," an assertion that is reinforced

&

286. Scott A. Moss, Against "Academic Deference": How Recent Developments in
Employment DiscriminationLaw Undercut an Already Dubious Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP.
LAB. L. 1, 21 (2006). Moss asserts that deference is inappropriate because defendant universities
rely on self-interested testimony and utilize subjective reasoning that may reflect unconscious
discrimination, while ignoring the persistence of gender segregation in the academia, a trend
compounded by virtue of the inability of social norms to police academic labor markets. See id. at
10-20 (citations omitted).
287. See Alexander, Academic Freedom, supra note 271, at 889.
288. Id. (footnote omitted).
289. See Bernstein, supra note 285, at 220 (implying that at least some empirical claims about
diversity are justified).
290. Id. at 210 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)).
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by the likely presence of self-selection bias. 29' Bernstein therefore concludes
that "[e]mpirical claims about the benefits of diversity might be accurate, but
they have also begged questions, confused correlation with causation, and rested
on dubious methodologies and insufficient precision." 292
As a practical and historical matter, the notion of "academic freedom
originally derives from Catholic tradition" rather than from the First
Amendment.293 Evidently, academic freedom
has been defended in recent times by both Pope John Paul II and
Benedict XVI. But both articulated a defense of academic freedom in
the context of also asserting the truth of Christianity and that academic
freedom was necessarily limited to efforts to better understand and
articulate the truth of Faith.294
Against the notion that both academic freedom and freedom as a whole are
only possible in light of that truth, including the truth of the human person, and
favoring a contentless freedom that reflects a subjective basis for morality, John
Stuart Mill altered the Western conception of academic freedom.295 "Freedom of
inquiry (including academic freedom) was justified, [Mill] argued, in order to
liberate humans from the dead hand of the past. What governed most human
affairs was mere Custom; what the liberation from custom and tradition through
free inquiry would entail was the unleashing of Progress."

296

Progress, on this

account, was found in the liberation to engage in a multiplicity of "experiments
in living," which is conducive to the liberation of the people from societal norms
in favor of "individuality." 297 This cosmopolitan maneuver can be seen as part
of an explicit obligation to foster an open and vigorous marketplace of ideas,
which, on Professor Lasson's account, enables universities to stray from truth or
even the pursuit of truth.298 When universities stray from truth, this may impair
the detection of provable evidence showing rectifiable injury, 299 a move that
likely advances privilege and expands opportunities for subjugation.

291. Id. at 220 (citing Stanley Rothman et al., Does EnrollmentDiversity Improve Education?,
15 INT'L J. PUB. OP. 8, 8 (2003)) (showing that researchers cannot readily distinguish between

causes and effects because those individuals open to engagement, creative thinking, and learning
from new people may have opted to seek admission to environments that offer what they prefer).
292. Id. at 252.
293. Patrick J. Deneen, What's Wrong with Academic Freedom?, THE AMERICAN
CONSERVATIVE 2 (Mar. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Deneen, Academic Freedom], available at
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/academicfreedom/?print= 1.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See Lasson, supra note 283, at 85-86 (referencing Holocaust deniers within a university
setting).
299. See id.
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Taking these sundry claims as a whole, it is possible to deduce that
contemporary conceptions of academic freedom and their jurisprudential
corollary academic deference may support "experimental thinking," forms of
cosmopolitan interchange, and universality favored by Czobor-Lupp that evolve
from constrained conceptions of diversity.3 00 It is possible that this move leads
to classroom uniformity, which Ackerman and other liberals crave. In addition,
contemporary conceptions of academic freedom may lack actual First
Amendment support,3 01 despite Justice Powell's claims to the contrary,302 while
failing to produce "academic freedom" as the pursuit of truth.303 The foregoing
examination, whether completely correct or not, says something about the
legitimacy of academic freedom and academic deference within the context of
American history and Supreme Court jurisprudence that patrols the boundaries
of affirmative action and racial preferences in this current epoch. The next
section supplies additional context.
VI. THE MISMATCH EFFECT

A.

Highly Contested Wrangle Redux

Various claims and contentions infect the affirmative action debate. In
response, commentators are provoked to plumb the complexities of race,
responsibility, remediation, and racial progress.304 Few observers doubt that the
concept and reality of race305 remain a persistent puzzle no matter how often
facts are recapitulated or how commonly the Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause is invoked. Presently, this debate inflects around a constellation of
divergent visions. "What is intellectually interesting about visions are their
assumptions and their reasoning, but what is socially crucial is the extent to
which they are resistant to evidence."306 Discussions regarding the verifiability
of empirical evidence give rise to doubt over whether the evidence matters more
than the suppositions and presuppositions tied to such discussions.307
Predisposition and inclination frequently precede evidence and, accordingly,
evidence alone is unlikely to produce consensus, although an agreed upon

300. See supra Part III.A.
301. Alexander, Academic Freedom, supra note 271, at 884.
302. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978).
303. See Alexander, Academic Freedom, supra note 271, at 884.
304. See supra Part IV.
305. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 1 (5th ed. 2004) (noting
consistent debate about the effects of racism, while implicitly accepting the existence of race); see
also supra Part IV.
306. THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANOINTED: SELF-CONGRATULATIONS AS A BASIS
FOR SOCIAL POLICY 7 (1995).
307. See SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 83-88 (discussing the dearth of accurate

empirical data that forms the basis of much of the affirmative action debate).
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consensus can certainly find evidence in support of its prevailing sentiment.30 8
Thus, it is deducible that modem society is poised for continuing conflict and
volatility despite the empirical tools that are at its disposal.3 09
Sander and Taylor, unvaryingly with the contemporary quest for
organizational predictability predicated on generalizations that ascend from the
manipulation of the tools of social science, 310 attempt to unscramble the dilemma
of affirmative action through various metrics. Based on data analysis, the
authors seek to reform and thus constrain the availability of preferences
premised on the intuition that reformation benefits minority group members by
enabling them to avoid the gap between their level of preparation and the
prevailing level of academic preparation within selective institutions of higher
learning. 1 On a preliminary level, the authors' focus on whether affirmative
action inures to the benefit of minorities is arguably consistent with the Sixth
Circuit Court's approach in Schuette and is incongruous with the approach
focused on institutional advancement taken by the Supreme Court in
Grutter.312
B. Sander and Taylor's Data Analysis and Central Claims
Sander and Taylor maintain that affirmative action, erected on the
foundation of the civil rights revolution and premised on the goal of social
mobility, promised to smooth the path of opportunity for all.313 The authors
argue that affirmative action was catalyzed by America's history of racial
discrimination and was initially calibrated as a backward looking remedy that
implied "'white racism' was the root cause of urban black riots." 314 Still, this

remedy "emphasized the importance of helping the disadvantaged in a raceneutral way." 315 Sander and Taylor insist that this remedial principle became the
initial driving force behind preference programs that spread briskly across
316
American higher education.
At its inauguration, individuals receiving racial
preference largely came from economically modest backgrounds or were the first
in their families to attend college.317 As applied, affirmative action expanded

308. See id. at 87.
309. See Epperson, supra note 19, at 490.
310. See generally MACINTYRE, supra note 57, at 88-102 (discussing the human search for
predictability through social science generalizations); see also Epperson, supra note 19, at 490
("Social science evidence has been used as a major tool in the litigation arsenal on both sides of the
[affirmative action divide].").
311. See SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 33-48.
312. See supra Part II.C.
313. SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 247.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 247-48.
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opportunities for previously disenfranchised individuals and groups,31 a move
that coheres with elementary notions of justice.
Today, Sander and Taylor perceive that the nation's affirmative action
approach has been altered, and not for the better.3 19 Relying on a wealth of
empirical analysis in support of such claims, and ignoring the tortured nature of
public dialogue about race in the country and the taboos associated with a frank
discussion of awkward statistical facts,320 the authors offer a straightforward
explanation for the current system's failings, building on Sander's prior
empirical work.32 1 Sander previously argued that the costs imposed on minority
students from the practice of affirmative action in the law school arena include
lower performance, increased struggles, higher attrition rates, lower bar passage
rates, and difficulties in the employment market.322 Consistent with this
perspective, "racial preferences produc[e] fewer black lawyers each year than
would be produced by a race-blind system." 323 The authors mourn the
possibility that affirmative action as currently practiced will encourage the
nation's future leaders to believe that blacks are slow learners and conclude that
for many black and Hispanic students, preference has proved to be a curse.324
The shortcomings of the current approach are illuminated by the mismatch
thesis, which opines that affirmative action as presently applied produces a
cascade effect that harms its beneficiaries by placing them in settings where they
often cannot compete academically.325 Briskly summarized, the authors contend
that minority students would benefit from placement in appropriate schools, that
is, schools and universities whose median standardized test and undergraduate
grade point average scores are closely matched with those of the applicant.326
The authors' data analysis indicates that the most elite colleges set racial
diversity goals and admit blacks with the highest academic indices, then continue
to use preferences as necessary to reach down into the pool of black students
327
until they achieve their admissions goals.
This maneuver by elite schools,

318. Id. at 247.
319. See id. at 248.
320. See id.
321. See generally Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American
Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004) (discussing the effects of affirmative action on law
schools).
322. Id. at 371-72.
323. Id. at 372.
324. SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 7 (quoting CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING
SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 63 (1992)).
325. Id. at 19-20.
326. Id. at 46 (suggesting that minority students who attended schools where their academic
index put them at or above the average freshman had an excellent experience, and that such well
matched students were about twice as likely as their ill-matched peers to sustain their plans to join
academia). But see Jackson & Moses, supra note 169, at 222-23 (explaining and contesting such
claims).
327. SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 19; see also id. at 21-24 (citations omitted)
(illustrating the process graphically).
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evidently defended as part of Grutter's approval of the pursuit of a "critical
mass" of minority students, is then followed by a "second tier of colleges that
start where their more elite competitors [have] le[ft] off." 328 However, the data

show that even the second tier schools' strongest black admittees will have
academic indices well below the white average.329 In order to avoid academic
index gaps that are too large, second tier schools end up admitting a smaller
proportion of blacks than do their counter-parts at the most elite schools. 330 This
process, part of the cascade effect, continues to third tier schools and so on down
the line, with an added challenge arising from the fact that the gap between
minority and nonminority students rises, at least as measured by academic
. * 331
indices.
After presenting data on the cascade effect, the authors further explicate
mismatch. Relying in part on the work of Dartmouth psychologists Rogers
Elliot and A. C. Strenta, Sander and Taylor explain why, for instance, leading
schools produce few black or American Indian scientists.332 Evidently, "poor
minority representation in science does not reflect these students' precollege
aspirations. 333 "As seniors in high school, blacks were somewhat more likely
than whites to report an interest in majoring in science, technology, engineering,
or math ... (collectively known as STEM)." 334 After experiencing high attrition
rates in elite schools, this interest waned. 335 "Blacks who entered these elite
schools pursuing STEM majors were only slightly more than half as likely as
whites to finish college with a STEM degree."336 These troubling results are
explained not by the absolute levels of academic preparation but by the relative
levels, meaning that the competition for talented minority students among
universities337 led to mediocre or bad grades and dampened student
aspirations.338
Sander and Taylor remark that affirmative action, often
correlating with large absolute preferences, is a counterproductive and self-

328. Id. at 19 ("The elite schools get their pick of the most academically qualified minorities,
most of whom might have been better matched at a lower-tier school. The second tier schools,
deprived of students who would have been good matches, must then in turn use preferences to
produce a representative student body, and so on down the line.").
329. Id.
330. Id. at 19-20; see also id. at 22 (illustrating the academic index gap between blacks and
nonblack students and median academic index by race).
331. Id. at 20 (showing that lower-ranking schools use larger and larger racial preferences).
332. Id. at 33. See generally Rogers Elliott et al., The Role of Ethnicity in Choosing and
Leaving Science in Highly Selective Institutions, 37 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 681 (1996) (discussing the
role of different standards of selection for black students on their success in science curricula).
333. SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 34.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See id. at 34-40.
338. Id. at 46 (citing STEPHEN COLE & ELINOR BARBER, INCREASING FACULTY DIVERSITY:
THE OCCUPATIONAL CHOICES OF HIGH-ACHIEVING MINORITY STUDENTS 10 1-02 (2003)).
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defeating policy.33 9
Linking their analysis with this claim, the authors
disentangle the mismatch problem by agreeing with scholars Cole and Barber
who encourage high school counselors to recommend that minority students
avoid going to the most prestigious school they can get into.340 In order to avoid
a lack of fit, such students should consider where they would likely do well
academically. 34 1 Contending that the central purpose of racial preferences is to
increase the presence of successful minorities in society, Sander and Taylor
emphasize that the practice of granting large racial preferences in admissions
essentially guarantees that many members of racial minorities will not perform
as well as they would have in less selective institutions, thus harming the
economic and social advances of racial minorities in the United States in a
342
number of ways.
The authors insist that if the mismatch effect were
eliminated, then the success rate for contemporary black law students, such as
the percent becoming lawyers, would increase from a baseline of forty-seven
percent to seventy percent. 343
Sander and Taylor intensify these various claims by inspecting the events
that occurred in California during the 1990s. 344

Following a tense national

conversation about the need to reform racial preferences because of the
"admitted disadvantages of preferences, such as stigma for the beneficiaries,
unfairness to whites and (increasingly) Asians, and the general departure from
race-neutral ideals," the Board of Regents of the University of California (UC)
345
voted to end racial and gender preferences in 1995.
This decision was
followed by the adoption of Proposition 209 by California's voters in 1996,346 a
referendum that affirmed and extended the preference ban to all state
programs. 347
After Proposition 209 was enacted, race-blind admissions
commenced during the 1997-98 season and the authors report that, rather than
producing a reduction in minority applicants, applications from blacks and
Hispanic rose.348 This observation allows the authors to conclude that the
elimination of preference did not chill the interest of minorities in attending the
UC system. 349 The authors highlight the fact that "the so-called yield rate-the
rate at which blacks and Hispanic accepted offers of admission from the various

339. See id. at 4.
340. Id. at 47 (quoting COLE & BARBER, supra note 338, at 249).
341. Id. (quoting COLE & BARBER, supra note 338, at 249).
342. See id. at 3-7, 33-48 (citations omitted) (suggesting that the main victims of large racial
preferences are not whites and Asians who get passed over, but the many blacks and Hispanics who
receive preferences and perform poorly).
343. Id. at 61.
344. Id. at 115.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 115.
347. Id. at 115.
348. Id. at 132-33.
349. Id. at 134.
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UC schools rose,"3 50 and contend that minority applicants now believe the likely
long-term benefit of attaining a colle~e degree has soared because it is untainted
by any affirmative action stigma.35
As Part VII shows, such claims have
provoked an intense reaction.
VII. ANALYZING MISMATCH: A PRELIMINARY REVIEW

In Part VII, the following analysis is offered (1) an analysis of the
introductory section of Mismatch; (2) a response to Sander and Taylor's
dependence on empirical analysis as well as the analysis offered by their critics;
(3) a consideration of the question regarding who benefits from affirmative
action as currently practiced; and (4) Sander and Taylor's recommended reforms
are set forth.
A.

Assessing the Major Themes of Sander and Taylor's Introduction to
Mismatch

It is beyond dispute that Sander and Taylor's various claims implicate race,
racialization, and status as well as issues of socio-economic disadvantage. 353 It
is possible that these issues have evolved, at least in part, through the process of
modem social and cultural construction.354 Although the contention that all
categories are merely socially constructed gives rise to the observation that the
concept of social construction is simply a dead end,355 it is argued that the
progression of race and racial construction has been an important part of
356
humankind's quest for social rank.
Against this backdrop, it is noticeable that
Sander and Taylor's introduction, while largely accurate in some of its
reflections, remains deficient in others.
First, the authors suggest that affirmative action, in its many guises, is driven
by an academic performance gap as measured by standardized testing that
disfavors racial minorities.357 Randall Kennedy agrees, stating that "[t]he bad
news is that racial minorities typically eligible
for affirmative

350. Id.
351. See id. at 140-141.
352. See infra Part VII.B.
353. See generally SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30 (discussing race, racialization, status,
and issues of socio-economic disadvantage in relation to the affirmative action debate).
354. BELL, supra note 305, at 1-2 (citing ROGER SANJEK, The EnduringInequalities of Race,
in RACE 1 (Steven Gregory & Roger Sanjek eds., 1994)) (arguing that that there are three concepts
that necessarily developed in tandem with "race," implying a framework of ranked categories that
segment the population with racialization and denote the process by which individuals are assigned
membership in those categories, with racism being a product of the two).
355. Alexander, Academic Freedom, supra note 271, at 893.
356. See BELL, supra note 305, at 1-2.
357. See generally SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 3-4 (introducing the concept of
"mismatch").
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action ... consistently perform less ably than others across a wide range of
standardized tests and other widely accepted markers of knowledge and skill."35 8
Rather than favoring the abolishment of affirmative action, Kennedy argues
instead for the abolishment of "the conditions that create the stark, predictable
racial gaps that [are] all too familiar."35 9 Consistent with this view, Kennedy
counsels proponents of affirmative action to "see racialized gaps in performance
as signs of a difficulty to be overcome-the ongoing effect of insufficiently
remedied . . . injustice."360 In concert with this observation, the performance gap
standing alone does not necessarily support Sander and Taylor's inclination to
use this differential as ground to impugn reasonably designed preferences that
361
are designed to act as remedial measures.
Still, it is necessary to balance that
conclusion with Kennedy's disavowal of any affirmative action regime that
"knowingly or negligently over-promotes beneficiaries, placing them in settings
in which they are conspicuously less prepared than nonpreferred peers, a
situation rife with risks of demoralization and the creation [and] reinforcement of
racist stereotypes."36 2
Second, Sander and Taylor contend that contemporary affirmative action in
higher education functions primarily as a vehicle to enact racial preferences.363
Despite Grutter's contrary insistence that affirmative action is only permissible
as a form of individualized treatment necessary to attain a critical mass of
minority students,364 the authors' submission is essentially correct but remains
profoundly incomplete. Completeness requires a full-blooded examination of
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, as well as the early and late judicial opinions aimed at
enforcing or constraining the remedial and compensatory effects of such
365
provisions.
Mismatch is devoid of such an examination. A more balanced
consideration of the origins of affirmative action would show that the abovereferenced constitutional amendments were principally conceived of as a
deliberate and distinct response to slavery, and that the statutory enactments
assailed as "illicitly race-sensitive" by President Andrew Johnson were designed
366
to give needed content to such amendments.
Seen from this perspective,

358. KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 122.

359.
360.
361.
362.

Id. at 123.
Id.
See id. at 145.
Id.

363. SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 15-16.

364. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334-37 (2003) (citing Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)).
365. See KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 104-05.
366. For a brief introduction to the nation's attempt to give content to the Fourteenth

Amendment, see generally id. at 22-26 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883);
Andrew Johnson, Veto Message, in 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897,
406, 413 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897); JAMES OAKES, THE RULING RACE: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN SLAVEHOLDERS 233 (1982); HEATHER Cox RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF
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affirmative action as a concept preceded the elevation of the contemporary
concept of diversity by almost a century.367 Equally true, the attempt to enact
race-conscious policies today may represent a highly imperfect effort to
instantiate approaches that are arguably designed to give substance to the
unfinished work commenced by post-Civil War legislation.368
Beyond Sander and Taylor's failure to adequately acknowledge America's
variable racial history, it is likewise clear that they fail to acknowledge the
record of government policy volatility on issues of race,369 which are
complemented by the nation's equally pervasive instability in the domain of
jurisprudence.3 70 Instability arguably precipitated the untimely termination of
the post-Civil War work of remediation and compensation that corresponds with
widely held notions of justice.3 7' Although cause and effect remain speculative,
the tangible achievement of remediation during the post-Civil War era would
have diluted the undeniable moral force of many of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
372
claims.
Given the absence of sustained remediation, Kennedy quotes King to
good effect, noting that King observed in 1963:
Our society has been doing something special against the Negro for
hundreds of years ....
How then can he be absorbed into the
mainstream of American life if we do not do something special for him
now, in order to balance the equation and equip him to compete on a just
and equal basis? 373

Sander and Taylor's analysis and the force of their claims would be
augmented if they conceded this history. Rightly appreciated, history supplies a
case for affirmative action that fulfills the promise of the Fourteenth
Amendment.374 Although that statement alone fails to provide guidance on
which form of race-based decision making ought to be chosen, it does provide a
remedial rationale that is thoroughly justified by past policy and jurisprudential
failures.375

RECONSTRUCTION 137 (2001); Arval A. Morris, ConstitutionalAlternatives to Racial Preferences

in Higher Education Admissions, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 279, 292 (1977)).
367. See generally Stacy L. Hawkins, A DeliberateDefense of Diversity: Moving Beyond the
Affirmative Action Debate to Embrace a 21st Century View ofEquality, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 75,

80 (2012) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307, 313) (summarizing historical use of the term "diversity").
368. See KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 11.
369. See supra Part II.B.
370. See supra Parts IIA-B.
371. See supra Part I.B.
372. See generally MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT (1963) (discussing
many of King's claims).
373. KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 33 (quoting KING, JR., supra note 372, at 146-47).

374. See id. at 11.
375. See id.
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The potency of Sander and Taylor's claims would also be bolstered if they
conceded a few facts on the ground. For instance, the historical record shows
that when the nation decided to tackle racial oppression through efforts to end it
through law or judicial opinion, such efforts have been frequently hampered by
the accusation that these actions are nothing more than a form of racial
favoritism.376 Such largely majoritarian oriented accusations, deftly debunked
by both Justice Harlan's dissent in the Civil Rights Cases377 and Randall
Kennedy's analysis,
are mistaken if not duplicitous.
Equally true, the
deployment and exploitation of such accusations conflates the genuine pursuit of
redress by African Americans with the illegitimate quest for unjustified
economic rents by labor or business cartels, 379 a move that inflicted additional
and unnecessary privation on those who were seen as racially inferior.380
Conflation implies that both the Supreme Court and the nation's policymakers
have often been unable or unwilling to distinguish the effects of enforced
subjugation from the instantiation of special favors through the capture of
government power that benefits large economic entities. 381' Taken together,
conflation exemplifies the modem world of contradictions wherein the pursuit of
justice by African Americans is delegitimized and the pursuit of a corrupt
corporate policy by government officials, labor hierarchs, and corporate officers
is applauded.3 8
To be fair, Sander and Taylor rightly observe in their introductory chapter
"[t]hat racial preferences have been widely supported by American elites and
widely opposed by the American public." 83 This gap may contribute to the
nation's current incapacity to enter into a civil discussion about affirmative
action, an inability that is only strengthened by an absence of transparency about
the existence and size of preferences, as well as the predictable participation by
publicly funded universities in efforts designed to conceal from inspection the
384
actual state of affairs within admissions departments.
While this Article will
examine this issue in more depth in subsequent sections, it is largely on these
grounds that Sander and Taylor's most convincing arguments rest, offering a

&

376. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
377. Id. at 26-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
378. See KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 22-39 (citations omitted).
379. For a summary of this illegitimate quest as part of a Progressive outlook and as part of
the New Deal, see generally Harry G. Hutchison, ProtectingLiberty? State Secret Ballot Initiatives
in the Shadow of Preemption and Federalism, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & L1BERTY 409, 478-94 (2012)
(citations omitted).
380. Id. at 483.
381. Id. (citing DAVID E. BERNSTEfN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER 7, 109 (2011); Ilya Somin,
Voter Knowledge and Constitutional Change: Assessing the New Deal Experience, 45 WM.
MARY L. REv. 595, 650 (2003)).
382. See id. at 494 (citing Somin, supra note 381, at 656) (suggesting that New Deal courts
became willing partners in a process that enabled judges to impose their policy preferences by
ignoring constitutional precedent and public opinion).
383. SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 11.
384. Id. at 7-9.
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basis for the nation and the courts to reconsider policies designed to provide
preferences.
Sander and Taylor's introduction to Mismatch correctly states that
affirmative action originated as part of a prevailing social consensus refreshed by
the recognition that the civil rights revolution was necessary for the nation to live
up to its constitutional ideals, to pursue justice in the form of equal opportunity,
and to jump start integration.385 Nevertheless, the authors' analysis is marred
because they fail to adequately note that the origins of such a consensus were
embodied in the language and history of the Equal Protection Clause, as well as
386
in most major steps toward undoing racial oppression in America.
Although
Sander and Taylor justly unmask the irony of law schools providing four times
as much scholarship aid on a per capita basis to high-income blacks as to low387
income whites,
a policy that may be part of higher education's lack of
transparency, the authors' exposure of such policy choices is compromised by
their failure to acknowledge what is self-evident to most observers. This is a
truth that Randall Kennedy convincingly excavates by stating that "[e]very major
step toward [reversing America's racial history] has been met with the charge
that it constitutes [a form] of reverse discrimination." 388 It is out of this charged
history that affirmative action arose in its many guises. A critical assessment of
this history suggests that courts, observers, and policy makers ought to separate
the undeniable appeal to justice that is embedded in such a history from the
contemporary notion that affirmative action more or less represents the pursuit of
cosmopolitan aims and depends, for its logical force, on Justice Powell's
predisposition favoring a robust exchange of ideas.389 It is not clear that either
cosmopolitan justice or the presumed necessity of a robust exchange of ideas is
connected to the lives all Americans live. On normative grounds, it is doubtful
that either concept ought to be so linked to the nation's charged racial history.
The quest for cosmopolitan justice and the judiciary's commitment to finding a
compelling interest that legitimizes the quest for a robust exchange of ideas
ought to be required to find a separate justification that is free of conflation with
the nation's racial history.
B. Persistent Wrangle Over Social Science
It may be impossible to settle the debate between the authors of Mismatch
and their various critics on empirical grounds for a number of reasons, yet a few
things are clear. Recall that Sander and Taylor insist that what principally

385. See id. at 3.
386. KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 24-25 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25
(1883); Morris, supra note 366, at 292; OAKES, supra note 366, at 233; RICHARDSON, supra note
366, at 137).
387. SANDER & TAYLOR, supranote 30, at 9-10.
388. KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 22.
389. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978).
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determines students' chance of success is not their absolute credentials, but
relative credentials,3 90 which on the authors' telling signifies that large racial
preferences have the large-scale effect of placing promising minority students in
settings where they are least likely to achieve their goals.'91 The authors were
thus not surprised to find that historically black colleges and universities
(HBCUs), where blacks are often well matched to their peers, play a
disproportionately positive role in producing black scientists.3 92 Evidently,
"HBCUs produced [forty] percent of blacks with bachelor degrees in science and
engineering even though they accounted for only [twenty] percent of black
college enrollment." 393 Premised on these and similar data-based observations,
Sander and Taylor emphasize the possibility that racial preferences are not
benign394 primarily because they increase the relative academic preparation gap
that minority students must surmount.395 It is possible that the authors'
observations are completely true. More likely, however, in order to vindicate the
authors' claim that preferences have pernicious effects on minorities, the authors
as social scientists ought to first attempt to control for all endogenous variables.
In the absence of such controls, most social scientists would be reluctant to reach
any conclusions about their data.396
Although a number of alternative explanations have surfaced in response to
Sander's earlier piece, Systemic Analysis, scholars Jackson and Moses
concentrate their critique on what appears to be missing from Sander's analysis:
the explanatory power of invidious effects of racism, including, racism
associated with lowered expectations, the legal curriculum itself, and economic
hardships.397
Additional doubts arise because "attempted replications of
Sander's [earlier piece] have raised [questions] about the accuracy of his
398
reported correlations.
Since Sander and Taylor rely directly on Systemic
Analysis, distrust seeps into any balanced assessment of Mismatch as well.
Moreover, Jackson and Moses's systematic appraisal responds directly to
Sander399 and Mismatch's central argument that affirmative action shrinks the
number of black lawyers in comparison with a race-blind system. Jackson and
Moses counter Sander's contentions by unearthing scholars Rothstein and

390. SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 36 (discussing STEM students).
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. See id. at 40-41, 46-47.
396. See, e.g., Jackson & Moses, supra note 169, at 222 (citing Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's
Riposte: The Mismatch Theory ofLaw School Admissions, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 637, 644 (2007))
[hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo's Riposte] (offering plausible alternative explanations that diminish
the theory of mismatch within a law school setting).
397. Id. (citing Delgado, Rodrigo'sRiposte, supra note 396, at 644).
398. Id. (citing Daniel E. Ho, Affirmative Action's Affirmative Action: A Reply to Sander, 114
YALE L.J. 2011 (2005); Daniel E. Ho, Why Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black Students to
Failthe Bar, 114 YALE L.J. 1997 (2005)).
399. Id. at 223 (quoting Sander, supra note 321, at 372).
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Yoon's empirical work.400 Rothstein and Yoon show that the elimination of
affirmative action leads to a sixty-three percent enrollment decline in all law
schools and a ninety percent enrollment decline in elite law schools.4 0' Indeed,
Rothstein and Yoon demonstrate in a simulation that African Americans did not
shift down to "appropriately matched" law schools as Sanders and Taylor
suggest; rather, they disappeared.402
William Kidder's analysis appears to be equally devastating. In stark
contrast with the findings in Mismatch, Kidder shows that: (1) higher graduation
rates by black students at HBCUs "may plausibly [be] due to campus climate or
other variables having nothing to do with [the] mismatch effect;" 403 (2) African
American and Latinos enjoyed "large benefits in the labor market from enrolling
at highly selective colleges," a finding that has been corroborated by a number of
studies;40 4 and (3) after the passage of Proposition 209, a larger share of top
black students admitted to the University of California campuses chose to reject
offers from the university in favor of selective private universities that utilized
405
affirmative action -an observation that contradicts the tenor and tone of
Sander and Taylor's evaluation and implies that after the elimination of
preferences the University of California system became more appealing to
406
minority applicants.
Whether Kidder's contradiction is accurate or not, Justice
Thomas offers evidence that supports some of Sander and Taylor's claims.
Drawing on publicly available sources, Justice Thomas observes that Boalt Hall
at the University of California Berkeley enrolled slightly more minorities, such
407
as blacks and Hispanics, after the passage of Proposition 209.
Nonetheless,
Kidder's overall analysis echoes Holzer and Neumark's empirical results,
implying that the mismatch thesis is based on interesting data and a provocative
argument. However, at least with regard to law schools, the empirical case for
mismatch has not been made.408
Beyond the specific issues that reflect the persistent tussle between Sander
and Taylor's empirics and the largely empirical critique offered by their
scholarly critics, some commentators argue that Mismatch also fails to give
sufficient weight to the potential advantages of attending elite schools. 409 Three
possible advantages prompt attention: (1) the possibility that when minority
"students are overmatched by their classmates, they appear to be carried along to

400. See id.
401. Id. (citing Jesse Rothstein & Albert Yoon, Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions:
What Do RacialPreferencesDo?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 649, 701 (2008)).
402. Id. (citing Rothstein & Yoon, supra note 401, at 701).
403. Kidder, supra note 38.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 135.
407. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 367 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
408. Kidder, supra note 38.
409. See KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 129.
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more [academic] success" than they might otherwise achieve; 410 (2) the
likelihood that minority students benefit from being socialized into the habits
and possibilities of eliteness, including lifetime membership in elite networks; 4 11
and (3) the possible benefits achieved by a minority community as a whole when
members of such communities attend the most elite schools and thereby provide
the community access to elite networks,4 12 a claim that may or may not be
difficult to corroborate.
In the absence of evidence proving that the critics have simply cooked the
books, it is reasonable to conclude that serious doubts infect Mismatch's
empirical analysis.4 13 Nonetheless, as Randall Kennedy shows, the pugnacious
response to Sander's Systemic Analysis, and to Sander and Taylor's work in
Mismatch may have provoked conduct and attempted suppression that undercuts
the goals of affirmative action proponents.414 Such attempts may be a boon to
Sander and Taylor's claims by implying that affirmative action defenders have
something to hide, and may facilitate the denial of important facts that warrant
the nation's attention.4 15 Still, this dispute regarding empirical results will not
completely resolve conflicting visions of affirmative action. Instead, a focus on
empiricism may fuel future debate and raise the temperature. On balance,
Sander and Taylor may have made a huge mistake in believing that their
overwhelmingly statistical approach to affirmative action can sort out the
intractable problems of race without apparent regard for the nation's history.4 16
In a similar vein, Kidder concedes that Sander and Taylor delve into a
"[fundamental[1y] important issue where our values (individually and
collectively) may be in conflict." 417 Kidder admits that "[s]ome of these
differences cannot be resolved empirically, [even if] other clashes can
be ... illuminated by sound social science."
Taken together with Part II's
inspection of the nation's volatile record on matters of race, commentators
should admit that American values and actions have been in a state of nonlinear
flux for quite some time, thus raising the issue of whether empirical analysis

410. Id. at 129 (citing Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the

Number ofBlack Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1824 (2005)).
411. Id. at

129-30 (quoting David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systematic

Disadvantage:A Response to Sander, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1915, 1931 (2005)).
412. Id. at 133.
413. See generally Ayres & Brooks, supra note 410, at 1809 (refuting Sander's mismatch
hypothesis); David L. Chambers et al., The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in
American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique ofRichard Sander's Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855,
1877 (2005) (stating that Sander has not shown any benefits from ending affirmative action);
Wilkins, supra note 411, at 1916 (providing empirical analyses of mismatch issues).
414. KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 132.

415. Id.
416. See, e.g., Kidder, supra note 38 (stating that some differences cannot be resolved
empirically); see also WRIGHT, supra note 46, at 64 ("Science studies the repeatable; history studies
the unrepeatable.").
417. Kidder, supra note 38.

418. Id.
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alone can adequately inform this debate. Lastly, Sander and Taylor's approach
is consistent with, and elevates, the modem belief that objective scientific
evidence leads inevitably to progress, a doubtful enterprise that John Gray has
already exposed. 41 9 Against this backdrop, Jackson and Moses "re-assert the
need for deliberate democratic discussion, dialogue, and debate." 420 A crucial
part of any such debate compels a fresh assessment of the justification for
affirmative action, which, requires a balanced understanding of the nation's
history, the demand for remediation tied to such a history, as well as a new
evaluation of whether diversity can plausibly serve as an ultimate trump within
the domain of higher education. As the next subsection shows, the diversity
rationale faces fresh doubt when observers consider the question of who benefits
from such a program.
C.

Who Benefits from Affirmative Action?

Initially, preference programs were invariably race-based.4 2' Still, Sander
and Taylor show that universities often tried hard to reach low-income and
moderate-income blacks.422 The authors point to "data sources [showing] that a
very large proportion of those receiving large racial preferences either were from
economically modest backgrounds or were the first in their families to attend
college."423 Today, the ground beneath affirmative action has shifted rather
dramatically. This shift favors affluent African Americans. Indeed, the evidence
shows that two-thirds of the 1992 cohort of blacks at elite colleges came from
the top quartile of American socioeconomic distribution, up from only twenty424
nine percent in 1972.
Based on socioeconomic data, the record shows that
most students at elite undergraduate schools and law schools come from
privileged backgrounds that seem to defy the notion of economic diversity or
most generalized conceptions of disadvantage. 425 This retreat from focused
remediation, predicated on the historical disadvantages that blacks have
encountered, can be made more tangible.426 Sander and Taylor demonstrate that
a large fraction of affirmative action beneficiaries come from immigrant, mixedrace, or affluent backgrounds, an unsurprising finding given the predictable self-

419. See GRAY, SILENCE OF ANIMALS, supra note 20, at 75.

420. Jackson & Moses, supra note 169, at 223.
421. SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 247.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 247-48.
424. Id. at 248-49.
425. Id. at 250 (citing Anthony P. Carevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status,
Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College Admissions, in AMERICA'S UNTAPPED RESOURCE: Low
INCOME STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 101, 106 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2004)); Richard
H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U.L. REV. 631, 639 (2011)).
426. Id. at 251.
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427

interest of admissions officers in selecting people who either look like them in
some way or who come from similar, perhaps privileged, socioeconomic
backgrounds.4 28
Randall Kennedy substantiates Sander and Taylor's
observations, indicating that some scholars worry that "'blacks whose
predominate ancestry is traceable to the historical oppression of blacks in the
United States are likely more underrepresented in affirmative action than
most ... [people] realize."' 429 This problematic development could fuel demand
for a different approach to affirmative action. Hence, if racial preferences are to
retain their connection to notions of justice, Sander and Taylor's analysis of this
important issue deserves wide attention. Affirmative action's disparate impact
on the economically disadvantaged sector of minority populations inarguably
fuels skepticism for some, but not necessarily all, racial preference regimes.
Whether or not a sustained demand for a different approach to affirmative action
surfaces, any such demand ought to be considered concurrently with Sander and
Taylor's conviction that the Supreme Court is capable of becoming the nation's
racial healer. 431' The next subsection develops this claim.
D. PursuingReform through the Courts?
Sander and Taylor evidently believe that the Supreme Court has sufficiently
flexible tools to engineer serious reform of affirmative action, short of an
immediate ban.432 Although this Article has more to offer regarding Sander and
Taylor's reforms, the Sander and Taylor offer three specific reforms that are
outlined before providing analysis.
First, tracking the late Senator Ted
Kennedy's effort to expand disclosure regarding legacy preferences, the authors
contend that universities should be transparent about preferences.433 Second,
Sander and Taylor recommend that universities target economic need before
racial identity when dispensing preferences.434 Finally, the authors would outlaw
race-based aid awards because such awards produce little, if any, diversity
benefits.

435

427. Id. at 252 (showing that admissions officers are drawn to the following facts: (1) the
academic indices of each of these groups are much higher, on average, than those of American
blacks in general, (2) these groups are easy to find, and (3) if one is focused on a numbers game,
then anyone with the appropriate racial markers will serve).
428. STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 80 (1991)
(quoting Dreyfuss and Lawrence who suggest that when the Supreme Court imposed limits on
preferential admissions, the winners were the country's economically and educationally privileged).
429. KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 143 (quoting Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of the
Talented Tenth, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1230 (2008)).
430. SANDER & TAYLOR, supranote 30, at 253, 258.
431. Id. at 273.
432. Id. at 274.
433. Id. at 281.
434. Id. at 284.
435. Id. at 285.
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The Power of Transparency

On Sander and Taylor's account, the sequence of racial healing would be
advanced by a directive that requires universities to disclose the size of racial
preferences employed and supply admitted students with data on the academic
outcomes of past enrollees with similar credentials, as well as information about
the process used to create the student body, its characteristics, and its
436
outcomes.
As part of full disclosure, the authors state that schools ought to be
required to supply any information they have or can reasonably obtain on
learning outcomes that detail how well similar students perform within an
admitted student's intended major, including information on attrition and what
percentage of similar students went on to complete graduate school.437 Lastly,
Sander and Taylor believe that the Supreme Court ought to mandate that all of
the above-referenced data on outcomes, as well as on the size of all admissions
preferences, should be made publicly available so that researchers, legislators,
the media, and all other citizens can evaluate the accuracy and completeness of
the information provided to applicants.438
F. TargetingEconomic Need Before Racial Identity
Sander and Taylor note the Supreme Court's insistence "that racial
preferences must not unduly harm members of any racial group."4 39 Although
undue harm is actually a function of how large the preferences are, "the Court
has never imposed a specific size limit.

440

Convinced that large preferences

harm intended beneficiaries, and persuaded that socioeconomic diversity is every
bit as compelling an interest as racial diversity in tandem with the intuition that
affirmative action ought to reclaim its original social mobility goal,44' the
authors offer a straightforward solution to the dilemma of outsized racial
preferences that would "require that the racial preferences a university uses be no
larger than the average size of preferences based on an individual applicant's
financial need or socioeconomic status (SES)." 442 Preferences ought to be

capped in order to "ensure that pursuit of campus diversity includes meaningful
consideration of each applicant's individual circumstances rather than just her
skin color . .. [and to] ensure that universities actually pay attention to raceneutral ways of pursuing diversity and, thus, would inhibit unconstitutional racial
balancing."443 Sander and Taylor argue that an "SES cap on racial preferences

436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.

Id. at 281.
Id. at 281-82.
Id.
Id. at 284.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
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would also foster simple justice to the economic have-nots who have been so
sorely neglected by our selective universities."444 This reform proposal builds on
Sander's successful work in devising a sophisticated system of SES preferences
at the University of California after the passage of Proposition 209.
1.

Outlawing Race-BasedAid Awards

Sander and Taylor's final reform proposal would "reinforce the effectiveness
of the second." 446 The authors contend that the Supreme Court "should, in a
proper case, prohibit state schools from using racial preferences in awarding
financial aid and scholarships [because] [s]uch awards produce little if any
diversity benefit." 447 Sander and Taylor assert that "the main function of racebased financial aid is to fuel zero-sum bidding wars among competing campuses
for the limited supply of blacks with strong academic qualifications."44 8
Cognizant of the nation's history, the next part places Mismatch and
affirmative action into the gulf that separates cosmopolitans and adherents to the
oikos, and reaches tentative conclusions.
Amidst this gulf, the Article
concentrates on whether the diversity rationale, which has been used to
legitimatize most affirmative action policies in the nation, can be fully justified
by reference to the chasm that separates the cosmos from the oikos. This focus
facilitates the deconstruction and contextualization of Mismatch and affirmative
action, and prepares a way forward. It also allows the Article to respond directly
to Sander and Taylor's claim that the Supreme Court is the only hope for serious
reform of race-conscious policies in the nation.
VIII. DECONSTRUCTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE COSMOS IN THE MIRROR
OF THE OIKOS?

A.

Affirmative Action in the Chasm

Martha Nussbaum stipulates that one of greatest barriers to rational
deliberation and discourse regarding politics, including the politics of affirmative
action and the controversy that consumes Mismatch, is "the unexamined feeling
that one's own preferences and ways are neutral and natural."449 Particularities
of country, locality, and ethnicity, it is argued, may reinforce an irrationality that
is ultimately tied to characteristics that are no more morally salient than an
accidental collision of an occupied vehicle with a doe in search of a nighttime

444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

Id.
Id. at 285.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 285-86.
Nussbaum, Patriotismand Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY, supra note 29,

at 11.
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snack. 50 Perhaps accepting or reacting to Tocqueville's intuition that the
advance of liberal "democracy make[s] men forget their ancestors [and] clouds
their view of their descendants" while isolating them from their
contemporaries, 451' Nussbaum suggests that rather than finding comfort from
local truths, and from the warm, nestling feeling of patriotism, individuals ought
to engage in the often lonely business of becoming citizens of the world, 52 a
process advanced by looking at ourselves through the lenses of others and by
recognizing our moral obligation to the rest of the world.453 That is, "[i]f we
really do believe that all human beings are created equal and endowed with
certain inalienable rights, we are morally required to think about what that
conception requires us to do with[] the rest of the world."454 From such a
cosmopolitan perch, one that is predicated on reason and love of humanity,
abstracted from place, and apparently detached from the presumptively
accidental contingencies that divide us, justice and equality surface.455 Although
such poetic claims appeal to the fact that present day political societies exist in a
global context and correspond with the notion that all of us are no longer self456
sufficient,
and while cosmopolitan justice appears both beautiful and
generous, doubts surface. First, if one looks backward at the available evidence
from the twentieth century, the idealized cosmopolitan plinth of reason and love
abstracted from place appears somewhat unsteady because it is not clear that
justice and equality are instantiated in the many cultures that make up the
world. 457 Instead, what are often instantiated are quite different values. 458 This
claim is unexceptional, particularly when we speak ofjustice "as the rule of law"
or of "rights as the civil rights of minorities," 459 a claim that equally contradicts
Nussbaum's contention that national boundaries lack moral salience 460 and the
prevailing melioristic-cosmopolitan-liberal worldview that disables many
461
commentators from learning from experience.
Second, cosmopolitanism and

450. See id. (suggesting that education that takes national boundaries as morally salient
reinforces the tendency to give moral weight to what is an accident of history).
451. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 508 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 1969).
452. Nussbaum, Patriotismand Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY, supra note 29,
at 15.
453. Id. at 11, 13.
454. Id. at 13.
455. Id. at 4.
456. DELSOL, supra note 1, at 6.
457. Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Illusions of Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY
supra note 29, at 72, 75.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Nussbaum, Patriotismand Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY, supra note 29,
at 11.
461 See, e.g., John Gray, The Truth About Evil, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2014), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/oct/21/-sp-the-truth-about-evil-john-gray
(exposing the
incoherent belief among many secular liberal commentators that the very idea of evil is an obsolete
relic that can be overcome with liberal human progress).
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its corresponding sense of universal justice seems to undermine politics and
actual human diversity, which, on Delsol's account, must be preserved4 62 if the
"Most
nation intends to stray from the pattern of most governments. 463
governments . . . are [simply] despotic[ ]in the sense that a single vision of the

common good is imposed as a matter ... of certainty." 464 On the other hand, the
"specifically Western form of politics [inherited by the United States] admits a
plurality of views of the common good and lets them govern in tum." 465 This

intuition may explain the history of governmental and judicial volatility on
issues of race, a particular history that coincided with the pursuit of freedom by
the Framers, as well as by those individuals and their descendants who initially
appeared to exist beyond the reach of the Declaration of Independence.46 6 This
history and the pursuit of freedom by "others" preceded the written
467
substantiation of the discovery of self-evident truths.
This history also has
consequences that ought to inform the American moral outlook, pursuit of
justice, and moral imagination, as well as the defensibility of affirmative action
and its corresponding reliance on competing versions of diversity.
Against this background, it is imaginable that the cosmopolitan notion that
children and adults ought to be taught that their "'fundamental allegiance' is as
'citizens of a world of human beings' rather than as citizens of [a particular
place, the United States,]" may give rise to an education that is more destructive
than constructive.468 An unreflective commitment to the cosmos as the source of
the nation's cultural and legal ecology may undermine the notion of a coherent
moral education, which, in the real world, is arguably rooted in particular moral
communities that fuse sentiments with the pursuit of the good469 and are
hopefully reinforced by notions of truth. To put Mismatch and its accompanying
affirmative action riddle in a somewhat narrower context, the question becomes
whether the simmering debate regarding racial preferences and diversity can be
resolved by reference to the universalizing impulses tied to the cosmos.
Alternatively, must the solutions, if any, be rooted in the particularities of place
of the founding documents of a particular nation and the wrenching history of a
particular people yearning to be free? For many, though certainly not for all, the
latter viewpoint produces a perspective that expresses itself in an unwillingness
to truckle to the cosmopolitan view that all human and social relations are

462. DELSOL, supra note 1, at 7.
463. See id. at 100.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. See supra Part II.B.
467. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights . . . .").
468. McConnell, supra note 29, at 79.
469. Id. at 79-80.
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fundamentally fungible,470 or to accept the cosmopolitan charge that any
perspective arising from the nostos is more or less irrational. Against the
limitless interchangeability of relations and the risible claim that rationality
necessarily favors the cosmopolitan's view, both the African American
experience and its collective interaction as peoples who occupy the nation's
space militate against reliance on the Sirens of the cosmos and instead call us to
return, at least on a provisional basis, to the oikos.47' Actual experience gives
rise to additional questions regarding the seemingly boundless cosmopolitan
capacity for optimism in progress,472 an infection that expands because of the
corresponding assertion of infinite choice governing the fashioning of identities
473
and relationships.
This analysis lends itself to the conclusion that, for many
African Americans, indeed for many Americans, the prospect of an endless
menu from which to shape identity becomes difficult to conceive of rationally. 474
Casting a gulf featuring these opposing conceptions in moral terms, it appears
that the cosmopolitans seek unity by minimizing any differences, even when
those differences are based on the distinctly dissimilar histories of individuals
and groups since such histories have little moral salience in the quest for the
universal. On the other hand, differences and particularities of birth have a place
within the nostos.
B. Affirmative Action: The Oikos and the Cosmos-the Odyssey Continues
1.

GroundingAffirmative Action

Perhaps the best way to ground affirmative action within the gulf separating
the oikos from the cosmos is to return to Grutter. Preliminarily, it seems clear
that diversity discourse, as currently practiced within the academy, signifies
more or less a capitulation to the racial and ethnic variety defended by the notion
of academic freedom. It bears reiterating that the Grutter opinion endorses
Justice Powell's view that affirmative action made tangible through a diverse
student body is a compelling state interest 475 even when the university "[does]
not purport to remedy past discrimination, but rather" endeavors "to include
students who may bring to the Law School a perspective different from that of
476
members of groups which have not been the victims of such discrimination."
This approach to diversity, whether sufficiently catholic or not, may find itself

470. DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 15 (summarizing the
view that social relations are fundamentally fungible).
471. See id.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. See id.
475. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978)).
476. Id. at 319.
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ravaged by its incapacity to rectify. This is because both the Grutter Court and
the universities appear to emphasize integuments that lend themselves to an
ostensibly robust, but arguably abstract, exchange of ideas as opposed to the
flesh and blood realities of racial justice.477 This outcome is made more likely in
our putatively post-racial era, one that may or may not correspond with a
478
cosmopolitan future.
Putting aside the possibility that the University of
Michigan Law School's admissions officers were simply attempting to evade the
force of Supreme Court precedents that disallow outright racial balancing, it
appears that the law school's specific approach-emphasizing a focused
examination of "each applicant as an individual, and not simply as a member of
a particular racial group" 479 has a lyrical and imaginative ring to it. Wisdom,
however, calls attention to the force of Professor Rodriguez's cautionary
reflection that individualized consideration of the kind that selective public
universities prefer does not restrain race-based judgments so much as it unbridles
them.480
Rodriguez's intuition hints at the possibility that individualized
consideration has less to do with the pursuit of racial justice and more to do with
an institution's internal reasons, which arguably limits rather than expands
4811
minority participation.
Consistently with Professor Rodriguez's claim, the
Grutter Court disregarded the record showing "that more than two-thirds of the
students from underrepresented minority groups ultimately admitted [on racial
grounds] were in fact initially excluded," 48 2 by the law school's core admissions'
policy, which gave preeminence to selectivity. This means that the school's
dedication to selectivity,483 like similar exclusionary policies elsewhere, appears

to disproportionately disfavor minority applicants ab initio. Whether Professor
Rodriguez's defenestration is correct or not, the Grutter Court's acceptance of
Justice Powell's approach was ostensibly influenced "by its belief that America
needs to produce a racially diverse cadre of future leaders."484 This outcome is

477. Id. at 324 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313) (insinuating that diversity promotes the
"robust exchange of ideas" necessary for a university to fulfill its missions and goals).
478. See Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox, supra note 49, at 1071 (citing Michelle Adams,

Racial Integration, 94 CAL. L. REV. 261, 263-64 (2006); Michael Selmi, Race in the City: The
Triumph ofDiversity and the Loss ofIntegration,22 J.L. & POL. 49, 70 (2006)).
479. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 722 (2007)
(citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337) ("The importance of . .. individualized consideration in the context
of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount.").
480. Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox, supra note 50, at 1078 (quoting Christina M.

Rodriguez, Against Individualized Consideration,83 IND. L. REV. 1405, 1409 (2008)).
481. See id. at 1088 (citing Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a MajoritarianDevice: Do

You Really Want to be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1224-25 (1991)) [hereinafter
Delgado, Affirmative Action] ("[T]he cultural meaning of diversity rhetoric symbolizes a constraint
on minority participation while providing a firewall to protect an institution's pursuit of status.").

482. See id. at 1081-82.
483. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1986) (describing the work of unconscious
racism).
484. Lund, supra note 54, at 21.
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purportedly advanced by a robust exchange of ideas-an experiment in thinking
and perhaps living-that does not oblige the school to exhaust the race-neutral
alternatives that might have achieved its racial diversity goals.485
The Supreme Court's conception of affirmative action proceeds without
apparent regard for whether this concept advances or retards either income
disparity or intellectual diversity,486 issues that some may see as important. The
Court also declined to advance a conception of justice that actually recognizes
America's volatile racial history and its corresponding subordinating effects,
which are made manifest in contemporary times by the worsening economic
disadvantage faced by some, but not all, minorities.487 As an alternative, the
Court was persuaded to accept the view that the law school, without direct
supervision by the courts, was entitled to engage in a narrowly tailored, raceconscious admissions policy putatively designed to achieve a compelling and
constitutionally permissible objective: diversity. 488
Moreover, there is no
evidence that the Grutter Court was concerned in the least with the fact that
affirmative action at selective public institutions tends to operate as a device that
favors the affluent, possibly at the expense of the economically disadvantaged.489
Accordingly, the Court explicitly declined to consider alternatives that might
compromise a university's allegiance to selectivity and expand its sympathy for
disadvantaged individuals.490 Rejecting the proposition that a school was
required to engage in "a dramatic sacrifice of. . . academic quality of all
admitted students," the Court instead unlocks the door to the probability that the
Justices were prepared to accept some reduction in the academic quality of
admitted minority students, if necessary, to achieve the university's objective.4 9
Rather than shrink the overall force of the law school's exclusionary admissions
policy because the pursuit of elite status has a disproportionately negative effect

485. Id. (stating "[o]ne obvious and facially race-neutral alternative would have been to hold
an admissions lottery among all applicants who had the minimum qualifications deemed necessary
for successful law school performance; another alternative would have been to decrease the
emphasis for all applicants on undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores").
486. See SANDER & TAYLOR, supranote 30, at 284.
487. See, e.g., Harry G. Hutchison, Achieving our Future in the Age of Obama?: Lochner,
Progressive Constitutionalism, and African America Progress, 16 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST., 483,
490 (2013) [hereinafter Hutchison, Achieving our Future] (citing RICHARD VEDDER & LOWELL
GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK: UNEMPLOYMENT AND GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 272-79 (1993)) (observing growing disparities in African American versus Caucasian

unemployment rates).
488. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (finding that the law school's narrowly
tailored use of race in admissions does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution);
see also Jackson & Moses, supra note 169, at 216 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343).
489. See SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 286 (contending that a large portion of blacks
receiving preferential admissions also come from well-off families yet are more likely to receive
financial aid than less well-off Asians and white students).
490. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340.
491. Id.; see also Lund, supra note 54, at 21.
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492

on members of minority groups,
the Court constructively furnishes the law
school with a relatively cost-free approach to branding itself as racially diverse, a
process that seems inconsistent with the racial healing that Sander and Taylor
crave. Rather, as the next paragraph demonstrates, the Court advances the
University of Michigan Law School's pursuit of racial capitalism.
To the extent that the University of Michigan Law School brands itself as a
racially diverse ecosystem consistent with its own assessment of its internal
values, the prospect of racial capitalism and commodification surfaces. "[R]acial
capitalism the process of deriving social or economic value from the racial
identity of another person"-often involves predominantly white institutions that
pursue and evidently derive social and economic value from associating with
individuals who have nonwhite racial identities.493 Apparently, the Grutter
Court sanctioned this quest for racial capitalism by authorizing the University of
Michigan Law School's race-conscious polices, not for the sake of the
educational benefits available to the minority students admitted under the
program, but largely for the sake of the school's own internal goal of affording
educational benefits to other students.494 These students, through interaction and
discourse might, in cosmopolitan terms, expand their sympathies for the whole
of humanity.495 The Court's doctrinal abandonment of the previously ascendant
"remedial rationale for race-based affirmative action in favor of an exclusive
[emphasis] on educational diversity496 appears to correlate with scholars Shin
and Gulati's approach. They explicitly argue that affirmative action can be
framed outside of the principles of justice and equality and, instead, can be seen
as a way to foster deep leaming and critical thinking. Thus, this policy choice
can be understood distinctly not in terms of external goals of social justice or
racial equality but in terms of internal values that fundamentally define academic
institutions. 9 7 Although there is no evidence that the Supreme Court's
understanding of affirmative action was influenced by views that implicate Shin
and Gulati's claims, judicial acceptance of their approach would permit highly
selective academic institutions to defend the pursuit of selectivity through status

492. Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox, supra note 50, at 1084-85 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at
367-68).
493. Leong, supra note 5, at 2153-54.
494. Vikram David Amar, Revisiting Grutter and Its Diversity Rational: A Few Reactions to
Professor Blumstein's Critique, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 195, 195 (2012) [hereinafter Amar,
Revisiting Grutter] (quoting Blumstein, supra note 100, at 64.
495. See Czobor-Lupp, supra note 219, at 14 (explaining Herder's approach to the
development of "good government and good laws [that] require the support of a culture that forms
the citizens' imaginative and cosmopolitan capacity to interact . . and share with others" which,
from a cosmopolitan perspective, can presumably be analogized to higher education).
496. Amar, Revisiting Grutter, supra note 494, at 195 (citing Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty
the Best (Judicial)Policy in Affirmative Action Cases? Fisher v. University of Texas Gives the
Court (Yet) Another Chance to Say Yes, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 77, 93 (2012)).
497. Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Cultivating Inclusion, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 117, 118 (2014) [hereinafter Shin & Gulati, Cultivating Inclusion], available at
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/ 112/Shin
Gulati.pdf
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enhancing racial preferences that may be difficult to truthfully defend externally
on grounds of justice, even though the academic institution's race-based policy
facilitates the institution's quest for minority students as a trifling part of its
fierce pursuit of its own internal values. 9 8 Indeed, it seems quite possible that
Shin and Gulati's defense of diversity as a way to foster deep leaming and
critical thinking corresponds with how diversity is actually practiced at elite
public universities such as the University of Michigan Law School. 499 An
emphasis on an institution's internal values enables the admission of a variety of
students who, whether black, white, brown, or yellow, reward the school's core
pursuit of eliteness. 00 This maneuver, in the long run, is likely to manifest itself
in monetary contributions to the school's alumni fund or, alternatively, to
provide the university with scope to market its fundraising activities in a society
more preoccupied with diversity rhetoric than with advancing equality. 0
Skeptically understood, diversity facilitates the exploitation of nonwhiteness for
its esteemed market value502 rather than for its contribution to academic freedom
as defined by a search for truth or justice, values that may be missing from an
academic institution's goals. This exploitive process appears to advance the
institution's interests while simultaneously supplying financial and status
benefits to selected students through the university's highly publicized pursuit of
marketable forms of human sympathy.503
Additional skepticism of diversity is warranted because institutional
selectivity appears to be part of an evasive process to transmute the legitimate
claim for remediation proffered by minority group members into something that
appears orthogonal to the history of actual racial oppression encountered by
African Americans, but which may be partially congruous with Nussbaum's
claim that "we should not confine our thinking to our own sphere."504 The
Court's doctrinal abandonment of remediation, its acceptance of racial capitalism
tethered to the internal goals of the institution, and the Court's potential, if
understated, embrace of our collective cosmopolitan future can be amplified.
This is so because the Court refused: (1) to pursue available evidence supporting
affirmative action as a remedial and constitutionally permissible mechanism for
eradicating the effects of Michigan's public school segregation;505 (2) to see
racial preferences, at least with regard to blacks, as a remedy for societal

498. See Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox,supra note 50, at 1085 (emphasis added).
499. See Shin & Gulati, CultivatingInclusion, supra note 497, at 118 (citing Mari J. Matsuda
Who is Excellent?, SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 29, 32, 36-37 (2003)).
500. See id. at 118 (citing Matsuda, supra note 499, at 36-37).
501. See Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox, supra note 50, at 1069.
502. Leong, supra note 5, at 2154-55.
503. See, e.g., id. (suggesting the "systematic phenomena" present when "white institutions"
seek to benefit from promoting diversity within their admissions process).
504. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY, supra note 29,
at 13.
505. Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox,supra note 50, at 1084.
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discrimination,506 a perception that might invigorate Justice Thurgood Marshall's
decades-old observation that "the racism of our society has been so pervasive
that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact;" 07
or (3) to accept Professor Charles Lawrence's path-breaking understanding of
unconscious racism.50 s If this account is correct, it appears that if the Court has
taken any side in the debate between cosmopolitans and those committed to the
primacy of the oikos, it has taken the side of the cosmopolitans, a move that
could also instantiate a new way of life5 09 and perhaps reflect the global tribe that
we ought to become 1 o without, of course, requiring the university to proclaim it.
Within this context, uncertainty arises as to whether a cosmopolitan approach to
affirmative action simply amounts to an elegant redescription of racial justice or,
alternatively, the culmination of its extinction. It follows that questions would
arise as to whether rootless cosmopolitanism nurtures rootless diversity, a
possibility that begs the question of whether rootless diversity justifies
affirmative action within university admissions.
2.

Can Rootless Diversity Justify Affirmative Action?
'

Affirmative action has been part of American mythmaking for some time.5
Many such myths insinuate that affirmative action, even in its post-Civil War
dimension, is nothing more than the illicit pursuit of racial favors, a claim amply
deflated by Randall Kennedy.5 12 As we have seen, affirmative action is not a
new phenomenon, but a process that began more than century ago.513 Thus, the
nation's present dispute about affirmative action is simply an epiphenomenon
that reflects the epic dimensions of the hopeful struggle by black Americans and
others to shrink the power of subordination through a welter of short-term and
long-term strategies that evidently include: litigation; conflicting and variable
interpretations of the Constitution; protest, violence, and strategic acceptance of
duplicity; 514 unconstrained appeals to the diversity rationale; a willingness to

506. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996) (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498, 504 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76, 288
(1986)).
507. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
508. See Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox, supra note 50, at 1074 (citing Lawrence, supra

note 482, at 322).
509. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 240, at 169 (stating that liberalism as a form of
cosmopolitanism promotes a "rich menu of ways of life" by encouraging diversity in society by
providing diverse religions, associations, occupations, and ideas to its members).
5 10. APPIAH, supra note 218, at xiii.
511. See KENNEDY, supranote 43, at 78-79.
512. See generally KENNEDY, supranote 43, at 78-146 (citations omitted) (arguing that racial
affirmative action does aid racial minorities).

513. Id. at 25-26.
514. See id. at 102 (citing Brown, supra note 161, at 1291) ("The diversity camp has long
been dogged by allegations of insincerity or outright duplicity.").
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accept the absence of candor regarding the diversity rationale;"' the possibility
of progress; the power and weakness of empirics; the recognition that diversity
may not be the strongest justification for race-conscious policies;516 and the
"locus of conflict[ing views] involv[ing] the allocation of benefit between, on the
one hand, the offspring of American-born black parents and, on the other, the
offspring of interracial couples and foreign born blacks," 1 7 as well as the
allocation of benefit between the affluent and the less well-off. Although this
history has been messy and arguably unique, it appears to generate a morally
salient call for justice. But, if so, for whom? While many will agree that this
history sustains affirmative action in its remedial dimension primarily for
individuals who are descendants of American-born blacks and who have suffered
deprivation because of the nation's prior surrender to subordination the
question becomes whether this history also obliges such descendants to refrain
from a reparative focus generated by the particularities of birth and deprivation,
and to concentrate instead, as cosmopolitan reasoning may suggests, on
safeguarding the right of all human beings be they whites, Asians or foreignborn blacks-to pursue life, liberty, and happiness in order to instantiate the
uniform moral universe that cosmopolitans favor?" Although it may appear
overly xenophobic, this question is morally salient and extends beyond appeals
to rationality alone. Hence, on a reading of history, the pursuit of justice that
seems inarguably connected to a particular place becomes problematic when this
defensible quest is converted into a pursuit of transcendence advanced either by
capitulation to an academic institution's internal goals or, alternatively, through a
seemingly whimsical love of humanity, however broadly understood.
3.

Attaining the Moral High Ground in Affirmative Action Debates?

It is conceivable that some observers will see the contest between the
cosmopolitans and oikopolitans over the moral high ground very much like the
contest between objectivity and subjectivity that animates philosophers of the
mind.51 9 Although the idea of objective reality is arguably a masterpiece of
Western thought, "the only view of the world that we can ever entirely have
from inside our own heads is subjective."5 20 However, the current effort by
some, including scientists, empiricists, and philosophers, to either banish or
diminish subjectivity, including one's private experiences, beliefs, pains, hopes

515. Id. at 104 (quoting Guido Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 427,
429 (1978)).
516. Id. at 104.
517. Id. at 143.
518. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY, supra note 29,
at 13-14.
519. See David Gelernter, The Closing of the Scientific Mind, COMMENTARY 18 (Jan. 1,
2014), available at http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/the-closing-of-the-scientificmind/.
520. Id. at 19.
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521

and fears in exchange for stoically objective reasoning in service of humanity
appears to be an effort to banish the very substance that has made African
Americans and others who they are. While the internalization of America's
racial history is far from uniform, internalization does exist. Since all stories
represent real human lives that cannot be completely measured, reasoned,
weighed, tracked, photographed, or subjected to data driven empirical
122*
verification,
it is possible that the modem cosmopolitan world may be poised
to reject the salience of a particularized human history because it cannot be fully
be objectified. Reality includes: (1) our mental states existing in a room that no
one else can ever enter, and (2) the world perceived through the window of a
mind the objective world.5 23 Both worlds, the subjective and objective, coexist
and have currency. Hence, when African Americans, and perhaps all Americans,
look out through their eyes into the natural world, they look backwards at the
same time to a history that they are attached to forever.524 From such subjective
yet also collective memories, and from our individual and collective perception
of the continuing effects of subordination, a cry emerges that is simply a demand
for justice. Although it is unlikely that this appeal results in a single perception
of the world, nor that it perceives progress as inevitable, it nevertheless remains
probable that the movement toward a shared understanding of justice is likely to
occur only within the framework of a tradition and a community whose primary
bond is a shared understanding of the good for man and for a community
wherein individuals identify their primary interest with reference to those
goods.525 It is possible, but perhaps only speculative, to hope that such a shared
understanding of the good can accommodate the contrasting views of Estreicher,
Lund, and Kennedy. With these observations in view, it remains possible that
the call for justice can be expressed in cosmopolitan terms that prioritize the
universal over the particular as humans choose to transcend the limitations of
locality and place of birth,5 26 and as they endeavor to break down barriers
separating humans, aided by the transformative potential of science to ameliorate
humanity's material and political conditions as well as heal its moral
527
capacities.
This contention can be seen as particularly true since citizens
currently live in a postmodern society that appears to be falling apart,5 28 a world
where people are waiting but do not know what they are waiting for.5 29
Nonetheless, one reading the terms of the affirmative action debate and its

521. Id.
522. Id. at 19-20.
523. Id. at 20.
524. Id.
525. MACINTYRE, supra note 57, at 240.
526. See DENEEN, THE ODYSSEY OF POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 217.
527. See id.
528. See Fredrick Mark Gedicks, Spirituality, Fundamentalism,Liberty: Religion at the End of
Modernity, 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 1197, 1197 (2005).
529. CHANTAL DELSOL, ICARUS FALLEN: THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN AN UNCERTAIN
WORLD xxvii (2003).
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accompanying historical record a reading that concedes "there is no neutral
ground, no island in the middle of the epistemological ocean as yet uncolonized
by any of the warring continents""-the call for justice appears to be more
morally salient when viewed from the perspective that accords primacy to the
oikos rather than the perspective that accords predominance to "experimental
thinking" 53' and the forms of cosmopolitan interchange and universality favored
by Czobor-Lupp and others. 32 If this is true, then this call warrants more than a
robust exchange of ideas instantiating a university's own internal values, a
uniform and universalizing respect for humanity and reason, a commitment to
rootless diversity, and the reification of selectivity favoring the affluent as part of
the process of individualized consideration. The next subsection applies these
claims to Sander and Taylor's recommendations, including their claim that the
Supreme Court remains the nation's only hope for racial healing.
IX. MISMATCH, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE PROSPECT FOR RACIAL HEALING
IN CONTEXT

Sander and Taylor, after censuring the current practice of preferential
admissions, have proposed a number of reform initiatives including: (1)
recognizing the power of transparency, (2) targeting economic need before racial
identity, and (3) abolishing race-based aid awards. 3 The authors assert that the
third reform reinforces the effectiveness of the second reform,5 34 hence this
Article simply collapses them into one for analytical purposes. The authors'
initial proposal-deploying the power of transparency to smoke out harmful
preferences-fails to deal with the internal institutional incentives and the
intellectual capacity of university admissions officers to engage in evasion.535 In
the face of evasion, the question becomes whether the Supreme Court would be
prepared to engage in aggressive monitoring of colleges and universities even if
the Justices accepted Sander and Taylor's claim that Grutter already provides the
framework necessary to advance full disclosure of preferences, as well as a
platform from which to encourage good faith efforts to develop race-neutral
536
alternatives to preferences.
The authors' claims are plainly ironic given the
extensive description of their own encounters with academic evasion, encounters
that are forcefully echoed by Professor Anita Bernstein's analysis.537 Bernstein

530. WRIGHT, supranote 46, at 64.
531. See, e.g., Deneen, Academic Freedom, supranote 293, at 2 (describing how the "freedom
of inquiry" can be disfavored when discussing what are considered already "settled" matters).
532. See Czobor-Lupp, supra note 219, at 9-28 (citations omitted).
533. SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 281-86.
534. Id. at 285.
535. See id. at 281-84.
536. Id. at 283 (suggesting that the narrow tailoring language of Grutter supplies a basis to
ensure institutional good faith in developing workable race-neutral alternatives to racial
preferences).
537. See Bernstein, supra note 285, at 252.
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shows, for example, that when proponents are "challenged in court by
individuals who say that a diversity measure hurts them, users of the rationale
have responded with evasion. For good instrumental reasons, they prefer bland
affirmation to specifics."53 8 Indeed, Sander and Taylor devote almost seventyfive pages of their book to direct and indirect examples of evasion by
universities and their co-conspirators,53 9 including a chapter on why academics
avoid honest debate about affirmative action as well as the tangible absence of
transparency that surfaced when the authors attempted to extract data relating to
the academic background of bar-takers from the California Bar.5 40 This latter
effort led the authors to conclude that opacity reigns supreme within the
academic arena.5 4' Hence, their proposal to transform Grutter's framework into
a monitoring device for racial preferences appears to be somewhat helpful in
theory, but doubtful in practice.542
Taken together, the second and third reforms Sander and Taylor advocate
would, if implemented, arguably go a long way toward extirpating racial
preferences, a move they counsel against in the short-run.5 43 In the long-run,
Sander and Taylor's proposed reforms would effectively replace racial
preferences with a focus on economic need, which appears to be their
objective.5 44 Still, problems arise if Stephen Carter's analysis is correct. Carter
asserts that "the most disadvantaged black people are not in a position to benefit
from preferential admission[s]". 545 If Carter's observation remains verifiable,
and if scholars Rothstein and Yoon's command of empirical analysis is
confirmable, then the elimination of affirmative action would lead to a dramatic
decline in the enrollment of blacks in all law schools and an almost a 100%
decline in elite law schoolS546 unless alternatives to elimination emerge.

Dramatic decline of the kind that Rothstein and Yoon forecast would be more
than a quotidian quandary, and it is doubtful that even the current Supreme Court
would countenance that possibility. Still, it is conceivable that preferential
university admissions of some sort would not be foreclosed by the authors'
reforms.
Sander and Taylor's scholarship implies that Professor Carter's
assertion is contestable since the authors observe that Sander has "actually
devised and implemented a sophisticated system of SES preferences at
University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) after the passage of Proposition

538. Id.
539. See SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 175-244.
540. Id. at 233-44.
541. Id. at 235 (explaining the difficulty researchers have experienced in extracting data on
admissions and student outcomes, and the efforts engaged in by the Law School Admissions
Council to obscure relevant information).
542. See id. at 235-44.
543. Id. at 273.
544. Id. at 284.
545. CARTER, supra note 428, at 80.
546. Jackson & Moses, supra note 169, at 223 (citing Rothstein & Yoon, supra note 401, at
711).
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209, and the system worked exceedingly well."5 47 If this claim is accurate, then

Sander and Taylor's reform initiatives such as targeting economic need before
racial identity and abolishing race-based financial awards have the power to
topple rootless diversity from its perch as a defense to racial preferences, even
though the actual parameters of Sander and Taylor's proposals are quite
complex.54 To be sure, Sander and Taylor's approach would not abolish racial
preferences, but would place a cap on them.5 49 In addition, this approach might
foster simple justice for economic have-nots who have been neglected by
selective universities. 5 o That said, it appears that Sander and Taylor's proposal
favoring improved university access to lower-middle class students may
compromise elite institutions' precommittment to exclusion and selectivity, a
risk that the authors do not adequately excavate. 5 Sander and Taylor's analysis
presumes that elite institutions are actually interested in the success of
disadvantaged members of underprivileged communities as a form of justice,
when it is just as likely that such institutions have an overwhelming commitment
to internal values that are inconsistent with reducing the effects of racial
552
subordination and are coherent with the organization's internal priorities.
Such priorities can be advanced through racial branding and the pursuit of
broadly understood cosmopolitanism.
Nevertheless, presuming that institutional insincerity, evasion, and
exclusionary focus can be successfully extinguished, it is possible to sympathize
with Sander and Taylor's recommendation that affirmative action ought to focus
more on income and class than on race. In a somewhat similar vein, Randall
Kennedy counsels that "[p]roponents of racial equity should enthusiastically
support initiatives aimed at securing more equity along the class divide."553 He
therefore suggests that "'[r]ace and class' is thus a suitable banner for affirmative
action reform." 554 Kennedy cautions, however, that although there is much to
commend in the effort to mitigate the racial effects caused by the passage of
Proposition 209 in California5 5 5 and he agrees with the effort to channel
affirmative action more directly to poorer racial minorities, he nonetheless
asserts that a focus on socioeconomic diversity is, in reality, "a version of racial
affirmative action regardless of efforts to hide that fact." 556 Although a focus on

income and class rather than on race may have the salutary effect of promoting
justice at the expense of institutional status, efforts to create so-called race-

547. SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 285.
548. See id. at 284-85 (citing authors' detailed efforts to compare the sizes of socioeconomic
versus racial preferences in their footnotes).
549. Id. at 284.
550. Id.
551. See id. at 285.
552. See id. at 284-85.
553. KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 91.
554. Id.
555. Id. at 92.
556. Id.
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neutral programs, appropriately understood, are simply "an example of raceconscious, class-focused redistribution with racial indicia erased from its
exterior."5 5 7 Hence, proponents of "class not race" have to acknowledge that
"the absence of overt racial selectivity in programs they propose is merely
strategic: the price to be paid for white support and the avoidance of white
opposition.
Moreover, Kennedy brilliantly shows that "even when concern
with race is not the primary driving force behind a program, if it turns out to
assist racial minorities disproportionately, one can expect it to be attacked as
racial affirmative action in disguise,"55 9 an observation that reflects the difficulty
of ever progressing beyond race and the permanency of President Andrew
Johnson's reasoning that any effort to helps disenfranchised blacks constitutes
"illicitly race-sensitive" legislation.560 Taken together, these observations
provide ground for some skepticism with regard to the instrumental value of
Sander and Taylor's focus on income inequality as opposed to a direct focus
race, even if the normative appeal of this reform initiative remains intact.
Additional skepticism emerges with regard to Sander and Taylor's claim that
the Supreme Court is the logical venue for the nation's racial healing; indeed, the
prior paragraph overlaps with observations that are offered here.56' As deduced
elsewhere in this Article, optimism regarding the Justices' capacity to resolve
pressing issues appears inarguably doubtful since neither the Constitution nor the
Court's interpretation of the Constitution remain reliable in a world where
political liberalism exists outside of a boundary cabined by a shared
562
understanding of truth.
Since the Court has demonstrated a tendency to
elucidation, 56 a possibility that infects the Grutter
postmodern
endless
in
engage
Court's jurisprudence, grounds for optimism are likely to be further diminished.
Recall that the Grutter Court constructively furnished the University of
Michigan Law School with a relatively cost-free approach to branding itself as a
racially diverse institution. This process may be inconsistent with racial healing,
strict scrutiny, and the eidetic memories of individuals who are descendants of
564
American-born blacks.
Instead, the Court found the University of Michigan
Law School's apparent pursuit of racial capitalism, concurrent with its pursuit of

557.
558.
559.
560.

Id.
Id. at 93.
Id.
Id. at 23.

561. See SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 273 (stating that elected officials are often
incapable of adequately addressing the preference problem, and therefore the U.S. Supreme Court
seems to be the best available venue for serious and stable reform).
562. Harry G. Hutchison, Liberty, Liberalism and Neutrality: Labor Preemption and First
Amendment Values, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 779, 835-42 (2009) (citations omitted).

563. See id.
564. See Douglas M. Raines, Grutter v. Bollinger's Strict Scrutiny Dichotomy: Diversity is a
Compelling State Interest, but the University of Michigan Law School's Admissions Plan is Not

Narrowly Tailored, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 866 (2006).
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*

exclusionary selectivity, to be defensible.565 The Grutter Court's decision
should surprise no one. The Supreme Court's institutional history has often been
566
one that coincides with the judiciary's precommitment to majoritarianism.
One need not solely examine the Court's opinion on contemporary conceptions
of affirmative action to reach such a conclusion.
As Kennedy has previously shown, the Supreme Court ruled in the
nineteenth century that blacks, whether free or enslaved, were not citizens of the
United States.567 Complementing President Andrew Johnson's veto of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, the Supreme Court invalidated parts of a federal law
568
prohibiting racial discrimination in 1883.
In doing so, the Court accused
blacks of seeking preferential treatment.569 These and similar moves by the
Court, signaled by editorials published in leading newspapers of the day,
reproduce majoritarianism. 570 For example, disapproving the federal legislation
that became the subject of the Civil Rights cases, the Chicago Tribune asked
whether, "'it is not time for the colored race to stop playing baby? "'.571
Evidently, the Supreme Court yielded to such sentiments as well. 2 Similarly,
the Court rejected an equal protection and due process challenge by Carrie Buck
to involuntary sterilization, thus valorizing a national campaign organized by
leading elites to cleanse society through the compulsory evisceration of the
reproductive capacity of individuals that were seen as defective.573 This socalled cleansing program, issued forth in law reform schemes maintaining the
*
*
* 574
innate inferiority of women and favoring scientific racism
and in similar
campaigns most notably in progressive labor legislation were often upheld by
the Supreme Court.
In 1944, the Court upheld the conviction of Fred
576
Korematsu,
an American-born son of Japanese immigrants because he failed
to enter a relocation center, which was, of course, a "euphemism for a prison."
The Korematsu Court's deeply deferential capitulation to majoritarian

565. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003) (holding that the
University of Michigan Law School's admissions process does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause).
566. See Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a "Majoritarian"Institution?, 2010 Sup.
CT. REV. 103, 105 (2010).
567. KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 22.
568. Id. at 24.
569. Id.
570. See id. (quoting HEATHER Cox RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: RACE,
LABOR, AND POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH 1865-1901, at 137 (2004)).
571. Id. (quoting RICHARDSON, supra note 570, at 137).
572. See id.
573. Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit, " supra note 78, at 3 (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200, 207 (1927)).
574. Id. (citing Mark V. Tushnet, Progressive Era Race Relations Cases in Their
"Traditional"Context, 51 VAND. L. REV. 993, 993 (1998)).
575. Id. at 31-34 (citations omitted).
576. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944).
577. Id. at 230.
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sentiments
is richly ironic coming a few years after the Court's ostensible
defense of "discrete and insular minorities." 79 This catalog of cases is not
meant to impugn the integrity of the Court, but to further suggest that the Court's
inclinations cannot be fully separated from prevailing, and often terribly
wrongheaded, social and cultural currents.
Today, for instance, eliteness and selectivity have achieved new currency. It
should surprise no one that the Grutter Court decided to defend the goal of
selectivity and defer to the prerogatives of elite public institutions rather than
pursuing racial justice by recognizing the State of Michigan and the University
of Michigan Law School's prominent participation in an educational system that
disadvantages minorities.so The Justices' undeviating preference for selectivity
may or may not correlate with "the fact that, as of 2012, every member of the
Supreme Court attended law school at either Harvard or Yale."5 s' Although
proof of cause and effect remains speculative, it seems possible that the Justices'
own self-interest may be implicated by any candid attempt to reform affirmative
action along the lines that Sander and Taylor recommend. This conclusion
acquires added force when recognizing that the Grutter Court and the admissions
officers at the University of Michigan Law School, like admissions officers
everywhere within the domain of selective public education, represent a
commitment to diversity rhetoric that may paradoxically confine minority
participation within acceptable limits and protect an institution's pursuit of
582
status.
These observations in conjunction with evidence implying that the
pedagogical significance of racial diversity remains debatable5 11 confirms
Richard Delgado's contention that "race-conscious remedies were designed by
members of dominant groups and produce scarce results," 58 4 thus reinforcing the
585
continued economic and political dominance of the masses by the elites.
This
claim undergirds some, but certainly not all, of Sander and Taylor's analysis.
Nevertheless, in this current epoch, one that perhaps teeters between the
oikos and the cosmos, it remains probable that the diffusion of sentiments that

578. See, e.g., Hutchison, Achieving our Future, supra note 487, at 528 (citing Korematsu,
323 U.S. at 224) (demonstrating the Court's overall deference to Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Congress).
579. See id. (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1937)).
580. See Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox, supra note 50, at 1086 (explaining how both the
state and the university participate in an educational system that includes university admissions, and
how educational malpractice at both the elementary and secondary levels appears to valorize
minority inferiority).
581. KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 14.
582. See Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox, supra note 50, at 1088.
583. See Bernstein, supra note 285, at 220 (showing that researchers cannot readily distinguish
between causes and effects associated with diversity because those individuals open to engagement,
creative thinking, and learning from new people may have opted to seek admission to environments
that offer what they prefer).
584. Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox, supra note 50, at 1088 (citing Delgado, Affirmative
Action, supra note 481, at 1224.
585. See Delgado,Affirmative Action, supra note 481, at 1224-25.
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have generated the nation's affirmative action policy may prevent its extinction
for some time to come.586 A contextualized inspection of governmental and
jurisprudential volatility on issues of race confirms that either in the hands of the
Supreme Court or, alternatively, in the hands of Sander and Taylor, affirmative
action and its corresponding diversity justification will remain very much like an
injured bear-too strong to succumb to its wounds but too weak to attain
justice.
At the end of the day, this review essay submits that contemporary
Supreme Court jurisprudence on affirmative action and race, like postmodern
society itself, remains dazed8 and confounded589 amidst the enigmatic paradox
of post-Enlightenment liberalism.590 Post-Enlightenment liberalism, which was
arguably birthed as a reaction against arbitrary and unlimited rule by autocrats,
but today seems less about limited government and more about the pursuit and
exercise of potentially limitless power toward the attainment of preferred ends,
which are ends that may or may not include justice.5 9' This assessment remains
true despite the fact that over-reliance on immoderate conceptions of Kantian or
other abstractions has frequently been reinforced by the thoroughly progressive
hope that progress is advanced through the modem emphasis on the acquisition
of knowledge through science, which presupposes human rationality and reason
as the sole ground on which modem disputes must be fought.5 92
Contextualization also indicates that universities, far from pursuing
academic freedom directed toward the search for truth, have now become
bastions of institutional self-interest that focus less on racial justice for
disadvantaged minorities than on profiting from racial capitalism.5 93 This
maneuver can be expressed as an institution's quest for status enhancing forms
of racial rent-seeking that may preempt conversations about past racial
injustice.5 94 This development-the monetization of race, color, and ethnicity in
order to advance the fusion of a selective institution's finances and its internal
values that appear to advance uniform thinking has been insulated from
condemnation by judicial deference to often whimsical cosmopolitan claims

586. KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 15.
587. Id.
588. See James Davison Hunter, Law, Religion and the Common Good, 39 PEPP. L. REV.
1065, 1070-71 n.14 (2013).
589. See generally Gedicks, supra note 528, at 1197 (suggesting that, metaphysically
speaking, our world is "fall[ing] apart").
590. Larry Alexander, Free Speech and 'Democratic Persuasion': A Response to
Brettschneider(Univ. of San Diego Sch. of L. Legal Studies Working Paper Series, Research Paper
No. 13-122 (2013)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2277849 (citing ALEXANDER, supra note
240, at 11-12).
591. See Patrick Deneen, Liberalism's (Un)limited Government, THE AMERICAN
CONSERVATIVE (Feb. 20, 2014), available at http://www.theamericanconservative.com/liberalismsunlimited-government/.
592. See generally ROBERT NISBET, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

306 (1980)

(discussing various forms of science and progress).
593. See Leong, supra note 5, at 2154.
594. See id. at 2206.
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intertwined with the notion of academic freedom, despite the fact that higher
education "is a field calling for special scrutiny, not special deference."5 95 It is
equally true that an examination of contradictions within the modem world,
which straddles the gulf between the cosmos and the oikos, may imply that
durable rectification within the domain of academia's race relations is impossible
and that chaos is likely, thus signifying that the achievement of actual progress in
the form of cross-racial understanding remains a chimera.
X.

CONCLUSION

After assessing the legitimacy of the various currents that infect the nation's
affirmative action debate, Mismatch and its correlative claims when placed in
context, elevate the primacy of the oikos rather than the cosmos. Any such
examination shows that diversity, despite its current position as higher
education's inamorata, remains a malleable term like affirmative action
itself5 96-that is difficult to define and often fails to evoke a shared purpose. 597
Malleability and obfuscation appear to advance within a framework designed to
further cosmopolitan justice. Seen from a perspective that is enriched by United
States history, a defensible cry for remediation and reparation surfaces. At the
same time, this cry is muffled by the evasion, duplicity, and insincerity that are
tightly attached to selective public universities' admissions policies that
materialize as diversity, a race-conscious admissions program that protects
institutional status. Shielded from critical review by the cloak of complexity
attached to the dual acceptance of cosmopolitan linguistics and Woodrow
Wilson's claim that the "nation 'needs efficient and enlightened men' [and] that
the 'universities of the country must take part in supplying them,"' 598 diversity
and its accompanying rhetoric emerge unscathed from less than strict judicial
review.599 Hence, it is probable that when public universities encounter race,
particularly elite ones, the resulting policy choices are poised to retain an
ephemeral connection to justice. The placement of affirmative action in the
chasm dividing the oikos from the cosmos reveals that the concept of diversity
persists as "a serious distraction in the ongoing effort to achieve racial
justice," 600 despite the fact that we live in a country that neither generates human
disadvantage solely through government policy nor is patrolled by white
supremacy. Given the nation's cultural commitment to indifference and its

595. Moss, supra note 286, at 22 (focusing on gender discrimination in the academy).
596. See, e.g., Shin & Gulati, CultivatingInclusion, supra note 497, at 122.
597. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 478, at 79 ("Diversity, on the other hand . . can be anything
to almost anyone: a slogan or a mandate, a program or a label, but there need not be any shared
purpose because diversity also implies allowing a thousand flowers to bloom without regard to
which of those flowers might have the best soil.").
598. BERG, supra note 77, at 138.
599. Hutchison, Diversity as a Paradox, supra note 50, at 1074.
600. Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (2003).
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ongoing surrender to the existing social order, so long as it provides us with an
economy of abundance, the question of whether the pursuit of justice must be
sacrificed for the sake of political and economic considerations that pander to the
preferences of elite public institutions remains an open one.
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and even the world. This has resulted, to a significantextent, from their abilities
on the one hand: (1) to present more serious risks to large numbers of people
through the use of often quite astounding scientific and technological
developments and the mass-marketing of products; and (2) to exercise
significant control over public perceptions of their products and other business
activities through highly sophisticated advertising and other public relations
campaigns. As a result of these two developments, many corporate actors have
amassed significantpower and influence over our environment and our choices
about what we consume and use on a regularbasis.
This Article, will focus on: (1) one method by which companies are trying to
influence public perception of their products, so-called "neuromarketing," a
new interdisciplinaryfield that aims to tap into the human mind as directly as
possible by using sophisticatedtechnological developments in neuroscience and
cognitive science; and (2) one increasinglypopularproduct that presents risks
to human health, namely, electronic cigarettes (or "e-cigarettes"), which are
battery-powered devices that vaporize liquid nicotine and other undisclosed
chemicals, allowing users to inhale (or "vape") the mixture.
This Article argues that in this postindustrial era of widespread human
threats presented by products and other business activities such as e-cigarettes,
and of companies' concomitant ability to obscure these dangers and induce
people to use their products by manipulating societal cognition through
techniques such as neuromarketing, tort law serves a "disruptionfunction."
This function is in addition to the two competing ideas about the primary
function of tort: (1) imposing a fair result individual disputes (moralfunction);
and (2) making public policy efficient (instrumentalfunction). The first function
fulfills a private need; the second, a public one. Judges and scholars tend to
favor one over the other, and that preference has driven outcomes in certain
kinds of legal disputes, like those involving federal preemption of state tort law.
But this dichotomy of tortfunctions overlooks a thirdfunction of tort law the
disruptionfunction which serves both a private need and a public one. More
specifically, the tort system provides a much-needed space away from pervasive
corporate manipulation of societal cognition. This space permits society
represented by litigants, judges, and juries-to examine closely and consider
whether corporateactivities should be subject to some legal oversight in a given
case after hearing the story of the occurrence of the particularharm or harms
relatively free of the "noise" of the corporate cognitive manipulation that so
often pervades society and culture.
Finally, the Article explains how the traditional tort function dichotomy
underlies many of the calls for limiting the tort system and that the third
function, the hybrid disruptionfunction, must be recognized if the tort system is
to remain viable in the current era of expansive corporate activities that can
cause widespread harms. This is particularly true if neuromarketing and other
increasingly sophisticated techniques for manipulating societal cognition
regardingproducts that present significant risks to human health, such as e-
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cigarettes, are as successful as the business literature indicates that companies
hope them to be.
We decided [in the early 1920s] that public relations advice
is more important than legal advice, because legal advice is
based on precedent but public relations advice might actually
establish precedent.
Edward L. Bemays'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The manufacturing of legal precedent through public relations has soared in
importance and sophistication since Edward Bemays first squeezed a line of
young, beautiful, cigarette-smoking women from church services along New
York's Fifth Avenue into the city's 1929 Easter Parade.2 Bemays, the so-called
"father of spin," grasped before nearly anyone else the power of mass culture to
shape law.3 Lawyers and judges have been rushing to catch up ever since.
Law can sometimes be used to disrupt the mass culture spin cycle that has
the power to manipulate societal cognition and thus to transform, and eventually

1.

Allan Dodds Frank & Lisa Gubernick, Beyond Ballyhoo, FORBES, Sept. 23, 1985, at 136,

140 (emphasis added), quoted in LARRY TYE, THE FATHER OF SPIN 61 (1st ed. 1998).
2.
See TYE, supra note 1, at 28-30 (quoting EDWARD L. BERNAYS, BIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEA
386-87 (1965) (describing how Bernays orchestrated a march of female smokers along Fifth
Avenue on Easter Sunday to attack the cultural taboo against women smoking in public); see also
generally Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court ofPublic Opinion, Installment Two:

How Far Should Corporate Attorneys Go?, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1119, 1121-23 (2010)
(noting lawyers' increased public relations role and the ethical concerns it raises).
3.
See TYE, supra note 1, at viii ("Edward Bernays almost single-handedly fashioned the
craft that has come to be called public relations."). In the preface to his biography of Bernays, Tye
points out:
Although most Americans had never heard of Edward L. Bernays, he nevertheless had a
profound impact on everything from the products they purchased to the places they
visited to the foods they ate for breakfast ....
Indeed, the very substance of American thought was mere clay to be molded by the savvy
public relations practitioner, or so it seemed.
This, then, is a book [not only] about Edward L. Bernays[, but also] a book about
America.
It is about how public thought is routinely shaped or, some might say,
manipulated by singularpowers in our culture. And so it is by necessity a book about
democracy in the era of the spinmeister.

Id. at viii, xi (emphasis added).
4.
See Beardslee, supra note 2, at 1123-25 (citing U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL
SENTENCING
STATISTICS
tbl. 11
(2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2006/table l l.pdf;
Beardslee, supra note 2, at 1154-61) (discussing the increased importance of public perception in
determining legal outcomes and the ethical implications that has for lawyers).
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establish, precedent.' This Article examines how tort law exemplifies this
concept. The process is not obvious and has not been directly studied. Indeed, to
accommodate this function of tort law, this Article carves out a hybrid space in
the current understanding of tort law's functions. However, once room is created
for viewing it, the Article will argue that this hybrid disruption function is as
hard to ignore as Bernays's elegant debutantes waving Lucky Strikes to the
crowd.
Tort law functions to disrupt corporate manipulation of societal cognition by
uncovering and providing some legal control of that manipulation, particularly in
areas involving scientific knowledge about risks to human health and the
6
environment. More specifically, this Article argues that in the postindustrial era
of widespread human and environmental harms resulting from the various
products and other business activities, tort law serves a function that falls
between, and is separate from, the two traditional categories of tort theory: (1)
moral/individual and (2) instrumental/public. Some tort scholars argue that tort
law is or should be designed to serve one function or the other, and other tort
scholars argue that it serves both.8 This Article argues that there is a third, hybrid
function of tort law, the disruption function.
This function cannot be
characterized as moral/individual or instrumental/public because it is inseparably
both.9
Further, this Article suggests that the existence of this third function calls
into question the traditional compartmentalization of tort law theory whether
by arguing for one function or the other, or by arguing that tort law serves both
functions. As evidenced by Edward Bernays's quote above,'o the desire to
control the public's perception of products and business activities is longstanding. In light of developments in neuroscience, the science of human
cognition and behavior, and so-called neuromarketing or "consumer
neuroscience,"" the disruption function of tort law may be a more essential
protective measure than ever.

5.
See infra Part IV.A.
6.
It bears emphasizing that this Article is not suggesting that tort law is the only, or even
the best, legal way to address such problems. Rather, this Article's argument is that: (1) tort law
serves this role as a descriptive matter, and (2) tort law should be allowed to continue to do so as a
prescriptive matter.
7.
See infra Parts IV-V.
8.
See Richard A. Posner, Instrumental and NoninstrumentalTheories of Tort Law, 88 IND.
L.J. 469, 469 (2013) ("There is the idea that law is an instrument of social policy, and the idea that
instead law is an expression of rights and duties regardless of the instrumental value of those rights
and duties.").
9.
See infra Part V.A.
10. See supra text accompanying note 1.
11. See C61ine Solnais et al., The Contribution of Neuroscience to Consumer Research: A
Conceptual Framework and Empirical Review, 36 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 68, 69 (2013) (citing
Susanne Erk et al., Cultural Objects Modulate Reward Circuitry, 13 NEURoREPORT 2499 (2002))
("[The ability to use] functional magnetic resonance imaging . . [to observe] the specific
components of the brain's functional architecture activated in response to marketing stimuli . .

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss1/5

76

Hutchinson: Affirmative Action: Between the Oikos and Cosmos Review Essay: Ri

2014] TORT AS A DISRUPTER OF CULTURAL MANIPULATION

195

Since at least the 1920s, corporate actors have acquired an increasingly
greater capacity for actions that can shape culture across the nation, and even
across the world.1 2 This has resulted, to a significant extent, in their ability to:
(1) present more serious risks to large numbers of people through the use of
often quite astounding scientific and technological developments; 3 and (2)
exercise significant control over public perceptions of their products and their
other business activities through highly sophisticated advertising and other
public relations campaigns.14 As a result of these two developments, many
corporations-in particular the tobacco, agriculture, oil, pharmaceutical, and
food processing industries have amassed significant power and influence over
the environment and over our choices about what the public consumes and uses
on a regular basis. 15 With such power and influence comes a great capacity to
present considerable risks to human health and the environment, and thus to
effect widespread harms.1 6 Although the extent of the ability of these business
interests to use neuromarketing to exert even greater control over consumer
choices remains uncertain, the potential for their doing so bears examination.
The tort system has consistently been called upon to respond to such
changes in technology and scientific knowledge. Further, the relationship
between consumers and powerful industries as litigants have brought claims
based on massive environmental and public health harms that have been caused
by the often complex activities of large corporate entities. 17 Such harms include

[has] resulted in the birth of a new interdisciplinary field commonly referred to as 'consumer
neuroscience."'); see also infra Section III.A (discussing marketers' use of psychology and
neuroscience to influence consumers).
12. See HERBERT I. SCHILLER, CULTURE, INC.: THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF PUBLIC
EXPRESSION 3 (1989) ("Through all the political and social changes of the last fifty years, the
private corporate sector in the American economy has widened its economic, political, and cultural
role in domestic and international activities.").
13. See Charles B. Craver, Mandatory Worker ParticipationIs Required in a Declining
Union Environment to Provide Employees with Meaningful IndustrialDemocracy, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 135, 167 (1997) (quoting Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and PracticalFramework
for Enforcing Corporate ConstituencyStatutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 584 (1992)).
14. See SCHILLER, supra note 12, at 46 (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942);
Robert Sherrill, Hogging the Constitution: Big Business & Its Bill of Rights, GRAND STREET,
Autumn 1987, at 95, 98 (describing how the scope of corporate influence expanded during the
twentieth century as corporations were granted greater free speech rights).
15. Cf id. at 40 (quoting UNESCO, CULTURAL INDUSTRIES: A CHALLENGE FOR THE
FUTURE
OF
CULTURE
21-22
(1982)),
available
at
http://unesdoc.
unesco.org/images/0004/000499/049972eo.pdf) (reflecting on the cultural impact of increased
concentration of power in the media).
16. See Susan P. Koniak, How Like a Winter? The Plight ofAbsent Class Members Denied
Adequate Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1787, 1800 (2004) ("Corporations . . for all
their incorporeal nature affect the real world with their power to do great good and their power to
do devastating and widespread harm.").
17. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Reforming Public Interest Tort Law to

Redress Public Health Epidemics, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 331, 365 (2011) (quoting Dan
Simon, The Double-Consciousness ofJudging: The ProblematicLegacy of Cardozo, 79 OR. L. REV.
1033, 1043 (2000)) (discussing the role courts play in addressing widespread societal harms).
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an epidemic of tobacco-related death and disease;' deaths and debilitating
injuries caused by defective drugs and medical devices;' 9 illnesses and
environmental destruction resulting from oil and chemical spills; 20 and, most

recently, the devastating environmental impacts of climate change.2 Such uses
of the tort system, in turn, have led to significant developments in tort doctrine as
well as in arguments in tort law scholarship, and in the political arena, about the
appropriate functions of tort law and its role in the United States (U.S.) legal
system.22

This Article argues that these cultural, political, and legal developments
have made clear that tort law also serves a role that is inseparably both moral and
instrumental, and thus occupies its own area that lies between the two traditional
functions of tort law. Specifically, the tort system provides much needed space
away from pervasive corporate manipulation of societal cognition, namely tort's
disruption function.
This space permits society represented by litigants,
judges, and juries-to examine closely and consider whether corporate activities
should be subject to some legal oversight in a given case after hearing the story
of the occurrence of the particular harm or harms relatively free of the "noise" of
corporate cognitive manipulation that so often pervades society and culture, and
getting further information through the civil justice system's powerful discovery
system. This Article also argues that tort's disruption function can, and often
does, provide the impetus for the public to consider whether other, more
comprehensive legal mechanisms such as statutes or administrative regulations
might be necessary.
Part II of this Article shows how the tort system has been called upon more
and more to address widespread harms as significant portions of the population
are increasingly exposed to large-scale, potentially catastrophic threats posed by

18. See Jon S. Vernick et al., Public Health Benefits ofRecent LitigationAgainst the Tobacco
Industry, in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS 215, 215-16 (Lawrence 0. Gostin ed., 2d ed. 2010)
(citing United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla.
2006)) (noting the large number of lawsuits filed against tobacco companies and the $200 billion
settlement between the major tobacco companies and forty-six states to reimburse the states for
smoking-related healthcare costs).
19. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Deregulatory Effects of Preempting Tort Litigation, in
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 18, at 225, 227 ("Tort law assists patients who have
been harmed by defective products, providing compensation for medical costs, pain, and disability.
Currently there is no government compensation program for patients injured by defective drugs or
medical devices . . . .").
20. Cf Tom Christoffel & Stephen P. Teret, Epidemiology and the Law: Courts and
Confidence Intervals, in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 18, at 204, 205 ("Exposure
to asbestos, toxic waste, radiation, and pharmaceuticals have led to large numbers of lawsuits in the
past [fifteen] years.").
21. Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 2
(2011) ("Plaintiffs in several cases have pressed tort claims . . seeking monetary damages and
injunctive relief to lessen the threat and financial burden of climate change's harmful impacts.").
22. See generally Rustad & Koenig, supra note 17, at 347-73 (citations omitted) (discussing
and responding to criticisms of public health torts).
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profit-driven, technologically complex, and often extremely high-risk activities,
including the sophisticated marketing of products such as automobiles, food,
drugs, and other products marketed for consumption containing ingredients
about which the public knows very little.23 Further, these threats also include the
production of energy from carbon-based sources that not only contaminate the
environment surrounding the production source in the normal course of
production as well as when accidents occur,24 but also contributes to the
25
alarming increase in the warming of the entire planet.
Part III elaborates on the marketing strategy of many business interests
developed in a previous Article on the tobacco product industry called the
strategy of "disinformation plus path-dependence" 26 by incorporating the
practice of neuromarketing.
The Article then shows how U.S. tobacco
companies have continued this strategy with their recent development and
widespread marketing of so-called electronic cigarettes, or e-cigarettes. This Part
summarizes the background of the development of neuromarketing, explains
why companies find it so attractive, and stresses the dangers in the context of ecigarettes.
Part IV describes the moral/individual and instrumental/public dichotomy
that dominates in tort law theory. The Article then explains how this dichotomy
has been employed in the corporate campaign to place limits on the tort system,
a campaign launched in response to the increased use of the tort system to seek
redress and accountability for widespread and catastrophic harms that the public
increasingly faces.

23. See, e.g., ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 125 (2001) ("The Food and Drug
Administration does not require flavor companies to disclose the ingredients of their additives, so
long as all the chemicals are considered by the agency to be [safe]. This lack of public disclosure
enables the companies to maintain the secrecy of their formulas . . . [and] hides the fact that flavor
compounds sometimes contain more ingredients that the foods being given their taste."); David A.
Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-toWarn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 495 (2008) ("Statutory gaps in the FDA's authority to gather
information [from drug companies] . . hamstring its ability to ensure the safety of the drugs on the
market.").
24. See, e.g., Blaine LeCesne, Crude Decisions: Re-examining Degrees of Negligence in the
Context of the BP Oil Spill, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 103, 104 ("The Deepwater Horizon oil rig
explosion was the worst man-made environmental disaster in United States history. This singular
event caused the death of eleven rig workers, damaged, perhaps irreversibly, the coastlines and
ecosystems of five Gulf States, and imposed financial ruin on the tens of thousands who relied upon
a functional Gulf of Mexico for their livelihood.").
25. See, e.g., ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION
FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD 6 (2010) ("Anthropogenic climate change has the potential to
influence a wide range of disasters .... This is not a book about climate change, but nearly every
issue I address is backlit by its presence.").
26. Karen C. Sokol, Smoking Abroad and Smokeless at Home: Holding the Tobacco Industry
Accountable in a New Era, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 81, 94 (2010) (describing the strategy
as "consist[ing] of (1) the pervasive dissemination of disinformation to encourage nonrational
decisionmaking . . and (2) the subsequent deprivation of free choice on the part of those who
become addicted to the products, even if the disinformation problem is corrected").
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Part V argues that this dichotomy in tort law theory is wrong as a descriptive
matter, and advances that tort law serves the disruption function, a function that
cannot be slotted into either the "moral" or "instrumental" tort function category.
Further, this Article argues that the dichotomy is problematic as a prescriptive
matter, as it underlies many of the calls for limiting the tort system.
Accordingly, tort theory must allow for hybrid private and public functions, such
as the disruption function, if the tort system is to remain viable in the current era
of expansive corporate activities that can cause widespread harms. The need for
such a rethinking of tort theory is particularly important if neuromarketing and
other increasingly sophisticated techniques for manipulating societal cognition
regarding high-risk products such as electronic cigarettes are as successful as the
business literature indicates that companies hope them to be.
Part VI concludes by emphasizing that the need has never been greater for
effective legal mechanisms, including tort law, to provide oversight of risky
business activities with the potential to cause widespread harms across space and
time. It is already clear that, due to the hybrid disruption function of tort law,
tort litigation based on widespread harms serves essential individual and public
needs at the same time. It is thus imperative that such litigation be allowed to
continue playing itself out, potentially in cases involving neuromarketing and
harms caused by e-cigarettes and beyond.
II.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TORT SYSTEM IN RESPONSE TO WIDESPREAD PUBLIC
HEALTH AND SAFETY HARM

In the 1916 landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,27 Judge
Benjamin Cardozo was faced with the task of applying the principles of tort law
to the drastic changes in the relationship between consumers and manufacturers
21
With the
that had taken place in the wake of the Industrial Revolution.
development of mass production and marketing, consumers rarely purchased
products directly from manufacturers as they had in the past. 29 Recognizing this

27.

111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).

28. See id. at 1053 ("Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stagecoach do not fit the
conditions of travel to-day. The principle that the danger must be imminent does not change, but the
things subject to the principle do change. They are whatever the needs of life in a developing
civilization require them to be.").
29. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW
FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 141 (2008) ("In the nineteenth century, ... craftsmen tended
to make and sell their products directly to those who would use them. . . . In contrast, with the rise
of mass-produced goods, . . . [t]he very people who were most likely to be affected by a defective
product were not the middlemen who purchased it directly from the manufacturer, but consumers
who purchased it from a retailer, or innocent bystanders who were not in the chain of distribution at

all.").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss1/5

80

Hutchinson: Affirmative Action: Between the Oikos and Cosmos Review Essay: Ri

2014] TORT AS A DISRUPTER OF CULTURAL MANIPULATION

199

'

reality,30 Cardozo concluded that it was necessary to abolish the requirement that
the person injured by a product be in a contractual relationship with the
manufacturer in order to bring a tort claim for negligent manufacturing.3
Cardozo justified this holding based on his portrayal of the trajectory being
carved out by previous cases in light of the inherently adaptable nature of the
common law of torts.32 As Cardozo put it, the general "principle" identifying the
nature of the "danger" presented by the given societal activity "does not change,
but the things subject to the principle do change."33 "They are," Cardozo
declared, "whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them to
be." 3 4
Three decades after MacPherson, Justice Roger Traynor expanded upon
Judge Cardozo's reasoning in another landmark opinion by a member of a state's
highest court applying tort principles to new types of conduct and harms in the
post-industrial era.35 By this time, the phenomenon of the mass production of
consumer products dealt with by Cardozo was coupled with increasingly
sophisticated marketing that included, inter alia, public relations and other

30. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053 ("The dealer was indeed the one person of whom it
might be said with some approach to certainty that by him the car would not be used. Yet [Buick]
would have us say that he was the one person whom it was under a legal duty to protect.").
3 1. As Cardozo resoundingly stated: "We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard
life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and
nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source
in the law." Id.; see also MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1052 (noting that nineteenth century precedents
can be ineffectual in addressing twentieth century situations). There is a very rich body of
scholarship on the import of MacPherson,and other opinions written by Cardozo, for the concept of
"duty" in tort law. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of
MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1735-77, 1812-47 (1998) (citations omitted) (providing an
overview of the way in which MacPherson has been invoked in support of various conceptions of
the role of duty in tort law and arguing for a different "moral" of the case regarding duty). This
Article does not take a position in that debate; rather, the focus is on the significance of the case for
the development of modern tort law in response to widespread harms caused by the activities of
corporate actors.
32. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051-53 (citations omitted) (cataloging relevant cases and
concluding that they justified dispensing with the rule that a plaintiff must be in a contractual
relationship with a manufacturer in order to prevail on a negligence claim against that
manufacturer).
33. Id. at 1053 (emphasis added).
34. Id. More specifically, Cardozo expanded the "inherent danger" exception to the privity
requirement to include "thing[s, the nature of which] is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made," for this characteristic makes them "thing[s] of danger."
Id. Cardozo did, however, place limits on the application of negligence law to suits by plaintiffs
who were not in privity with the manufacturers of the products that caused their injuries. See id.
(imposing a duty of care only on manufacturers that have "knowledge that the thing [they
manufacture] will be used by persons other than the purchaser . . . without new tests").
35. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 442 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring) (quoting MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053) (crediting Cardozo's opinion in
MacPherson with paving the way for courts to hold manufacturers liable for injuries caused by their
products, even in the absence of negligence).
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36

advertising techniques.
By such marketing strategies, consumer product
manufacturers conveyed messages that in effect became a key part of what the
"product" was in the minds of consumers.3 7 In the 1944 case of Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co.,38 the California Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict finding
the manufacturer of Coca Cola bottles liable for the negligent manufacture of a
bottle that exploded in the hand of a waitress, lacerating her palm and thumb.39
Traynor concurred in the judgment of the majority, but wrote separately to argue
that the majority's reasoning in justification of negligence liability was
unacceptably strained.40 Rather, according to Traynor, the court had in effect
determined that the bottling company was strictly liable for the plaintiffs
injuries-that is liable notwithstanding a failure to prove negligence on the part
of the bottling company. 4' Specifically, Traynor declared: "[I]t should now be
recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article that he
has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves
,,42
to have a defect that causes injury to human beings.
That is, in cases
involving injuries caused by mass-marketed products, the existence of a defect
alone rendered the manufacturer responsible in tort for the injury according to
43
Traynor.
In support of this assertion, Traynor drew heavily on Cardozo's reasoning in
MacPhersonjustifying the rejection of the rule that manufacturers were subject
to liability for negligence in product manufacturing only to those who had
purchased the products directly from the manufacturers.4 4 In particular, Traynor
invoked earlier cases finding liability for injuries caused by food products and
argued that they were better explained in MacPherson-type terms. 45 That is,

36.

See id. (noting consumers' increased reliance on advertising to gauge a product's

quality).
37. See id.
38. 150 P. 2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
39. See id. at 437-38, 440 (citing Druzanich v. Criley, 122 P.2d 53, 56 (Cal. 1942); Michener
v. Hutton, 265 P. 238, 240 (Cal. 1928)). The plaintiffs injuries occurred when "[t]he bottle broke
into two jagged pieces and inflicted a deep five-inch cut, severing blood vessels, nerves and muscles
of the thumb and palm of the hand." Id. at 438.
40. See id. at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring) ("It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence
the basis of recovery and impose what is in reality liability without negligence.").
41. See id. ("In leaving it to the jury to decide whether the inference [of negligence by the
manufacturer of a defective product] has been dispelled, regardless of the evidence against it, the
negligence rule approaches the rule of strict liability.").

42. Id. at 440.
43. See id. (citing Sheward v. Virtue, 126 P.2d 345, 345-46 (Cal. 1942); Kalash v. L.A.
Ladder Co., 34 P.2d 481, 482 (Cal. 1934); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053
(N.Y. 1916)). According to Traynor, "[e]ven if there is no negligence . . public policy demands
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health
inherent in defective products that reach the market." Id.

44. See id. at 440 (citing Sheward, 126 P.2d at 345-46; Kalash, 34 P.2d at 482; MacPherson,
111 N.E. at 1053).
45. See id. at 441-43 (citations omitted). The line of "food" cases that Traynor infused with
Cardozo's MacPherson logic were cases in which negligence could not be shown by a
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these cases finding liability for product-caused injuries were in fact instances of
judicial analysis and application of the principles of tort law that accounted for
the changing realities of the marketplace and the resulting new product-caused
46
harms that were becomingly increasingly common.
In justifying this conclusion, Traynor catalogs the changes in societal
conditions that warranted this result, highlighting the significant changes that
had taken place in the relationship between product manufacturers and
consumers, as well as the resulting power inequities, and thus the likelihood of
massive, unaddressed harms if tort law continued to be understood in terms of
the drastically different world of previous centuries. 7
Echoing Cardozo,
Traynor stated: "As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its
great markets and transportation facilities, the close relationship between the
producer and consumer of a product has been altered." 48 Traynor also pointed to
changes in that relationship since MacPherson that had further altered this
relationship; namely, that the manufacturer now had control over information
regarding increasingly complex production processes as well as over the
representation of the product on the market.49 In particular, Traynor noted:
Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, are
ordinarily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the
general public. The consumer no longer has means or skill
enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product,
even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his
erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of
manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and
marketing devices such as trade-marks.o
"The manufacturer's obligation to the consumer," Traynor stressed, "must
keep pace with th[is] changing relationship between them,"" which required
assigning tort responsibility to the manufacturer for harms caused by defective

preponderance of the evidence, and so the cause of action was contractual-specifically, for
violation of the implied warranties of merchantability and safety in which the courts essentially
abolished the privity requirement for similar reasons to those advanced by Cardozo in MacPherson.
See id. at 442 (citing Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); Klein v. Duchess
Sandwich Co., 93 P.2d 799, 803-04 (Cal. 1939); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d
828, 831-32 (Tex. 1942)).
46. See id. at 443 ("The manufacturer's obligation to the consumer must keep pace with the
changing relationship between them .....
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id.
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products even if those who are injured are unable to prove negligence.52 In sum,
Traynor recognized that, in an era of corporate national marketing campaigns
that made representations of products essential to what consumers perceived the
product to be, tort law had to be able to address harms that were caused not by
isolated instances of individual actions, but rather from systematic and systemic
activities of corporations.53
Two decades after Escola, Traynor made the same arguments for tort
liability based on product defects, but this time writing the court's majority
opinion. 54 In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,5 the defect-based
products liability action that Traynor had advanced in his Escola concurrence
became law for the state of California.56 It also quickly became law for much of
the rest of the country, as it was recognized as the majority rule in section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, published a mere two years after
Greenman and then adopted by almost every other state within a decade.
Developments in tort law such as that represented by the development of
liability for defective products provide one lens for viewing changing
conceptions of the boundaries of social responsibility that the public thinks
should, or should not, be legally enforceable.
Since tort law holds individuals

52.

See id. at 442 ("[The logic of MacPherson]pave[d] the way for a standard of liability that

would make the manufacturer guarantee the safety of his product even when there is no
negligence.").
53. Cf Gregory C. Keating, A Social Contract Conception of the Tort Law of Accidents, in
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 22, 39-40 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) ("In the world of
acts, risk impositions are discrete one-shot events.. .. At the opposite pole from the world of acts is
the world of activities. In the world of activities risks are systemic.... [T]he typical injury arises not
out of the diffuse and disorganized acts of unrelated individuals or small firms, but out of the
organized activities of firms that are either large themselves, or small parts of relatively wellorganized enterprises.").

54.

See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (citations

omitted).

55.

377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).

&

56. See id. at 901 (citations omitted). Traynor confidently stated that "[the court] need not
recanvass the reasons for imposing strict liability on the manufacturer." Id.
57. See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 145 ("[I]n one of the quickest transformations in the
history of tort law, strict products liability swept the country. In 1965, in its influential Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the American Law Institute . . . squeezed a hastily created strict products liability
provision, section 402A, in between the already prepared sections 402 and 403. The courts of
dozens of states then followed California and the Restatement, which had described the law as
providing strict products liability for injuries caused by products that were in a 'defective condition
unreasonably dangerous' to the user or consumer.") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965)); see also JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD
INTRODUCTION TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 271 (2010) ("Within ten years of [s]ection 402A's publication,
almost every state had adopted some form of defect-based products liability.").
58. See, e.g., Lance Liebman, Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM xii (2010) ("This volume [of the Restatement] explains the ideas
we hold about social duty and responsibility early in the [twenty-first] century."); GOLDBERG
ZIPURSKY, supra note 57, at 1 ("To commit a tort is to do wrong to another.... [It] is a legal
wrong-a wrong recognized by law, as opposed to wrongs that are exclusively violations of moral
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and entities liable for causing harm to another in certain circumstances, two
significant drivers of this conceptual evolution are the emergence of: (1) new
kinds of activities that cause harm, and (2) new kinds of harms.5 9 Certainly,
harms may "emerge" in the sense that society now recognizes them as such, even
though the experience of them has been extant for a long time.60 Harms may
also actually emerge as a result of changes in types of actors, activities, and
often, in both.6 It is this sort of change that has led to significant, and often

rules."); see also ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 1 (1995) ("[Private law] is the

public repository of our most deeply embedded intuitions about justice and personal
responsibility."); Marshall S. Shapo, An Essay on Torts: States of Argument, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 579,
579 (2011) ("I have believed for some time that tort law is a fairly accurate mirror of ourselvesour desires, our hopes and ambitions-and of the attitudes that grow out of those elements of
ourselves... . Beyond that, tort law captures tensions within ourselves . . . .").
59. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Dialectic of Injury and Remedy, 44 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1, 6
(2010) (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 107 (1985)) (noting that society has
become concerned with "new kinds of injuries," as well as injuries suffered by previously
marginalized groups). As Professor G. Edward White artfully states:
Tort law's integrity has come from a recurrent need in American
society for some legal response to the problem of responsibility for
civilly inflicted injuries. In the last hundred-odd years Americans have
been injured in all sorts of diverse ways; in that time secular
explanations for, and responses to, the problem of injuries have
predominated. Tort law has been a major explanatory and responsive
device. Its integrity, and its amorphousness as well, can be linked to
the place of injury in American life.
G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY xxviii (expanded ed.
2003); see also John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1640, 1654 (2012) (quoting GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 57, at 27) ("Tort law is a
'gallery of wrongs.' . . . [T]he composition of the gallery has changed, and will continue to change,
over time."); cf David G. Owen, Why Philosophy Matters to Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 1, 18 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) ("[T]he question posed [in tort
disputes] is 'What caused what?' Causation issues are colored, however, by issues of responsibility
and harm that connect to it on either side. So, matters bearing on responsibility and risk need first
to be understood in order to decide or even define the issue of 'What caused what?').
60. See Galanter, supra note 59, at 4 ("[W]e can visualize a moving legal frontier in which
some things are newly conceived of as remediable injuries, and formerly remedied injuries are
redefined as undeserving of legal remedy."); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890) ("Political, social, and economic changes entail the
recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of
society. Thus, in very early times, the law gave a remedy only for physical interference with life
and property .... Later, [however,] there came a recognition of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and his intellect."). Warren and Brandeis referred to this social development as "the
recognition of the legal value of sensations." Id.
61. See Galanter,supra note 59, at 4, 6 (citing FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 107) ("As more
things are capable of being done by human institutions, the line between unavoidable misfortune
and remediable injury shifts. The realm of injury is enlarged.... Not only does society's concern
expand to include new kinds of injuries, but it moves to the troubles of the sorts of people who were
previously held of little or no account. . . .").
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quite rapid, developments in tort law since the Industrial Revolution, when the
country began to experience the impacts of mass production and great
concentrations of wealth and power in corporate entities.
These impacts have accelerated since the 1960s as corporate actors have
acquired greater capacity for actions that can affect individuals and communities
across the nation, and even the world.64 This has resulted, to a significant extent,
from their abilities to: (1) present more serious risks to large numbers of people
through the use of often quite astounding scientific and technological
developments to, for example, manufacture new productS 65 and to implement
new means of extracting and processing fossil fuels such as underwater drilling
and hydraulic fracturing;66 and (2) at the same time exercise significant control
over public perceptions of their products and other activities through highly
sophisticated advertising and other public relations campaigns.67 As a result of
these two developments, many private actors and entities have amassed
significant power and influence over our environment and over our choices
61
about what we consume and use on a regular basis.
With such power and
influence comes a great capacity to present considerable risks to human health
69
and the environment, and thus to effect widespread harms.
The tort system has consistently been called upon to respond to these
changes as litigants have brought claims based on massive environmental and
public health harms that have been caused by the often complex activities of
large corporate entities,70 including an epidemic of tobacco-related deaths and

62. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American
Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 28 (2002) (quoting
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467 (2d ed. 1985)).
63. See Harold P. Southerland, Sovereignty, Value Judgments, and Choice Of Law, 38

BRANDEIS L.J. 451, 472 (2000).
64. See Craver, supra note 13, at 167 (citing Mitchell, supra note 13, at 584).
65. See Craver, supra note 13 and accompanying text. For example, many food, medical,
cosmetic, and other personal care products now contain nanomaterials; these materials are so small
that they are not visible even with the use of a regular microscope and consequently have different
physical, chemical, and biological properties than the same materials have in a regular-scale state.
Nanotechnology Fact Sheet, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/scienceresearch/
specialtopics/nanotechnology/ucm402230.htm (last updated June 24, 2014).
66. See Susan L. Sakmar, The Global Shale Gas Initiative: Will the United States Be the Role

Model for the Development of Shale Gas Around the World?, 33 HoUs. J. INT'L L. 369, 370-71
(2011).
67. See supra note 14.
68. See supra note 15.
69. See supra note 16.
70. See supra note 17. For a statement on the role of tort litigation in this context, see PUBLIC
HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 18, at 195. The tort system provides "attorneys general and
private citizens . . . a powerful means of indirect regulation" that is "an effective method for
reducing the burden of injury and disease" resulting from "pollution, toxic substances, unsafe
pharmaceuticals or vaccines, and defective or hazardous consumer products." Id.
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diseases; 7 ' deaths and debilitating injuries caused by defective drugs and medical
devices;72 illnesses and environmental destruction resulting from oil and
chemical spills; 73 and, most recently, the devastating environmental impacts of
climate change.74 Such uses of the tort system, in turn, have led to significant
developments in tort doctrine itself as well as advances in arguments in tort law
scholarship and in the political arena about the appropriate purposes of tort law
and its role in the U.S. legal system.
Importantly, these developments have
also brought into sharp relief the disruption function of tort law namely its
ability to serve private and public functions at once by providing an opportunity,
albeit limited, to evaluate such activities and harms in a space that provides a
respite from the omnipresent corporate manipulation of societal cognition.

III. THE

CONTINUING

DEPENDENCE"

POWER

STRATEGY:

OF

THE

"DISINFORMATION

NEUROMARKETING

AND

PLUS

PATH-

ELECTRONIC

CIGARETTES

A.

The PotentialManipulation of Societal Cognition by Neuromarketing:
"Disinformation Plus Path-Dependence" Revisited in Light of
Neuroscience Developments

In a 1999 Harvard Law Review article on product manufacturers'
manipulation of consumers' perceptions regarding the risks of various products,
Professors Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar made the prescient observation that:

71. See ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY 339 (2007) ("[T]obacco lawyers who
followed this research [indicating cigarettes were addictive and harmful] expressed concern about
how the publication and discussion of such studies might make the industry vulnerable to
litigation."); WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA,
AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 233-41 (2004) (citations omitted) (discussing three distinct periods in
the history of tobacco litigation); Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of
Litigation in the Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 63,
76-81 (1997) (citations omitted); see also supra note 18.
72. See David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95, 101
(2005) (discussing "the discipline imposed by the tort system" and describing medical devices as "a
perfect illustration of the inadequacy of relying on regulation alone"); see also supra note 19.
73. See David T. Peterson & Thomas P. Redick, Innovations and Considerationsin Settling
Toxic Tort Litigation, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1988, 9, 9; see also LeCesne, supra note
24, at 120 (noting that a "series of [negligent] decisions, acts, and omissions . . occurred over the
course of many months" leading up to the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig).
74. See Kysar, supra note 21, at 4 ("Just as earlier periods of unprecedented injury and loss
of life contributed to significant changes in American tort doctrine and practice, an influx of climate
change claims may force a reevaluation of the existing system for compensating and deterring
harm.").
75. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katrina, and 9/11:
Exploring Liabilityfor ExtraordinaryRisks, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1075, 1113 (2009) ("In considering
the desirability of compensation for catastrophic risks, we need to think broadly about the societal
interests at stake.").
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The markets that we have described as evincing manufacturer
manipulation-food products, pharmaceutical drugs, environmental
pollutants, weapons, and automobiles-are all markets in which one
would surmise intuitively that consumers are at least somewhat aware of
the fact that health and safety issues are implicated by the product. [In
such circumstances], manufacturers have incentives to manipulate risk
perceptions in the manner that benefits them most ....
It is our position that markets evolve to a point at which manufacturers
behave as if they know and understand consumer's [sic] biases and
cognitive shortcomings and can manipulate them accordingly ... The
evidence of market manipulation that we offer may therefore represent
only the practices that have been around long enough and are pervasive
enough to be identifiable. Market manipulation may be far more
prevalent andproblematic than we could ever demonstrate.76
As Edward L. Bemays well understood, insight into the mind of humans in
their capacity as consumers is a highly powerful and profitable tool.7 7 Beginning
in the 1920s, Bemays drew on the theories of human psychology developed by
his uncle, Dr. Sigmund Freud, and consequently became among the first to apply
the methods of public relations in the commercial sphere by, inter alia,
developing marketing campaigns targeting women for the American Tobacco
Company.
Around the time that Bemays was applying Freud's theories about
the human psyche and behavior to the marketing of products, another Austrian
psychologist, Ernest Dichter, was living in the United States and writing about
the implications of psychoanalytic theory for manipulating consumer
purchases.79 Further, large companies, including "Proctor & Gamble, Exxon,
Chrysler, General Mills[,] and DuPont," were paying Dichter millions to apply
his theories to the marketing of the myriad products that they sold throughout the
nation.so Dichter's incredibly lucrative idea was to apply Freudian theories
about the power of the subconscious in decision-making to marketing
strategies.s' Specifically, beginning in the late 1930s, as a result of Dichter's
advice, these and other leading national and multinational companies
incorporated into their marketing the idea "that every product has an image, even

76. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of
Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1422, 1466-67 (1999) (emphasis added).
77. See TYE, supra note 1, at 9-10.
78. See TYE, supra note 1, at 8-10, 28-31 (quoting BERNAYS, supra note 2, at 386-87); see
also supra text accompanying note 2.
79. See Sex and Advertising: Retail Therapy, ECONOMIST, Dec. 17-30, 2011, 119, 119
(noting that Dichter began exploiting his insights into "irrational buying" in America in the 1930s
and by the 1950s was considered "the Freud of the supermarket age").
80. Id.
81. See id. ("[Dichter] held that marketplace decisions are driven by emotions and
subconscious whims and fears . . . .").
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a 'soul,' and is bought not merely for the purpose it serves but for the values it
seems to embody."8 2 Dichter's psycho-marketing ideas were so pervasive that
they led Vance Packard, a sociologist, to claim in his 1957 book The Hidden
Persuadersthat, as a result of advertising techniques such as those developed by
Dichter, "Americans have become the most manipulated people outside the Iron
Curtain."83
In the 1960s, the efficacy of applying Freudian-type psychoanalytic theories
to consumer marketing began to be called into question as computers were
becoming increasingly sophisticated and the discipline of cognitive science was
emerging, which provided the opportunity for more quantitative and direct
studies of the human mind.8 4 Manufacturers of consumer products have never
stopped spending significant amounts on research into the human mind;
however: as Professors Hanson and Kysar pointed out in 1999, manufacturers
were spending eight billion dollars a year on cognitive science research focused
on consumer behavior.8 5
Although research of consumer behavior continues, and thus corporate
spending on it undoubtedly also continues to increase,86 manufacturers are
apparently now also turning toward investigating the human mind and associated
behavior through the relatively recent methods of so-called consumer
neuroscience or neuromarketing.
In contrast to consumer behaviorism and
psychology research, neuromarketing research employs methods that aim to
directly, rather than merely theoretically, tap into the consumer's mind

82.

Id. at 120.

83.

Id. at 119 (quoting VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS Preface (1957))

(internal quotation marks omitted). Further, Packard targeted Dichter for exploiting the emotions of
consumers to inspire a national glut of self-indulgence. He claimed that motivational researchers
such as Dichter, with their scientific cunning and Freudian voodoo, had unleashed the "chilling
world of George Orwell and his Big Brother." Ironically, Packard's dramatic assessment of
Dichter's dark powers ended up bringing him plenty of new business. Id. at 122-23 (quoting
PACKARD, supranote 83, at 5).
84. See id. at 123 (noting "the development of the cognitive sciences from the late
1950s . . to the 1970s").
85. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 76, at 1429.
86. But see Eric K. Clemons, How Information Changes Consumer Behavior and How
ConsumerBehavior Determines CorporateStrategy, J. MGMT. INFO. Sys., Fall 2008, 13, 14 (noting
that greater consumer access to information means many successful products are never formally
advertised or promoted). For an example of research into consumer behavior, see Echo Wen Wan et
al., To Be or Not to Be Unique? The Effect of Social Exclusion on Consumer Choice, 40 J.
CONSUMER RES. 1109, 1109-10 (2014), where the researchers concluded, based on three
experiments, that individuals who perceive themselves to be excluded socially with little chance of
reintegration "will seek to differentiate themselves" by making "distinctive" product choices, while
socially excluded individuals who feel confident about their ultimate "reaffiliation" are "less likely
to differentiate their choices from others' choices."
87. See LEON ZURAWICKI, NEUROMARKETING: EXPLORING THE BRAIN OF THE CONSUMER 1
(2010) ("Neuroscience constitutes a fusion of various disciplines .... This relatively new field of
research has in recent years significantly contributed to a better understanding of human behavior.
In that sense, it provides insights into the consumer conduct as well.").
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particularly into the subconscious and emotions with which Freudian theory was
To do so, neuromarketing researchers use complex modem
concerned.
techniques such as scanning various regions of the brain with magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI); measuring the electrical activity of brain cells with an
electroencephalogram (EEG); eye tracking; measuring physiological responses
such as heart rate, blood pressure, and hormonal levels; and often some
combination of these and various other techniques.89
The advantage of such techniques, according to those who study and
promote neuromarketing, is that its machinery-based research methods allow for
an unfiltered reading of human mental reactions to stimuli. 90 That is, the hope is
that researchers and the companies that hire them have finally achieved a means
of peering into what, since the days of Freud, has been considered the ultimate
"black box"-the human mind and its decisionmaking processes. 9' Whereas the
science of consumer behaviorism aims to provide a scientific description of
human behavior using natural or external research observation methods, and thus
conceives of the mind as a black box, neuromarketing techniques allow the
researcher to "directly observe internal psychological or physiological
,,92
processes.
Professor Leon Zurawicki, who specializes in business and marketing and
has written one of the leading books on neuromarketing, estimates that "around
the world there are approximately [ninety] private neuroscience labs contracting
with businesses to perform applied studies on consumer behavior, attitudes[,]
and related issues." 93 Professor Zurawicki is unable to provide an estimate of the
number of companies that hire these neuromarketing firms; however, as "many
client companies resorting to neuromarketing research do not publicize that fact
fearing the public backlash for the 'Frankenstein style' experiments."94

88. See ROGER DOOLEY, BRAINFLUENCE: 100 WAYS TO PERSUADE AND CONVINCE
CONSUMERS WITH NEUROMARKETING xii (2012). But see Sex and Advertising, supra note 79, at
123 ("[T]hese studies don't explain why something is happening, or what its effect might be in the
real world. Rather, they create a framework for new assumptions, new leaps of faith, new ways to
tell stories about the irrational choices people make.").
89. See ZURAWICKI, supra note 87, at 42-53 (explaining the various methods "used to
investigate the anatomy and the physiological functions, to model the brain activity and analyze
behavior").
90. See id. at 212 (observing that such techniques allow advertisers to "refin[e] the way
[consumers] interact with the markets"); see also DOOLEY, supra note 88, at xii (noting the ability
of MRIs and EEGs to directly measure reactions to specific stimuli, thereby allowing marketers to
optimize their ads).
91. See Peter Kenning et al., Consumer Neuroscience, in HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENTS IN
CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR 419, 419 (Victoria Wells & Gordon Foxall eds., 2012) (citing THE THEORY
OF BUYER BEHAVIOR (J.A. Howard & J.N. Sheth eds., 1969); Peter Kenning et al., Applications of
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging for Market Research, 10 QUALITATIVE MARKET RES.
INT'L J. 135, 136 (2007)).
92. Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
93. ZURAWICKI, supra note 87, at 211.
94. Id.
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Given the general nature of neuromarketing as a potential new means of
developing marketing and other public relations strategies by manufacturers, 95 as
well as the fact that addiction is of particular interest in the neuromarketing
96
field, neuromarketing could very well become an important part of both prongs
of the tobacco industry's "disinformation plus path-dependence" strategy
described in a previous article: namely, "(1) the pervasive dissemination of
disinformation to encourage nonrational decisionmaking ... [,] and (2) the
subsequent deprivation of free choice on the part of those who become addicted
to the products, even if the disinformation problem is corrected." 97
In light of the tobacco industry's systematic use of this strategy in various
forms over time to accommodate new cultural, socio-political, and technological
developments,9 8 it seems highly probable that the tobacco industry is involved in
neuromarketing in one form or another. If that is so, their efforts surely involve
the one product deemed capable of insuring a new generation of "smokers" in
the developed world: electronic cigarettes.
B.

The Case ofElectronic Cigarettes: "Vaping" Liquid Nicotine

Within the last couple of years, the three largest tobacco product companies
in

this

country

Altria

Group

(previously

Philip

Morris), 99

95. See id. at xii-vii.
96. Cf id. at 228-36 (citations omitted) (arguing that consumers should learn from
neuroscience to better understand the ways marketers influence them).
97. Sokol, supra note 26, at 94.
98. See BRANDT, supra note 71, at 339 (noting that documents produced in litigation against
the industry showed that "tobacco companies had known the addictive properties of nicotine for
decades" and that "[d]espite their campaign to discredit the [Surgeon General's report on nicotine
addiction], the companies had been deeply involved in studying the scientific and behavioral effects
of nicotine since at least the 1960s"); STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 61-74

(1996) (citations omitted) (describing and quoting from studies on nicotine addiction undertaken for
industry giant British American Tobacco); Sokol, supra note 26, at 95 & n.48 (quoting Philip J.
Hilts, Philip Morris Blocked '83 Paper Showing Tobacco is Addictive, Panel Finds, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 1994, at A21). As further pointed out:
[R]esearchers working for Philip Morris were the first to successfully design a research
method for assessing the addictive properties of nicotine as delivered to the body by the
use of tobacco products. Their study . . . , as recognized by the editors of the scientific
journal that accepted the paper on the study for publication . . was tremendously
significant, as it occurred several years before the Surgeon General issued the Report on
Nicotine Addiction. However, their paper was never published; Philip Morris compelled
the authors to withdraw it. The larger scientific community and the public were thus
denied the benefit of this vital information. Had it been published, the Surgeon General's
report undoubtedly would have been issued much earlier.
Sokol, supra note 26, at 95-96 (footnotes omitted).
99. See About Philip Morris USA, PHILIP MORRIS USA, http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/
cms/Company/Corporate_Structure/default.aspx?src=top nav (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (stating that
Philip Morris USA is now a wholly owned subsidiary of Altria Group). NuMark, manufacturer of
the MarkTen e-cigarette, is also an Altria subsidiary. See Our Companies & Their Brands, ALTRIA,
http://www.altria.com/About-Altria/Our-Companies-and-Their-
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R.J. Reynolds, 0 0 and Lorillard bought electronic cigarette or e-cigarette
companies, created subsidiaries that manufacture these products, and have been
highly successful at selling them by wielding their considerable marketing
power.101 Shortly before this Article went to press, R.J. Reynolds bought
Lorillard, so now there are only two large U.S. tobacco companies.102 Ecigarettes are battery-powered devices designed to look similar to regular
cigarettes, with an LED light at the end that lights up upon inhalation to mimic
burning.103 But instead of burning, they "vape" which is to say, a batterypowered vaporizer heats up a cocktail made up of nicotine and a mix of
undisclosed chemicals that is then inhaled by the user.1 04
Unlike their predecessors that were imported from China in 2007,1o' the
versions of e-cigarettes that Altria, RJ Reynolds, and Lorillard (until not long

Brands/Pages/default.aspx?src=topnav (last visited Oct. 4, 2014).
Philip Morris International was also originally a subsidiary company of Philip Morris, and then
of Altria. See Our History, PHILIP MORRIS INTERNATIONAL, http://www.pmi.com/eng/about
us/pages/our history.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2014). However, after acquiring tobacco product
companies all over the globe and capturing a global market share of 15.6%, the company spun off
from Altria, "becoming the world's leading international tobacco company and the fourth largest
global consumer packaged goods company." Id.
100. Who
We
Are,
R.J.
REYNOLDS
TOBACCO
Co.,
http://www.rjrt.
com/whoweare.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) ("R.J. Reynolds is an indirect wholly owned
subsidiary of Reynolds American Inc. . . . [which] is also the parent company of American Snuff
Company (formerly Conwood Company, LLC), Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Company,
Inc ...
Niconovum AB, and R.J. Reynolds Vapor Company."). For a summary of the major
tobacco companies' corporate restructuring history, see Sokol, supra note 26, at 88 n.20.
101. See Matt Richtel, A Bolder Effort by Big Tobacco on E-Cigarettes,N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2014, at Al; Melissa Block, E-Cigarettes:A Nearly $2bn Industry, a Regulatory Wild West, NPR
(Oct. 21, 2013, 4:37 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/10/21/239269426/e-cigarettes-a-nearly-2bnindustry-a-regulatory-wild-west; Richard Finger, Altria Group: E-Cigarettesor Die?, FORBES (May
22, 2013, 9:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardfinger/2013/05/22/altria-group-mo-ecigarettes-or-die/.
Interestingly, Lorillard, the first of the three tobacco product manufacturers to start selling ecigarettes, launched its new product Blu" e-cigarettes at the same time that the Food and Drug
Administration considered banning menthol flavored conventional cigarettes in addition to all other
flavorings. See Mike Esterl, Got a Light er Charger?Big Tobacco's Latest Buzz, WALL STREET J.,
Apr. 26, 2012, at B3. At the time, menthol cigarettes, specifically Newports, accounted for
approximately ninety percent of Lorillard's revenue. Id.
102. Fred Barbash, Reynolds Buys Lorillard in $27.4 Billion Giant Tobacco, E-cig
Consolidation, WASH. POST, July 14, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2014/07/15/reynolds-buys-lorrilard-in-27-4-billion-giant-tobacco-e-cig-deal/. R.J. Reynolds
will continue to market its "Vuse" e-cigarettes; it sold Lorillard's Blu e-cigarette brand and some
other "traditional" cigarette brands to Imperial Tobacco, "making Imperial a major U.S. competitor
for the first time." Id.
103. See Block, supra note 101.
104. See id.
105. See Esterl, supra note 101, B3 This Wall Street Journalarticle announcing Lorillard's
acquisition of an e-cigarette manufacturer pointed out:
[T]he niche [e-cigarette] industry has grown rapidly since arriving from China five years
ago. It now accounts for between $250 million and $500 million in annual sales,
according to industry estimates. A government survey found 2.7% of U.S. adults had
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ago-now Imperial Tobacco) 106are now marketing look remarkably like
conventional cigarettes and incorporate increasingly sophisticated battery
recharging technology and software. 0 7 Philip Morris's brand, MarkTen, is
white, shaped like a cigarette, and packaged in a box that looks like a
conventional cigarette pack.'os Further, unlike many of the versions of ecigarettes sold by companies that sell only e-cigarettes, which are larger and
rather awkward-looking and are akin to "small flashlights,"' 09 Philip Morris's
MarkTens have four small lights at the end that the company calls "FourDraw
technology." Phillip Morris touts its MarkTens as providing users, called
"vapers," with "a more consistent experience."" 0 R.J. Reynolds's Vuse ecigarettes are even sleeker in appearance; like Philip Morris's MarkTen, Vuse ecigarettes look like conventional cigarettes in size and shape, but have a black
and silver metallic appearance appropriate for an age of sleek-looking
technology like iPhones and iPads." Lorillard's Blu (now sold by Imperial
Tobacco) e-cigarettes are similar in design to Vuse, and now come in a box that
serves as a charger.11 2 The company soon plans to incorporate software into
their e-cigarette boxes that will allow users to employ social media tools to
connect with other users as well as to be alerted when they are near locations that
sell Blu products." 3
Because they contain nicotine, e-cigarettes are unquestionably addictive."14
In fact, the U.S. Surgeon General has compared the addictiveness of nicotine to

tried e-cigarettes by 2010, up from 0.6% a year earlier.
Id.
106. See Barbash, supra note 102 (describing the R.J. Reynolds's purchase of Lorillard, and
sale of Lorillard's "Blu" e-cigarette brand to Imperial Tobacco).
107. See,
e.g.,
Products
Overview,
NUMARK,
http://www.nu-mark.com/ourproducts/products-overview/Pages/default.aspx?src=topnav (last visited Oct. 4, 2014) (describing
product features).
108. See MarkTen E-Vapor, NUMARK, http://www.nu-mark.com/our-products/markten/Pages/default.aspx?src=topnav (last visited Oct. 4, 2014).
109. Matt Richtel, Some E-Cigarettes Deliver a Puff of Carcinogens, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2014, at Al ("Unlike disposable e-cigarettes, which tend to mimic the look and feel of conventional
smokes, tank systems tend to be larger devices heated with batteries that can vary in voltage, often
resembling fountain pens or small flashlights."); see also Block, supra note 101 (quoting an ecigarette user who referred to the product's appearance as "ridiculous").
110. See MarkTen E-Vapor, supra note 108.
111. See VUSE, http://vusevapor.com/modules/Security/Landing.aspx (last visited Oct. 4,
2014).
112. See Rechargeable Kits, BLU CIGS, http://www.blucigs.com/blu-rechargeable-kit (last
visited Oct. 4, 2014).
113. See Sean Cole, "Smart Pack" Encourages Social Networking Among E-Cig Users,
MARKETPLACE (June 21, 2011, 07:47), available at http://www.marketplace.org/topics/tech/smartpack-encourages-social-networking-among-e-cig-users.
114. See, e.g., Daniel Cressey, Regulation Stacks Up for E-Cigarettes, 501 NATURE 473, 473
(2013) ("[A]1though [e-cigarettes] are smoke-free, nicotine itself causes high blood pressure and
palpitations, and is highly addictive.").
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cocaine and heroin."' Furthermore, liquid nicotine is a neurotoxin that can be
deadly if consumed or absorbed through the skin.116 As reported recently in the
New York Times, instances of poisoning by liquid nicotine ("juice" or "e-juice"
in e-cigarette terminology),"' particularly among children, "are soaring"
throughout the nation." According to Professor Lee Cantrell, director of a
division of California's Poison Control System and a pharmacy professor, "[i]t's
not a matter of if a child will be seriously poisoned or killed. It's a matter of
when."1 9 This frightening rise in the number of children suffering from nicotine
poisoning is unsurprising not only because of the increased use of e-cigarettes,
but also, and even more so, because the e-juice comes in a number of kidfriendly flavors including chocolate, vanilla, pifia colada, cherry, bubble gum,
cotton candy, tutti-frutti, root beer, and gummy bear. 120
Undoubtedly, the companies that produce e-cigarettes do not produce them
in flavors such as these in order to induce young children to drink or to touch
liquid nicotine.121 Rather, the industry is unquestionably attempting to induce
children and adolescents to use, and consequently become addicted to, their
products by vaping the liquid nicotine. 122 Tobacco product companies' history
of targeting the young is well documented.1 23 This marketing campaign was
remarkably successful for decades until indoor smoking bans, documents
unveiled in tort litigation, whistleblower accounts regarding the industry's
deceptive tactics, and other factors coalesced to make smoking much less
attractive.1

24

Except for a handful of indoor bans in some states and municipalities,
however, none of those factors exist with respect to e-cigarettes. 125 Thus, it is

115. See Sokol, supra note 26, at 94 (citing to OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERvS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION, A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 11 (1988), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/

NN/B/B/Z/D/_/nnbbzd.pdf.
116. See Matt Richtel, Selling a Poison by the Barrel:Liquid Nicotinefor E-Cigarettes,N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2014, at Al.
117. See Block, supra note 101.
118. Richtel, supra note 116, at Al.
119. Id.
120. See Richtel, supra note 116, at Al, A3; Block, supra note 101; see also Original and
Premium Electronic Cigarette Flavor Cartridges, BLU CIGS, http://www.blucigs.com/store/
cartridges (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
121. See Richtel, supra note 116, at Al, A3 (noting the significant risks associated with liquid
nicotine, especially for children, but characterizing most poisonings as accidental).
122. See Block, supra note 101 (describing e-cigarette marketing as "especially seductive for
young people").
123. See Sokol, supra note 26, at 100 ("[Efforts to maintain a positive image of cigarettes
were] primarily directed at children and adolescents . . . .").
124. See id. at 106-08 (citing Master Settlement Agreement, § III(a)-(c)(1), available at
http://ag.ca.gov/tobacco/pdf/1msa.pdf; Michael Gormley, Reynolds Agrees to Quit Selling Flavored
Cigarettes in U.S., U.S.A TODAY, Oct. 11, 2006, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
money/industries/manufacturing/2006- 10-11-flavored-tobaccox.htm).
125. See Block, supra note 101.
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not surprising that a recent study by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
found that "[t]he percentage of U.S. middle and high school students who
use . . . e-cigarettes[] more than doubled from 2011 to 2012."126

Significantly,

twenty percent of the students in the CDC study who reported using e-cigarettes
also told the researchers that they had never tried a conventional "burning"
cigarette.127 The various flavors, as well as the marketing tactics of e-cigarette
manufacturers documented in a recent report on an investigation into these
tactics, spearheaded by Representative Henry Waxman and other congressional
Democrats, make clear that the industry is continuing to target the young in its
128
marketing, notwithstanding its vociferous insistence to the contrary.
The findings of the CDC study indicate that e-cigarettes may not only turn
out to be a gateway to nicotine addiction, but perhaps also to the use of
conventional cigarettes, as many medical and public health experts have
feared.1 29 Indeed, the fact that e-cigarettes look like cigarettes or modernized
versions of them may lead to a renormalization of conventional cigarettes, thus
undoing what was achieved by the indoor bans throughout the nation and
revelations about the industry's deceptive marketing tactics that it maintained in
order to profit from a product that it knew was deadly. 3 0
A recent study published in the British Medical Journalcombines these two
concerns about e-cigarettes, namely, that they will provide a gateway to other
tobacco products, particularly conventional cigarettes, and that many new users
will be the young.' 3 ' Although the article acknowledges that this area of

126. Press Release, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, E-Cigarette Use More
than Doubles Among U.S. Middle and High School Students from 2011-2012 (Sept. 5, 2013),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2013/p0905-ecigarette-use.html.
127. See id.
128. See STAFF OF SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN ET AL., GATEWAY TO ADDICTION 1 (2014)
(finding, inter alia, that "[e]ight e-cigarette companies promote their products through sponsored or
sampling events, many of which appear to be youth-oriented;" that "[f]our e-cigarette companies
use celebrity spokespeople to market their products and depict e-cigarette smoking as glamorous;"
and that "[s]even e-cigarette companies utilize social media to promote their products"); see also
Sabrina Tavernise, E-CigarettesAre Targetedat Youths, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2014, at
Al6.
129. See Cressey, supra note 114, at 73 (quoting Professor Stanton Glantz, a researcher of
tobacco product use at the University of California, San Francisco, who warned that a CDC study
indicates that e-cigarettes may act as a gateway to use of traditional cigarettes).
130. See Sokol, supra note 26, at 108 ("Th[e] confluence of increased public awareness of the
[tobacco] industry's deceptive business strategies . . and of the numerous indoor smoking bans
across the nation, appears to have been bad for cigarette business in the United States."); Block,
supra note 101 ("[E-cigarette advertising] renormalizes something that looks about [ninety-five]
percent the same as smoking . . . .").
131. See Elizabeth L. Durmowicz, The Impact of Electronic Cigarettes on the Paediatric
Population, 23 TOBACCO CONTROL ii4l, ii4l (2014) (citing TODD D. FRALEY ET AL.,
RESPIRATORY

HEALTH

Ass'N,

E-CIGARETTES

AND

YOUTH

2

(2013),

available

at

http://www.lungchicago.org/site/files/487/148613/490314/681242/RHA_Tobacco_WhitePaper_E-CigarettesandYouth; Press Release, Matthew L. Myers, President, Campaign for TobaccoFree Kids, CDC Survey Finds Youth E-Cigarette Use More than Doubledfrom 2011-2012, Shows
Urgent
Need
for
FDA
Regulation
(Sept.
5,
2013),
available
at
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research is still nascent and thus information is far from comprehensive, it was
able to conclude from even the small amount of data available that "youth
awareness" of e-cigarettes is "high" and that use of e-cigarettes by children and
adolescents is "increasing rapidly and . . . is not limited to current smokers." 32

Many medical and public health experts are also concerned that e-cigarettes
could serve as a bridge product that will allow users of conventional cigarettes to
sustain nicotine addiction, in spite of the many indoor bans that still exist.'33 As
Dr. Vaughan Rees of the Harvard School of Public Health told a reporter for the
journal Nature, "care needs to be taken to ensure that they don't flourish
alongside conventional cigarettes."1 34 Importantly, none of the largest tobacco
companies have stopped selling conventional cigarettes or other conventional
tobacco products such as snuff and chewing tobacco.1 35
Finally, although some scientific experts, such as Dr. Rees, believe that ecigarettes could "present an opportunity to improve public health," 36 many
others highlight the great need for more information before any such conclusions
can be drawn.1 37 Alarmingly, some small studies indicate that vaping may
present dangers similar to those presented by conventional cigarettes, such as

http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press releases/post/2013_09_05_ecigarettes; E-Cigarettes, AM.
ACAD. PEDIATRICS (Jan. 2014), available at http://www2.aap.org/richmondcenter/pdfs/ECigarette
handout.pdf).
132. Id. at ii45.
133. Cressey, supra note 114, at 73.
134. Id.
135. See Am. Lung Ass'n, Tobacco Industry, ST. TOBACCO CONTROL 2014,
http://www.stateoftobaccocontrol.org/at-a-glance/tobacco-industry.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
136. Cressey, supra note 114, at 73.
137. See, for example, id., which points out that, given the dearth of research that has been
conducted about the effects of e-cigarettes, at least outside the industry, "[1]ittle is known about the
long-term effects of e-cigarette vapour," and that, furthermore, it is known that "nicotine itself
causes high blood pressure and palpitations." See also Tavernise, supra note 128, at A16 ("Public
health experts are deeply divided on the perils and benefits of e-cigarettes. Some say they offer the
first satisfying alternative to smoking in generations . . .while others contend they could become a
gateway to traditional cigarette smoking for young people."). Regarding the risks of nicotine alone,
the full extent of its long-term effects are also in question, as the studies of nicotine are largely
based on human intake of it through conventional cigarettes which contain numerous chemicals,
many of which are known carcinogens and significantly contribute to cardiovascular disease. See,
e.g., Neal L. Benowitz & Steven G. Gourlay, CardiovascularToxicity of Nicotine: Implicationsfor
Nicotine Replacement Therapy, 29 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1422, 1427-29 (1997) (describing
possible implications of nicotine replacement therapy). As Benowitz and Gourlay's article states:
Establishing whether the relation between [nicotine replacement therapy] and
cardiovascular events is causal is difficult. Acute cardiovascular events are common in
cigarette smokers, and the increased risk for such events persists beyond the time when
they stop smoking. Therefore, it is impossible to ascertain from retrospective reports
whether acute cardiovascular events reflect the risk of underlying disease, cigarette
smoking, concurrent cigarette smoking or nicotine medications, alone or in combination.
Id. at 1427-28.
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cancer.1 38 Further, as one of the researchers who was involved in one of these
studies stated, "There is a lot that we don't know about e-cigarettes, and one
concern is that some of the substances within e-cigarettes could contribute to
negative health effects."1 39

Other than the handful of indoor bans and age restrictions in some localities,
e-cigarettes are currently completely unregulated.1 40 The companies that
manufacture and market them do not have to, for example, disclose their
ingredients, as they now do with respect to conventional cigarettes and other
products classified as "tobacco products" by the 2009 legislation giving the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate tobacco products.141
As Representative Henry Waxman, who also led an exhaustive investigation into
the industry's tactics with respect to conventional cigarettes almost two decades
ago, recently told a New York Times reporter: "We fought for decades to set
strict rules for marketing of traditional cigarettes. E-cigarette manufacturers
don't have to play by the same rules. They are free to sponsor youth-oriented
events and make flavors that appeal to kids, and that's exactly what's
happening."142

Although they look like cigarettes, contain nicotine, and are thus highly
addictive like cigarettes, e-cigarettes do not contain tobacco.143 It is for this
reason, according to Joe Murillo, the president and general manager of
NuMark the Altria subsidiary that manufactures and markets MarkTen ecigarettes-that e-cigarettes are not, and thus should not be, considered or treated
by regulators as the conventional cigarettes that Altria continues to manufacture

138. See Barry Meier, E-Cigarette Study Data May Raise Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,
2014, at B1 (describing a "little-noticed study" in which "nicotine-laced vapor generated by an
electronic cigarette promoted the development of cancer in certain types of human cells much in the
same way that tobacco smoke does"); Richtel, supra note 109, at Al (summarizing the findings of
a study to be published in the journal Nicotine and Tobacco Research which discovered "that the
high-power e-cigarettes known as tank systems produce formaldehyde, a known carcinogen, along
with the nicotine-laced vapor that their users inhale").
139. Meier, supra note 138, at BI The researchers emphasized, however, that the information
currently available on e-cigarettes is limited and they are still working on the best method for
studying the impact of nicotine vapor on humans. See id. (reporting that one lead researcher
cautioned that "it was hard to apply the findings of test-tube studies to people"). It bears mentioning
that this problem is not unlike that faced by medical and other scientific researchers outside the
tobacco industry when trying to assess the impact of tobacco smoke on humans. See, e.g., Benowitz
& Gourlay, supra note 137, at 1427-28 (describing the difficulty of isolating the effects of nicotine
from the overall effects of smoking).
140. See Block, supra note 101.
141. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 901(a), 21 U.S.C. § 387a(a)
(2012); Block, supra note 101.
142. Tavernise, supra note 128, at A16.
143. Id. The nicotine is extracted from tobacco, however. See Markten® E- Vapor, NUMARK,
http://www.nu-mark.com/our-products/mark-ten/Pages/default.aspx?src=topnav
(last visited Apr.
10, 2014).
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such as Marlboro.1 44 In a recent interview with a National Public Radio
correspondent, Murillo emphatically stated that:
Smoking is not vaping and vaping is not smoking, and that seems
obvious. [D]espite the popular name, an electronic cigarette is not a
cigarette. You are not burning tobacco. There is no odor. So what I
would urge everyone-including the public health and regulators, just
like consumers-is to think about this for what it is not for what it's
not. 145
What is an e-cigarette then? Without a doubt, it is a continuation of the
industry's "disinformation plus path-dependence" strategy, designed to maintain
existing addictions and form new nicotine addictions while evading any sort of
governmental oversight; and so far, it has.
A few years after e-cigarettes began to proliferate in the United States, the
FDA did begin the regulatory process by classifying e-cigarettes as a drug and
device combination subject to the agency's "drug and device" authority, rather
than as a tobacco product subject to its "tobacco" authority.146 However, that
attempt was derailed when an e-cigarette company successfully challenged the
FDA's assertion of regulatory authority.147 In 2010, a panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that because the liquid nicotine in e-cigarette
juice is derived from tobacco, they are tobacco products like conventional
cigarettes, chewing tobacco, and so on, rather than drugs and devices.148
The FDA responded that it would not appeal the D.C. Circuit's decision and
would instead propose regulations of e-cigarettes under its tobacco product
regulatory authority.1 49 However, Murillo's statement strongly indicates that the
tobacco product industry will also fight this attempt by the FDA to regulate its
latest nicotine product. 0 This is further buttressed by the industry's concerted
effort in its marketing to introduce a whole other vocabulary for e-cigarettes,

144. See Block, supra note 101.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. See Soterra, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
147. See id. at 898 (holding that U.S. Supreme Court precedent and the "Tobacco [Control]
Act establish that the FDA cannot regulate customarily marketed tobacco products under the
FDCA's drug/device provisions, that it can regulate tobacco products marketed for therapeutic
purposes under those provisions, and that it can regulate customarily marketed tobacco products
under the Tobacco Act.").
148. See id.
149. See Stakeholder Letter from Lawrence R. Deyton & Janet Woodcock, Regulation of ECigarettes and Other Tobacco Products, FDA (Apr. 25, 2011) (citing Soterra, 627 F.3d at 898),
available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm252360.htm.
150. See Block, supra note 101 ("what I would urge everyone-including the public health
and regulators just like consumers-is to think about this for what it is not for what it's not").
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including not only "vapers" and "vaping" instead of "smokers" and "smoking,"
but also "juice" or "e-juice" instead of liquid nicotine and other ingredients.'
As the D.C. Circuit stated in its opinion, holding that e-cigarettes were not
within the FDA's drug and device authority, the Tobacco Control Act was
"[w]ritten to address the regulatory gap ... identified" by a U.S. Supreme Court
case rejecting the FDA's attempt to regulate conventional cigarettes using its
drug and device authority. 5 2 In late April 2014, the agency began the long
process of attempting to fill the gap created by the introduction of e-cigarettes
into the U.S. market by proposing rules that will govern e-cigarettes.1 53
Importantly, the proposed rules would ban the sale of e-cigarettes to minors and
require that manufacturers disclose their products' ingredients, manufacturing
processes, and scientific data to the agency.1 54 However, unlike conventional
cigarettes, the proposed rule does not regulate advertising or ban flavorings of ecigarettes; this is problematic given the information about the industry's
aggressive marketing to youth.
If the industry is successful in what appears to be its argument that ecigarettes also do not fall within the FDA's tobacco regulatory authority, the
only protection against the likely harmful effects of this latest "e-manifestation"
of the industry's disinformation plus path-dependence strategy may very well be
provided by tort law. This will also be the case even if the industry ultimately
does not successfully challenge the proposed rules as the rulemaking process

15 1. See, e.g., Amy McQueen, et al., Interviews with "Vapers ": Implications for Future
Research with Electronic Cigarettes, NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. J., April 5, 2011, at 4, tbl. I
available
at
http://www.stop-tabac.ch/fra/images/stories/documents_stoptabac/interview%/`20
with%20vapers.pdf. (describing the new phrases used to explain how to use electronic cigarettes).
152. See Sottera, 627 F.3d at 897. The U.S. Supreme Court case relied on by the e-cigarette
manufacturer who brought the suit against the FDA and ultimately by the D.C. Circuit is Brown v.

Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
153. See Regulations on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products, 79 Fed. Reg. 23, 142

(Apr. 25, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1100, 1140, 1143). In addition to e-cigarettes, the
proposed rules would cover other "[p]roducts that meet the statutory definition of 'tobacco
products' . . . such as certain dissolvables, gels, hookah tobacco . . . cigars, and pipe tobacco." Id. at

23, 143.
154. See id. at 23, 148.
155. See Lawrence 0. Gostin & Aliza Y. Glasner, E-Cigarettes, Vaping, and Youth, 312 J.

AM. MED. Ass'N 595, 596 (2014) (applauding the FDA's deeming of e-cigarettes as "tobacco
products" within the agency's regulatory authority, but calling on the agency to "move boldly and
rapidly to prevent companies from exploiting youth . . . [b]y bolstering the proposed rules to limit
advertising and prohibit flavored nicotine"); see also Richtel, supra note 101, at Al7 (describing
the dispute between public health experts and the top three tobacco companies regarding whether
the agency should limit advertising to youth, as well as whether the companies are in fact already
doing so).
In the preface to its proposed rule, the FDA expresses awareness that e-cigarettes and
other "novel tobacco products" come in various flavors that are attractive to youth, but at this stage
asks for comment on the matter and expresses that it needs more data before proceeding with any
flavoring restrictions akin to those provided for in the Tobacco Control Act for conventional
cigarettes. See Regulations on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products, 79 Fed. Reg. at 23,

144.
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will invariably be a long one, particularly if the industry initiates judicial
challenges to the FDA's assertion of its tobacco product authority.15 6
Thus, tort law will in all likelihood be needed to provide an essential role in
consumer protection against these new, unregulated products, as it did with
respect to conventional cigarettes. This may be particularly so if neuromarketing
turns out to be successful and becomes a part of the disinformation plus pathdependence strategy. Tort law played a protective role in the conventional
cigarette litigation through its disruption function. Thus, it is essential that the
misguided tort theory dichotomy and the campaign to limit the tort system that is
based on it be dispelled.
IV.

THE

MORAL/INSTRUMENTAL

DICHOTOMY

AND

THE

SO-CALLED

TORT

"CRISIS"

The relatively rapid development of a torts liability doctrine in response to
harms caused by mass-marketed defective products, provided significant fuel for
what was around the same time becoming a very rich scholarly debate about the
purposes of tort law and, relatedly, its appropriate role within U.S. law. 5 7
Unfortunately, however, it has also been a significant impetus for a wideranging, concerted, and persistent campaign by corporate interests to convince
state and federal governmental officials and the general public that the tort
system must be cabined.'
The scholarship has continued to grow, and this

156. See Gostin & Glasner, supra note 155, at 595. The World Health Organization recently
issued a report on e-cigarettes in which it recommended, inter alia, that countries ban the use of ecigarettes indoors, require that manufacturers provide sufficient supporting evidence before making
claims that e-cigarettes are safer alternatives to traditional cigarettes, and that marketing to youth
should be restricted. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems 1,
11-13 (July 21, 2014), http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTC_COP6_10-en.pdf?ua=1.
157. See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 146 (noting that the application of economic theories to
law, including tort law, around the time that a separate doctrine for products liability was
recognized, led to a strong focus on the deterrent effects of tort law, that is, its ability to provide
incentives for greater safety measures, whereas previously it had principally been on its ability to
provide compensation for injuries). As David Owen points out in the introduction to the
PhilosophicalFoundations of Tort Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s 1881 book The Common Law
was "arguably the first 'modern' effort to unravel fundamental problems of the common law,
including tort law, in basic philosophical terms." David G Owen, Why Philosophy Matters to Tort
Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 1, 1 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). However,
Owen says, "the bridge between tort law and philosophy remained thereafter lightly traveled for
many decades" until the 1960s and early 1970s, when scholars such as Guido Calabresi and
Richard Posner began putting forth "important economic efficiency theories of tort liability." Id. at
1-3. (citations omitted) According to Owen, "[t]ort law scholarship of this type, which viewed the
law of torts through the consequentialist lens of economic analysis, spurred a sharp response in the
1970s from those in the academy who thought that the foundations of tort law rested more firmly on
moral ground." Id. at 2.
158. See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 71, at 38-39; John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and
Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919, 1919-20 (2010) (citing THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS,
LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 24
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corporate campaign has strengthened in response to the increasing use of the tort
system to address systemic corporate activities and the resulting widespread
harms. 159
A.

The Moral/Instrumental(or Individual/Public) Dichotomy of Tort Law
Functions

Many of the most prominent and influential scholars of tort law have framed
their inquiry as one seeking a unifying theory of tort law, that is, they start with
the question of how people can make sense of the entire tort system, or most of
it, with a single, or at least primary, theory of the functions that it serves.160 The
answers have largely been divided into two categories: (1) moral theories that
focus on effecting justice in the individual case, such as providing redress for
harms and a venue for holding wrongdoers accountable for harms;' 6' and (2)
instrumental theories that focus on the benefits provided to the public by tort

(2002)); see also Timothy D. Lytton et al., Tort as a Litigation Lottery: A Misconceived Metaphor,
52 B.C. L. REV. 267, 268-69 (2011) (describing the views of various scholars who "[fjor over forty
years . . have disparaged the tort system as a lottery" and argued that the system should be
"reformed" in various ways, including "replac[ing] the tort system with some form of no-fault
accident insurance").
159. See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the "Tort Reform" Movement, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 538 (2006) ("Perhaps the most interesting issue raised by the tort reform
movement is: How will we know if the movement has succeeded in 'reforming' tort law?").
Products liability law continued to develop rapidly. As noted in the introduction to the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM at 1 (2010), section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts "launched the vast body of modern products-liability
law."
160. See, e.g., Christopher J. Robinette, Why Civil Recourse Theory is Incomplete, 431 TENN.
L. REV. 431, 432 (2011) (stating that, "[fjrom the days of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to the present,
many scholars have pointed to a single answer" to the question of what tort law "is for," and
critiquing "[t]he latest attempt to so unify tort law"; namely, "the rich 'civil recourse' theory of
Professors John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky"). Tort law scholarship has increasingly
drawn on other disciplines particularly economics, moral philosophy, and political theory to
explicate the purposes of tort law. For an overview of some of the most prominent theories that
scholars have advanced "to identify some unifying and rationalizing themes or aims" of tort law, see
Gerald J. Postema, Introduction: Search for an Explanatory Theory of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND
THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 53, at 1.

&

161. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 198, 380-81 (1992) ("At the core of
tort law is a certain practice of holding people liable for the wrongful losses their conduct has
occasioned," and not instrumental theories such as economic analysis, for they do not proffer any
"principled reasons for connecting injurers and victims in the way that tort law does," which is "a
way that reflects their relationship to one another, rather than to the goals of tort law."); John C.P.
Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists(and the Rest of Us): Private Law in Disguise, 28 HARV. J.L.
PUB. POL'Y 3, 10, 15-16 (2004) (arguing for an individual-case, "wrongs-based view of tort law,"
and stating that "[t]o gain a genuinely realistic sense of what tort law actually does, what it can do,
and what it ought to do, we must dispense with the notion that tort law ought to be public regulatory
law because that is the only thing it can be"). See generally Scott Hershovitz, What Does Tort Law
Do? What Can It Do?, 47 VAL U. L. REV. 99 (2012) (discussing various prominent "corrective
justice" theories and proffering an alternative way of framing this function).
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law, such as the efficient distribution of the costs of losses and deterrence of
unnecessarily risky behavior.1 62
Many scholars whose primary theory of tort's function lies on one side of
this conceptual divide do not necessarily dismiss that tort law does in fact
sometimes serve other functions that fall on the other side of the dichotomy.163
These scholars maintain, however, that tort law's primary rationale, and the one
that accounts for most decisions, and perhaps should account for all decisions, is
either moral/individual or instrumental/public.1 64 A few scholars take a more
evenhanded pluralist position, maintaining that tort law serves multiple
purposes. 16 These scholars, however, still view tort law's purposes as being
amenable to discrete characterization as either moral or instrumental.166 In sum,
a dichotomy between moral/individual and instrumental/public dominates in tort

162. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 14 (1987) (discussing that fault may have an economic rationale);
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 312 (1970)
(summarizing that a system other than the fault system may better reduce accident costs); Gregory
C. Keating, Is Tort a Remedial Institution?, 24-25 (U.S.C. Ctr. in Law, Econ., and Org. Research
Paper
No.
C10-11,
available
at
http://weblaw.usc.edu/assets/docs/contribute/
C10_1 1paper 000.pdf (arguing that to "[c]all [] the repair of wrongful losses the 'overarching aim
[sic] or purpose' of tort law misunderstands the law of torts[,]" for tort law is designed to prevent
the need to address wrongs by deterring wrongful conduct, and, thus, "[i]n a social world where the
law of torts was fulfilled as far as reasonably possible, tortious wrongs requiring repair would
presumably be rare.") (citing COLEMAN, supra note 161, at 395).
163. See COLEMAN, supra note 161, at 198 ("At the core of tort law is a certain practice of
holding people liable for the wrongful losses their conduct has occasioned."); LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 162, at 14 ("It would be consistent with these efforts to find that the tort concept of fault
has an economic rationale also.")

164. See, e.g., Michael Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REv. 433, 435-36 (2011)
(citing DAN. B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 12 (2000)) ("The law of torts is a multi-paradigmatic
field with most scholars fitting into two competing camps. The emphasis is either on 'morality or
corrective justice' or on 'social utility or policy."').
165. See, e.g., Tony Honor&, The Morality of Tort Law Questions and Answers, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 73, 84-85 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) ("arguing that
tort law serves both the purpose of corrective justice-in other words, "correcting" the harm
suffered by plaintiffs as a result of tortious conduct -and the purpose of "distributive justice"-the
fair distribution of injury in society); Christopher J. Robinette, Can There Be a Unified Theory of
Torts? A Pluralist Suggestion from History and Doctrine, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 369, 413 (2005)
(arguing that the history of tort doctrine and scholarship demonstrate that "tort law must be based on
multiple rationales" moral/individual, such as corrective justice and compensation, as well as
instrumental/public, such as deterrence).
166. See, e.g., Izhak Englard, The Idea of Complementarity as a Philosophical Basis for
Pluralismin Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 183, 187 (David G. Owen
ed., 1995) ("My primary argument is that positive tort law is based upon polyvalent justifications
that are often mutually inconsistent . .. [f]or the purposes of my endeavor, it suffices to classify the
pluralistic reasonings under the two headings of instrumentalism and non-instrumentalism and noninstrumentalism. . . ."); Robinette, supra note 160, at 433 ("In each successive reform,
instrumentalism made increasing inroads into tort. Civil recourse theory, in failing to acknowledge
this instrumentalism, omits a substantial component of tort law."); see also id. at 471-75 (citations
omitted) (characterizing the development of modern products liability tort doctrine as driven largely
by the "instrumentalist" rationales of deterrence and loss-spreading).
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law theory. This dichotomy, in turn, underlies the prevailing assumption that
tort law generally, or particular doctrines or decisions, are driven largely by
moral or individual purposes of addressing wrongful conduct and resulting
harms that have already taken place in the individual case, or by the instrumental
or public purposes of distributing losses across society, or protecting the public
against ongoing and future wrongful conduct and harms.
B.

The So-Called Tort "Crisis" and the Callfor Tort "Reform"

Because many of the business ventures that present significant risks to
populations and the environment involve activities that are highly complex,
scientifically and technologically, and because of the widespread and often
complex nature of the harms that such activities cause, many policymakers,
political commentators, and business interests have argued that the tort system is
an inappropriate mechanism for making judgments about responsibility in such
cases.167 Rather, they argue that tort law should be confined to its proper, longstanding function of redressing unique individual harms caused by relatively
uncomplicated activities and processes. That is, although these cases may
involve wrongful conduct and harm, either or both are not of the sort that should
be recognized as such in the tort system as properly understood. Rather, if these
sorts of activities and harm are dealt with by the legal system at all, it should be

167. See, e.g., HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 71, at 36 (2004); Michael L. Rustad, The
Endless Campaign: How the Tort Reformers Successfully and Incessantly Market Their Groupthink
to Rest of Us 5 (Suffolk Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-32, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1614983 ("The tort reform movement is often
portrayed as a grass roots movement by ordinary Americans calling for changes in the tort system.
In reality, tort reform is an astro-turf movement by public relations professionals representing
America's most powerful corporations and insurance companies."); id. at 6-7 (observing that those
associated with the tort reform movement "often employ the theme of personal responsibility to
marginalize plaintiffs seeking compensation for mass torts. For example, the tort reformers
'attacked the plaintiff in a landmark tobacco product liability action by arguing that the plaintiff
should have taken personal responsibility for the cancer caused by her smoking rather than blame
the tobacco industry."') (quoting Rustad & Koenig, supra note 62, at 3-4); Daniel Fisher,
Filmmaker Takes on Lawyers - With Chamber's Help, FORBES (July 11, 2011, 10:07 AM),
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/07/11/filmmaker-takes-on-lawyers-withchambers-help/ (discussing a documentary financed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce portraying
the tort system as a venue for abuse in litigation arising out of asbestos exposure.); cf Victor F.
Schwartz, Taking a Stand Against Lawlessness in American Courts: How Trial Court Judges and
Appellate Justices can Protect Their Courtsfrom Becoming JudicialHellholes, 27 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVoc. 215, 224-25 (quoting Holmes Cnty. Bk. & Trust Co. v. Staple Cotton Coop. Ass'n, 495
So. 2d 447, 451 (Miss. 1986)) (using Mississippi litigation involving tort claims against a
pharmaceutical manufacturer as a case example to argue that appellate courts should take proactive
measures to curtail what the authors argue are unfair jury verdicts against corporate defendants
including, for example, reigning in noneconomic pain and suffering damages and consolidation of
claims).
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through the public law system of statutes and administrative rules for
governmental regulation of private business activities.1 68
It is in part on the basis of such an individual/public dichotomy or
moral/instrumental dichotomy that corporate interests have argued that there is a
tort crisis that must be addressed by limitations on tort law. 69 Many of their
arguments for so-called tort reform are variants of the claim that the use of tort
law to address large-scale, systematic corporate activities involving complex
technology that cause widespread harms-such as harms caused by dangerous
products like conventional cigarettes, defective automobiles, and possibly ecigarettes, as well as those caused by anthropogenic climate change and toxic
spills-is not an appropriate function of the civil justice system.1 70 Rather,
corporate interests have repeatedly argued that such activities and harms are
properly addressed only through public regulatory law, more specifically, U.S.
congressional statutes and federal administrative agency rules.' 7

168. Cf Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an
Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 356 (2011) (arguing that the tort system should be used
to adjudicate claims involving massive harm, such as the myriad harms caused by climate change,
so the tort system has "an opportunity to fulfill a crucial institutional role too often neglected both
by dominant theories of tort law's purposes and by institutional competence analyses that compare
tort law with regulation 'proper'). Such arguments that tort law is being improperly employed for
"public law" functions are often particularly directed at cases involving complex activities and
harms brought by a group of plaintiffs-such as class action members or a community
and,
increasingly, by state attorneys general on behalf of the residents that they are charged with
protecting. See, e.g., id. at 369-70 ("many of the reasons for skepticism that climate change tort
defendants could be held liable . . .have been similarly applicable to other environmental and toxic
tort suits. Albeit with hesitation and confusion, courts have devised a number of doctrinal devices to
accommodate the difficulties of proof associated with those cases.").
169. See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 71, at 34.

170. See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 168, at 369-7 1; HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 71, at
36; Rustad, supra note 167, at 5-6 (citing Rustad & Koenig, supra note 62, at 4; FOWLER V.
HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS xxx (3d. ed. 2006)).
171. See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 168, at 418 (citing to Tribe et al., Too Hot for Courts to
Handle: Fuel Temperatures, Global Warming, and the Political Question Doctrine 21 (Wash. L.
Found., Working Paper No. 169, 2010), available at http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/
workingpaper/012910TribeWP.pdf).
That does not mean, however, that the same corporate interests do not spend significant
resources fighting legislative and administrative regulation. In Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007), for example, trade associations of the automotive industry filed amicus briefs in support of
then-President George W. Bush administration's argument that the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) did not have authority to regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas
emissions. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505, n.6 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument and further held that the states were correct that the EPA was required by the
Clean Air Act to regulate carbon dioxide emissions as a "pollutant" harmful to human health. See
id. at 534-35 (citing 42 U.S.C. §7607(d)(9)(A) (2012)). It bears mention that, in arguing that the
EPA did not have authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, the administration relied heavily
on FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), in which tobacco companies
successfully challenged the FDA's assertion of its "drug/device" authority to regulate tobacco
products. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 512 (citing Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159).
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The tort reform campaign has multiple fronts, including state and federal,
and legislative and constitutional. A significant part of the campaign is a dual
push for statutory and constitutional limits on damage awards on the one hand,
and for statutory and constitutional immunity from tort claims on the other.1 72
To demonstrate how the tort reform campaign relies on the moral/instrumental
and individual/public dichotomy in this Article, this Article focuses on the push
for constitutional immunity from state tort claims, which are potentially the most
troubling means of limiting the tort system. The most efficient way to limit the
system is at the national level, but those seeking to do so have much less success
in convincing Congress to enact legislation than they have state legislatures. 173
What has been successful at the national level, however, is a federal
constitutional argument that may prove to be even more effective than national
legislation, namely, preemption of state tort claims.1 74

&

172. See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 167, at 5 (citing Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An
Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1996)) (noting that tort reformers portray the tort
system as plagued by unscrupulous plaintiffs' attorneys, as well as confused and "irresponsible"
juries, and thus argue that "we need to adopt various 'tort reform' proposals to inhibit claims (e.g.,
loser pays) and limit awards (e.g., eliminating joint and several liability, capping damages, etc.).");
John Gramlich, Republicans Reward Business with Lawsuit Limitations, The PEW CHARITABLE TR.
(June
22,
2011),
available at
http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/
republicans-reward-business-with-lawsuit-limitations-85899375030
(last visited Oct. 8, 2014)
(discussing Ohio's passage of eight bills limiting tort suits and damages, including, for example, a
$350,000 cap on pain and suffering damages in many suits, and noting that Ohio is not alone as
"[a]t least 18 states have passed legislation in 2011 changing the rules of the civil justice system to
favor businesses," and that "[t]he new laws run the gamut, from changes in the way class-action
suits can be filed to new rules" immunizing defendants from tort liability for certain claims).
173. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE
FROM THE STATES ix, tbl. 1, 3-4 (June 2004), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/55xx/doc5549/Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2014) (providing a summary of various
state statutes which evidence that, since the mid-1980s, "[t]ort reform has been a national trend");
Gramlich, supra note 172 (quoting a Tulsa businessman as stating that, although he strongly
supported Ohio's new sweeping legislation limiting tort claims and damages, he ultimately believed
that, "[t]he states can deal with it, but until it's done nationally, we're not going to get rid of the
problem").
The gun industry, however, succeeded at the federal level in securing sweeping blanket
statutory immunity from many tort claims. In 2005, Congress enacted the Protection of Lawful
Commerce in Arms Act, which immunizes gun manufacturers and sellers, and their trade
associations, from liability for most civil actions based on the "criminal or unlawful misuse" of
firearms. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-03 (2012).
174. See THOMAS 0. McGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR 209-10 (2008) (noting that the
preemption push is to some extent a part of the broader "tort reform" movement); Kessler
Vladeck, supra note 23, at 463-64, 474-75 (quoting Requirements on Content and Format of
Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935-36 (Jan.
24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601)) (describing the "seismic shift in FDA
policy" regarding preemption under the administration of President George W. Bush, and pointing
out that the agency's position that failure to warn claims are preempted by its approval of a label
represented a complete reversal of its long-standing "view that its regulatory efforts could
comfortably coexist with state-law damage claims by consumers injured by drugs"); Vladeck, supra
note 72, at 100-101 ("The current Bush Administration has taken unprecedented steps to persuade
courts to adopt its pro-preemption position . .. [B]y working hand-in-glove with industry to change
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Similar in respect to many of the other means of limiting tort law, the
tobacco product industry has been a leading industry proponent of the argument
for preemption of tort law. 75 Indeed, the argument appears to have been crafted
by tobacco industry lawyers before the early 1990s when the tobacco companies
asserted before the Supreme Court in Cipollone ex rel. v. Liggett, Inc.176 that the
plaintiffs' state tort claims were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act (FCLAA). 7 7 The Supreme Court had largely recognized the
possibility of federal preemption only of state positive law that is, statutes and
administrative regulations-as arguments for preemption of state tort law were
"a rarity."
However, a majority of the Court agreed with the companies'
preemption argument in Cipollone, concluding that several of the plaintiffs'
claims were expressly preempted by the FCLAA's provision governing the
preemptive effect of the Act's requirements on state laws. 179
Unsurprisingly, given that preemption is virtually a grant of federal
constitutional
immunity
from
state
tort
claims, 8 o
product
manufacturers and other corporate interests have frequently made preemption
arguments
in
the
wake
of
Cipollone,''
often
with
great

the law on preemption, the Administration has given the public legitimate reason to question
whether the FDA is serving the interests of the public or the industry it regulates.").
175. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL LEGISLATIVE
ACTION To REDUCE TOBACCO USE ii, 53 (2000).

176. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
177. Id. at 520 (citing Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et
seq. (2012)). In Cipollone, the Court was addressing earlier versions of the FCLAA, and it was the
amendments to the preemption provision of the Act enacted in 1969 that the Court found to have
preemptive effect on many of the plaintiffs tort claims. See id. at 520; see also Public Health

Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87-88 (1969).
178. Vladeck, supra note 72, at 106 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524-3 1).
179. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524-25 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012); Unfair or Deceptive
Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg.

8324, 8356 (July 2, 1964); 21 C.F.R. § 191.102 (1965)) (holding that the petitioner's tort claims for
failure to warn and fraudulent misrepresentation were preempted by the 1969 amendments to the
FCLAA's preemption provision).
180. Cf Ewing & Kysar, supra note 168, at 401-02 ("Technically, preemption is not a barrier
to merits adjudication, but rather an implied revision of the substantive law governing the merits; a
preempted cause of action is one that the common law can no longer cognize."). This Article argues
a "virtual grant of constitutional immunity" because Congress could amend the statute to provide
explicitly that it does not preempt state common law claims in response to U.S. Supreme Court
decisions holding that state tort claims are preempted. That is highly unlikely, however, given the
tendency of the U.S. Congress toward inertia, particularly when it comes to highly charged political
issues, as tort law has been for at least the past three decades.
181. See, Vladeck, supra note 72, at 106. As Professor Vladeck points out: "Prior to
Cipollone, preemption defenses were a rarity; post-Cipollone, they were routine." Id. Indeed, as
Vladeck
further
states,
"Cipollone unleashed
a
torrent
of preemption
litigation,
including . . . litigation over medical devices," as well as other products such as automobiles and
pharmaceutical drugs. Id.; see David C. Vladeck, DeconstructingWyeth v. Levine: The New Limits

on Conflict Preemption, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 883, 887-88 (2009) (citing Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865, 886 (2000)); see also Ewing & Kysar, supra note 168, at 401-09
(citations omitted) (arguing the tort system should be used for claims which involve massive harm).
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success.182 The arguments for preemption of tort law are essentially based on the
premise that when tort claims are based on harms that are widespread and caused
by the activities of industries, those asserting the claims are attempting to use tort
law in ways that are sufficiently similar to the ways in which statutes and
regulations function, which will interfere with the function of those statutes and
regulations.' 83 That is, tort law cannot serve a private/public hybrid function, but
rather must fall either on the moral/individual side or on the instrumental/public
side of the traditional tort function dichotomy. 8 4 Based on this argument, if tort
claims based on national business activities are subject to federal regulation, it
may be argued that those claims are serving as something akin to a federal
statute or an administrative regulation, and are thus preempted by that statute or
regulation.
As noted, this misguided reasoning based on the moral/instrumental or
individual/public dichotomy was the basis of the Court's decision in Cipollone
and its progeny.8 5 More specifically, in Cipollone, the Court held that several of
the plaintiffs' tort claims against cigarette manufacturers were "expressly"
preempted' 8 6 by the provision of the FCLAA providing that "any State

182. See, e.g., Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2575-76, 2584 (2011) (citing U.S.
DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF: EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS

3-4 (2010), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/genericdrugs/ib.pdf) (holding that
manufacturers of generic drugs which, as the dissent points out, the vast majority of patients are
taking are immune from tort claims for failure to warn because the FDA's labeling approval
process for generic drug manufacturers under amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) and the FDA's implementing regulations preempt such claims); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.
555, 559-60, 580-81 (2009) (citing Geier, 529 U.S. at 883) (holding that the plaintiffs tort claim
based on failure to warn of the dangers associated with the administration of a brand name drug
manufactured by the defendant was not preempted by the FDCA and the FDA labeling regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto); Riegel ex rel. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 327-28
(2007) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012)) (holding that the plaintiffs' claims against the defendant
manufacturer for defective and negligent design and labeling of catheters and for breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability were expressly preempted by the Medical Device Amendments
to the FDCA); Geier, 529 U.S. at 864-65, 874 (holding that the plaintiffs tort claim alleging
defective design of an automobile without an airbag was preempted by a Department of
Transportation regulation allowing car manufacturers to choose among passive restraints, with
airbags being one option). But see Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1134,
1139-40 (2011) (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 434-35, 444 (2005); Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (holding that most of the plaintiff farmers' tort claims for
damage to their peanut crops against a herbicide manufacturer, including those claims based on
defective design, negligent design and manufacture, and breach of express warranty, were not
preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act).
183. See Mary J. Davis, The Case Against Preemption; Vaccines & Uncertainties, 8 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 293, 302 (2011) (citing Riegel, 552 U.S. at 325).
184. See id. ("There is certainly little regard in these remarks for tort law's historic place in
contributing to public safety or for its 'catalyzing' effect to increase access to risk information as
discussed in Bates.")
185. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 536 (citing San Diego Bldg. Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 247 (1959)).
186. See id. at 515, 520 (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §
1340 (2012)). The U.S. Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence is based on the Supremacy
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requirement or prohibition relating to cigarette advertising or health is
preempted." 8 7 The provision does not mention state tort claims, and as
Professor David Vladeck has pointed out, in interpreting "requirement or
prohibition" as including state common law tort claims, "[t]he Court took a
wrong turn in Cipollone." 88 As Vladeck further explains:
There is not a hint in either the language of the FCLAA or its
legislative history that Congress understood that the preemption
provision would nullify state common law claims even failure
to warn claims that might arguably be in tension with the Act's
dictates. To the contrary, the provision was included in the Act
to 'avoid the chaos created by a multiplicity of conflicting [state
and local] regulations,' not to deprive injured smokers of their
state damages action remedies.18 9
In subsequent cases in which a majority of the Court has held that tort claims
are preempted, the Court has similarly made a "wrong tum" based on a
misreading of congressional intent, which, in turn, is to a significant extent based
on a misunderstanding of tort law. That is, when the Court finds preemption of
state tort law claims, it is largely based on the misguided notion that the claim is

Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides, in pertinent part: "This Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . .. shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Generally, the Court's preemption cases have established two categories of preemption,
"express" and "implied." Express preemption occurs when the Court determines that a state law is
preempted by the terms of a federal statute, as in Riegel, 552 U.S. at 328 and Cipollone, 505 U.S. at
520. Even when Congress has been silent regarding preemption, however, a state law may
nevertheless be subject to implied preemption if the Court determines: (1) that it is impossible for a
defendant to comply with both federal and state law; (2) that Congress intended to preempt the
particular state law at issue because its application would "frustrate the objective" of a federal
statute or regulatory scheme; or (3) that the comprehensive nature of the statutory regime evinces
congressional intent to "occupy [the] field" of regulation of the given subject matter. See JOHN C.P.
GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES & REDRESS 1095-96 (3d ed. 2012) (citing

English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990)); see also Vladeck, supra note 181, at 885
("The inquiry is to determine whether, although Congress did not say so explicitly, circumstances
compel the conclusion that Congress intended to displace state law, because Congress wanted a
federal regulatory regime to occupy the field or because state law either actually conflicts with
federal dictates or would frustrate the attainment of federal objectives."). As Professors Goldberg,
Sebok, and Zipursky point out in their Torts casebook, "The notion of . .
implied preemption
comes in several forms, [and] it is not always easy to distinguish them." GOLDBERG ET AL., supra
note 186, at 1095. This is particularly so for the categories of so-called "impossibility" preemption
and "frustration of purpose," or "obstacle," preemption in the wake of Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S.

Ct. 2567 (2011).
187. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 515 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012)).
188. Vladeck, supra note 72, at 110.

189. Id. at 110 (quoting S. REP. No. 91-566, at 12 (1969), reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2652, 2663).
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based on an instrumental or public duty.' 90 That is, the Court concludes that tort
law serves the instrumental function of requiring manufacturers to design or
label their products to promote human safety.191 However, such an analysis
completely misses the unique disruption function of tort law, which is based on a
general duty that manifests itself in a way that serves both moral and
instrumental functions in a given case. This duty is by no means sufficiently
akin to those imposed by statutory provisions and regulations to justify
preemption of tort claims.
Of course, the reputational impact of an adverse judgment or the prospect of
future verdicts in favor of injured plaintiffs may influence a product
manufacturer's decisionmaking about the nature of the product that it puts in the
marketplace whether regarding that product's informational nature, that is, the
labeling, advertising, and promotion of it, its design, or perhaps both. The
manufacturer may choose, for example, to make changes in its products because
of a concern that an adverse judgment or judgments, and the information that is
revealed through the civil discovery process, are not worth the reputational harm
that would likely result. The manufacturer may also, as Blackmun put it in his
Cipollone dissent, "decide to accept damages awards as a cost of doing business
and not alter its behavior in any way."1 92 Either way, as Blackmun puts it, any
"effect of tort law on a manufacturer's behavior is necessarily indirect."1 93
Thus, Cipollone evinces a failure on the part of the Court to understand that
tort law's inherent, limited, and case-based nature merely provides a space for
the litigants, and perhaps ultimately the public, to consider carefully a given
product, a way of doing business, or, relatedly, an entire company or industry.
Any effect of this opportunity that the disruption function of tort law provides
for litigants and the public on defendants' future behavior is, in the words of
Justice Blackmun, "necessarily indirect."194 Further, this wrongheaded tendency
to gloss over the complexity of tort law and its potential to disrupt corporate
manipulation of societal cognition is not confined to express preemption cases
such as Cipollone.195 Rather, the Court has continued to render decisions that

190. Cf Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 536-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Tort law has an entirely
separate function-compensating victims-that sets it apart from direct forms of regulation").
191. Cf id. at 536 (arguing that all that a tort judgment in favor of a plaintiff requires of the
defendant is payment of monetary damages).
192. Id.
193. Id. Blackmun further notes that: "The level of choice that a defendant retains in shaping
its own behavior distinguishes the indirect regulatory effect of the common law from positive
enactments such as statutes and administrative regulations." Id. at 536-37.
194. See id. at 536.
195. See Riegel ex rel. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324 (2008) (citing Cipollone,
505 U.S. at 521, 522, 548-49) (finding, like Cipollone, that the statutory phrase "requirement or
prohibition" included state tort law claims). In Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861
(2000), the Court held that the word "standard" in the preemption provision of section 1392(d) of
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§131-1431 (recodified
without substantive change at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30183 (2012)), "arguably might preempt" tort
claims under Cipollone and other cases. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 868. However, because the Act also

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

109

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5

228

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 66: 191

ignore this third disruption function of tort law in implied preemption cases as
well. 196
That is, the Court has, to a significant extent, continued down the path of the
wrong turn of which Professor Vladeck warned.1 97 The Court has done so not
only in cases involving implied preemption in the form of the obstacle or
frustration of purpose,19s which involves an analysis that Justice Thomas has
repeatedly condemned as a "freewheeling judicial inquiry" that is "vague and
'potentially borderless."'1 99 The Court has also veered in the wrong direction,
rather incredulously, in the 2011 case of PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,200 a case that
201
involved "impossibility" preemption.
In Mensing, the Court appears to have
was a "demanding defensea202
stressed
had
Court
morphed a doctrine that the
mere two years earlier in Wyeth v. Levine, into a doctrine involving the same sort
of "freewheeling judicial analysis" that Justice Thomas maintains is what the

included a so-called "savings" clause stating that "[c]ompliance with" a federal safety standard
"does not exempt any person from any liability under common law," the Court concluded that
Congress did not intend to expressly preempt common law tort actions. Id. at 868 (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988), repealed by Pub. L. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379).
The Geier Court went on, however, to hold that the plaintiffs negligent and defective
design claims based on the lack of an airbag in her vehicle were impliedly preempted by a safety
standard that the Department of Transportation (DOT) promulgated that gave automobile
manufacturers a choice of passive restraint mechanisms, like airbags. See id. at 886. According to
the Court, Ms. Geier's claims frustrated the objective that Congress evinced through the agency's
regulation that is, in the words of the Court, her tort claims "stood as an 'obstacle' to the
accomplishment of [the agency's] objective." Id.
The Court recently reiterated this view in a similar case, Williamson v. Mazda Motor of
Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011), stating that: "We had previously held that a word somewhat
similar to 'standard,'

namely, 'requirements' . . . included within its scope state . . . duties created

by state tort law." Williamson, 131 S. Ct. at 1135 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
502-05 (1996)). The Williamson Court went on to recognize that the "savings clause of the National
Traffic and Motor Safety Act meant that tort claims were not preempted by the Act's preemption
provision. See id. (citing § 1397(k)) In contrast to the Geier Court, however, the Court in Williamson
held that a similar DOT regulation did not impliedly preempt the plaintiffs' tort claims based on the
design of their minivan specifically, the lack of a shoulder harness on the seatbelt mechanism in
the rear aisle seat. See Williamson, 131 S. Ct. at 1139-40 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941)); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 173, 3-4 (explaining the tort claim and
agency regulation).
196. For an explanation of the categories of "express" and "implied" preemption that the
Supreme Court has developed over the years in its case law based on the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, see supra note 180.
197. See Vladeck, supra note 72, at 110.
198. See Geier, at 885-86. (2000).
199. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 587 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Geier, 529
U.S. at 907-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
200. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
201. See id. at 2577 (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)).
202. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573.
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Court undertakes when it evaluates a state law under "frustration of purpose"
implied preemption doctrine.203
The plaintiff-respondents in PLIVA-Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy
sued the manufacturers of the generic drug metoclopramide, which both women
were prescribed to treat their digestive disorders.204 After taking the drug for
several years, both women developed a neurological disorder called tardive
dyskinesia, which causes those that suffer from it to make involuntary
movements, is irreversible in many cases, and is caused by long-term use of
certain drugs such as metoclopramide. 205 Both women brought tort claims
against the generic drug manufacturers, which produced the metoclopramide
they took, for failing to provide adequate warnings of the risk of tardive
206
dyskinesia.
The manufacturers asserted preemption in defense to both
207
Rather unsurprisingly, given that the Supreme Court had
plaintiffs' claims.
recently held the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA)208 and relevant FDA regulations governing the labeling of brand name

203. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. Interestingly, Justice Thomas wrote the
opinion for the majority of the Court in PLIVA holding that the plaintiffs' tort claims based on the
defendant generic drug manufacturer's failure to warn were preempted because it was "impossible"
for the manufacturer to comply with the tort duty of adequate labeling and the FDA rules
promulgated pursuant to 1984 amendments to the FDCA creating a "fast-track" labeling approval
process for generic drugs. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2577. In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor points
out this anomaly and resulting diminishment of the exacting nature of impossibility preemption. See
id. at 2591 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc.,
471 U.S. 707, 716 (1985); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). However,
Justice Thomas effectively ignores Sotomayor's important point in his opinion for the majority,
relegating his response to a footnote in which he simplifies her argument so much that he
mischaracterizes it. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2577, n.5.
204. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2572, 2573. The women's physicians prescribed the brand name
drug Reglan, but both of their prescriptions were filled with metoclopramide. Id. As Justice
Sotomayor points out in her dissent, most patients end up taking the generic version of brand name
drugs because federal law, many state laws, and many insurance plans are designed to promote such
use as generic versions are less costly than their brand name counterparts. See id. at 2583-84 & n.2
(citing U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF: EXPANDING THE USE OF
GENERIC DRUGS 7 (2010), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/genericdrugs/ib.pdf)).
205. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2572; see also Tardive Dyskinesia, NAT'L. Assoc. OF MENTAL
ILLNESS,
http://www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/Helplinel/TardiveDyskinesia.htm
(last
visited Sept. 1, 2014) (explaining that tardive dyskinesia (TD) "is primarily characterized by
random movements of different muscles within the body and can occur in the tongue, lips or jaw
such as facial grimacing-or consist of purposeless movements of arms, legs, fingers and toes. In
some severe cases, TD can include swaying movements of the trunk or hips or affect the muscles
associated with breathing. TD can be quite embarrassing and depending on its severity can be
disabling as well.").
206. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2573. More specifically, both women claimed that, "'despite
mounting evidence that long term metoclopramide use carries a risk of tardive dyskinesia far greater
than indicated on the label,' none of the Manufacturers had changed their labels to adequately warn
of that danger." Id. (quoting Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 2009)).
207. See id. at 2573.
208. Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99d (2012).
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drugs did not preempt tort claims based on failure to warn, 209 both federal
appellate courts rejected the generic manufacturers' preemption claims. 21 0 A five
Justice majority of the Supreme Court, however, reversed on the ground that the
different labeling approval process for generic manufacturers introduced by
amendments to the FDCA in 1984 21 rendered it impossible for the generic drug
manufacturers to comply with federal law and the state tort law duty to provide
adequate warnings on their products.2 12
As the Mensing majority points out, the amendments to the FDCA regarding
approval of generic drug labels requires much less of generic drug manufacturers
than of brand name drug manufacturers.2 13 Specifically, in order to get approval
to put its drug on the market, the manufacturer must show only that its label "is
the same as the labeling approved for the [brand-name]

drug." 214

Most

importantly, according to the majority, unlike the brand name manufacturer,
once the drug is approved and on the market, the generic manufacturer cannot
strengthen the warnings on its label unilaterally or without pre-approval from the
FDA.2
Rather, the generic manufacturer cannot change its label unless the
brand name manufacturer changes its label.216
And, because the Court
understands tort law duties in terms of the moral/instrumental function
dichotomy,

217

the Court frames the plaintiffs' failure to warn claims as requiring

that the generic manufacturers change their labels to include stronger warnings
about the risk of tardive dyskinesia, rather than what they were in fact required
to do, namely, to pay the damages awards. 21 8 Thus, since "[f]ederal drug
regulations, as interpreted by the FDA, prevented the manufacturers from
independently changing their generic drugs' safety labels," 2 19 the majority deems
the plaintiffs' tort claims preempted on grounds of impossibility of compliance
with both state and federal law.220 This ruling has tremendous implications for

209. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 580-81 (2008) (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861, 861, 883 (2000)) (holding that the plaintiffs tort claim based on failure to warn of the dangers
associated with the administration of the brand-name drug (Phenergan) manufactured by the
defendant was not impliedly preempted by the FDCA and the FDA labeling regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto).
210. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2573.
211. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585, 1586 (1984).
212. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2570-71.
213. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v)(2012)).
214. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v)) (alterations in original).
215. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575-76 (quoting Aner v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
216. See id.
217. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
218. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2577.
219. See id. However, as Justice Sotomayor emphasizes in her dissent, such a change by the
brand-name manufacturer is still subject to the FDA's subsequent approval. See id. at 2588-89
(quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 571 (2009)) (noting that a brand-name manufacturer's
"label change [i]s contingent on FDA acceptance, as the FDA retained 'authority to reject labeling
changes made pursuant to the CBE ["changes-being-effected"] regulation').
220. See id. at 2578.
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patients throughout the United States, most of whom are taking generic versions
of any drugs they are prescribed. Indeed, as Justice Sotomayor points out in her
dissent, the generic drug manufacturing industry is huge:
Today's decision affects [seventy-five] percent of all
prescription drugs dispensed in this country ... Ninety percent
of drugs for which a generic version is available are now filled
with generics. In many cases, once generic versions of a drug
enter the market, the brand-name manufacturer stops selling the
brand-name drug altogether .

.

.. Reflecting the success of their

products, many generic manufacturers, including the
Manufacturers [that are defendants in this case] are huge,
multinational companies. In total, generic drug manufacturers
sold an estimated [sixty-six] billion [dollars] of drugs in this
country in 2009.221

Leaving so many patients without the protection provided by tort law is
unnecessary. It is based on a misunderstanding of tort law that assumes the
validity of the false moral/instrumental dichotomy, and, further, that tort claims
based on widespread corporate activities and the harms that they cause generally
fall on the instrumental side. For the most part, Justice Sotomayor does not
222
disagree with this characterization of the tort duty by the majority.
Rather, she
principally disagrees with the majority's conclusion that the regulatory regime
does not allow the generic manufacturers to take measures to strengthen their
label, and thus renders it impossible for them to comply with both federal
223
Justice Sotomayor is right in
labeling laws and the state tort law duty to warn.
this respect.
However, a better way of understanding the tort duty, and thus a better
preemption analysis, is the one that Justice Sotomayor suggests in a footnote and
is one that echoes Justice Blackmun's Cipollone dissent: "Respondents' statelaw claim is not that the Manufacturers were required to ask the FDA for
assistance in changing the labels; the role of the FDA arises only as a result of
the Manufacturers' pre-emption defense."224 As Justice Blackmun might have
further stated, the drug manufacturers' tort duties were satisfied by the payment

221. Id. at 2583-84 (citing U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 211, at 3-4).
For graphs depicting the steady rise from 2006 to 2010 in both generic and brand name
manufacturers' share of the prescription-drug market, and, relatedly, in the market available for
generic drug substitutions, see Leonard H. Glantz & George J. Annas, Impossible? Outlawing State
Safety Laws for Generic Drugs, 8 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 681, 682 (2011).
222. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2588-89.
223. See id. at 2588. Specifically, Justice Sotomayor points out that: "Just like the brand-name
manufacturer in Wyeth, the Manufacturers had available to them a mechanism for attempting to
comply with their state-law duty to warn. Federal law thus 'accommodated' the Manufacturers'
state-law duties." Id.
224. Id. at 2588 n.11.
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of money damages.
Whatever effect that duty may have had on drug
manufacturers' behavior otherwise-for example, requesting that the FDA
strengthen the warning label regarding the risk of tardive dyskinesia on
metoclopramide's warning label would necessarily have been indirect. 225 The
possibility of that effect is, in turn, simply an example of the disruption function
of tort at work.
Thus, the either/or structure of constitutional preemption doctrine is quite
amenable to the assumption that there is a single, or at least primary, justificatory
theory of the function of tort law and that there are two primary, discrete, and
virtually
hermetic
theories-one
moral/individual
and
the
other
instrumental/public. Under such an account of tort law, when tort claims are
based on industry activity that is subject to federal regulation by widespread
harms, it may forcefully be argued, and indeed has been successfully argued, that
tort law is improperly functioning as public regulatory law and thus is preempted
thereby. In the wake of PLIVA v. Mensing, preemption resulting from taking the
wrong turn down the tort law dichotomy appears now to be available in every
type of preemption except so-called field preemption.226 That being said,
PLIVA's extension of preemption to impossibility preemption presents the risk
that it will infect the entire body of the Court's preemption jurisprudence,
including that of field preemption.
Like the arguments for preemption, other calls for tort reform are to a
significant extent based on the misguided moral/individual
and
instrumental/public dichotomy, and the assumption that tort law falls on the
instrumental/public side in cases involving widespread harms. For example,
claims alleging that the tort system is in crisis, out of control, and so on, often
largely rel on the premise that tort is being improperly used to achieve public
purposes.2 7 Also like preemption, such arguments are based on a failure to
understand the civil justice system's unique role in the legal system one that
belies the dichotomy with the hybrid individual/public disruption function and in
many other ways.

225. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 536 (1992); see also supra note 188 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Blackmun's explication of the nature of tort-law duties in his
Cipollone dissent).

226. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2578; Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Private Law in the Gaps, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1689, 1735-36 (2013) (citing City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,
317 (1981); see also supra note 182 (explaining the types of preemption).
227. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss1/5

114

Hutchinson: Affirmative Action: Between the Oikos and Cosmos Review Essay: Ri

2014] TORT AS A DISRUPTER OF CULTURAL MANIPULATION
V.

233

THE THIRD HYBRID DISRUPTION FUNCTION OF TORT LAW AND WHY IT IS
MORE VITAL THAN EVER IN LIGHT OF ELECTRONIC CIGARETTES AND
BEYOND

A.

The Disruption Function of Tort Law

The moral/instrumental or individual/public dichotomy misses an important
function of tort law that defies the dichotomy, namely, what this Article calls the
disruption function. Naturally, so do the arguments based on the dichotomy,
such as those made by advocating limits on the tort system and the majority of
the United States Supreme Court in many of its preemption decisions involving
state tort law. Particularly, in the current era of corporate activities that affect
many lives and that are capable of causing widespread harms, the dichotomy and
the concomitant tendency to ignore the vital disruption function are simply not
tenable. Even if such a dichotomy was arguably fairly accurate at one very
nascent time in the development of tort law, it is no longer acceptable to
characterize the tort system as properly falling on one side or the other of the
moral/individual or instrumental/public dichotomy.
Indeed, the tort system in many ways serves the individuals in the given case
and the public at once, in ways which will be overlooked if one views the
potential goals of the system through the lens of the dichotomy. One of the
principal ways that the tort system serves a hybrid individual/public function is
by providing a space relatively insulated from disinformation-a disruption of
the assumptions, cognitive biases, unquestioned beliefs, and so on, created by
myriad corporate communications pervading society and culture.
Such a
relatively undisrupted space permits the individuals involved in the case, and
many times eventually the larger public as well, to look back in time to examine
the present and future implications of the issues that arise as a result of the case.
That is, by focusing on an individual case or a number of similar individual
cases at once or over time, the tort system has long served the disruption
function by its unique ability to bring into sharp relief the devastating impacts of
various actions and activities in society and to respond in a relatively direct, but
limited, private law way through individual judgments in cases between private
As a result, the tort system allows society as litigants, judicial
parties.

228. The moral/individual and instrumental/public dichotomy claims to be false and place tort
law in a "catch-22" is distinct from the "private/public" dichotomy fundamental to the reigning
conceptual framework of U.S. law. See, e.g., Goldberg, Pragmatism and Private Law, supra note
59, at 1640 ("Private law defines the rights and duties of individuals and private entities as they
relate to one another. It stands in contrast to public law, which establishes the powers and
responsibilities of governments, defines the rights and duties of individuals in relation to
governments, and governs relations between and among nations.").
This Article assumes that the categories of private and public law remain salient within a
descriptive account of the current landscape of U.S. law, and that the cases brought by state
attorneys general alleging tort claims based on harm to state residents are consistent with that
account.
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officials, jurors, and the public at large-to express its evolving ideas about the
nature of conduct and harms that are deemed unacceptable, and get vital
information about both in the process.
This opportunity for careful consideration provided by the disruption
function of tort law is a key part of its ability to provide redress in the individual
case, as the plaintiffs may be vindicated in their assertion that they have been
wrongfully harmed. 229 Additionally, the disruption function at the same time
often provides the public with vital information to process and perhaps,
230
consequently, question pervasive disinformation.
Importantly, the tort system
accomplishes both of these things without requiring society to decide
immediately whether to address those harms through legislative or
administrative regulatory mechanisms and, if so, how.
Thus, that the tort system has increasingly been called upon by those seeking
relief from individual experiences of harms that are in fact experienced widely is
simply an instance of this long-standing disruption function at work, which is
perfectly natural and indeed essential in the face of increasing widespread and
ongoing harms in an inextricably intertwined and complex nation and world.
State common law tort claims do not, and of course cannot, address widespread
harms caused by complex business activities in the same way that legislation and
administrative rules can address them.21 However, to maintain that that fact
justifies confining the tort system to redressing unique individual injuries on the
ground that it cannot function in the way that legislation does is simply wrong.
After all, the tort system need not function in a positive law way in order to
serve a much needed role in the legal system for protecting public health, safety,
232
and the environment.
Nor does the fact that the tort system can, and does,
serve this protective role in any way diminish its ability to provide redress to

229. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse Defended: A
Reply to Posner, Calabresi, Rustad, Chiamallas, and Robinette, 88 IND. L.J. 569, 570-71 (2013)
("[W]e argue that the concept of a tort fits very naturally with the idea of having a court system that
is open to hearing complaints that are filed at the discretion of a putative victim of injurious
wrongdoing and that seek relief as against a wrongdoer.").
230. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 0. GoSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 216
(2d ed. 2008) ("Perhaps the most important effect of tobacco litigation was to transform public and
political perceptions about risk and responsibility in smoking, making clear what manufacturers
knew, how they concealed this knowledge, and how they manipulated consumers .... Here we
have a case where tort law refrained the debate from personal to corporate responsibility"); see also
Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 23, at 492 n. 150 ("The information-gathering tools lawyers have in
litigation are, by any measure, more extensive than the FDA's," as the agency does not have "the
most important tool trial lawyers have the right to subpoena relevant information from any
source," including the companies' own safety assessments and other internal documentation that
companies are not obligated to provide to the FDA).
231. See GoSTIN, supra note 19, at 196.
232. Cf id. at 195 ("The levers of public health regulation are often viewed as being in the
hands of legislatures and executive agencies. However, attorneys general and private citizens
possess a powerful means of indirect regulation through the tort system.").
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individuals for harms that they have suffered as individuals. 233 In fact, it is
because tort law focuses on an individual case that it is capable of
complementing statutory and administrative regulatory systems.
The
moral/individual and instrumental/public dichotomy is thus a catch-22 for the
tort system that threatens to diminish its power in the legal and political system
in the increasingly important cases in which an individual or group seeks redress
for a harm that is widespread and caused by technologically and scientifically
complex business ventures.
Thus, contrary to the claim that tort law has been improperly morphed into
regulatory law as a result of its use to address these sorts of public harms, tort
law is still being tort law. Tort law is simply doing so in a world in which
corporate activities are becoming increasingly expansive as marketing has
234
become more pervasive, 2 and as unprecedented technological and scientific
manipulation of cognition, environment, and the products used and consumed
has become possible.235 Consequently, massive public health and environmental
236
harms have become more frequent and will only continue to become more so.
Tort law accomplishes this through a combination of its focus on the individual
case and its ability to reveal public, and previously undisclosed, information
about the nature of how the harm experienced by the given individual or
individuals came about.
Importantly, tort cases involve the whole civil justice system and not just the
individual plaintiff or plaintiffs against the individual defendant or defendants
and their respective attorneys, but also the jury and judge, all of whom use the
system's powerful discovery procedures and apply long-standing, but adaptable,
general principles of social responsibility to deem conduct legally wrongful and
the harms caused thereby unacceptable.
The tort system, therefore, provides a
forum for meaningful inquiry into the question whether wrongful conduct and
resulting harms rise to a level deserving of legal recognition.
Thus understood, the notion that tort law primarily does or should serve a
moral/individual function, instrumental/public function, or multiple functionssome moral/individual and some instrumental/public-obscure the unique and
increasingly essential disruption function of tort law in the United States legal
system. Due to the disruption function, tort law can bring into sharper relief
significant human harms caused by corporate activities that may have previously
been diminished or unrecognized as a result of lack of information and pervasive
disinformation.238 Because the tort system is case-based, the individual or

233. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 158, at 1919.
234. See supra note 4.
235. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
236. See Stephen Gillers & Richard W. Painter, Free the Lawyers: A Proposal to PermitNoSue Promises in Settlement Agreements, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 293 (2005).
237. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1994).
238. One might compare this ability of the tort system to John Rawls's extremely influential
theory that basic principles of justice would be unanimously agreed upon if everyone assumed a so-
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individuals seeking redress for injuries have the opportunity to tell the judge,
jury, and part of the legal system their story or stories, which have a special
power to reveal harms or a degree of the severity of harm previously
overlooked. 23 9 This individual, case-based nature, coupled with powerful
discovery procedures, provides the clarity needed for a close and thoughtful
examination of the plaintiffs' individual experiences of injury, including insights
into the role that manipulation of societal cognition may have played in the
plaintiffs' stories. Tort law thus provides society with vital tools for determining
how and whether to respond to those experiences in the particular case, as well
as in the future.
B. E-Cigarettes as a Potential Future Example of the Vital Role of the
DisruptionFunction of Tort Law
Because of the tort system's ability to serve this disruption function over
time, society now knows that the tobacco industry used a strategy of
disinformation plus path-dependence for decades to maintain high demand for a
deadly product even in the face of mounting evidence of its devastating health
240
and mortality consequences.
Similarly, before federal legislation was passed
immunizing gun manufacturers and sellers from tort suits based on harms caused

called "veil of ignorance" regarding their socioeconomic status. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 136-37 (1971) (describing "the veil of ignorance" as a thought experiment permitting
"pure" theoretical inquiry into justice by "assum[ing] that the parties . . do not know how the
various alternatives will affect their own particular case" because they are unaware of their "place in
society," of their "class position or social status," and of what they will possess in terms of "natural
assets and abilities," such as "intelligence, strength, and the like"); id. at 140 (arguing that under
these "veil" conditions, "each is forced to choose for everyone," and thus "[t]he veil of ignorance
makes possible a unanimous choice of a particular conception of justice").
Many have questioned whether Rawl's theory provides a useful, or even plausible, thought
experiment for ascertaining the nature of "justice." This Article's use of Rawls's theory, however, is
at a very general level for the purpose of describing what this Article argues is an essential function
of the tort system that is, providing the space and resources for meaningful inquiry into the
wrongful conduct and the harm that the plaintiffs have brought to public attention in seeking
redress.
239. Cf Anne Bloom, Zen and the Art of Tort Litigation, 44 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 11, 31 (2010)
(citing DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS, 165-88 (2006)) ("Although we live in a
world of uncertainty, we know that our best capacity to predict the future comes from listening to
those who have already been there.").
240. See Sokol, supra note 26, at 94-102 (citing PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 11 (1988)

OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION, A

available at http://profiles.ntlm.nih.gov/
NN/B/B/Z/D/_/nnbbzd.pdf; Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 1): Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Health and the Environment of the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 103d
Cong., at 598 (Mar. 25 & Apr. 14, 1994); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 76, at 1470; Jon D. Hanson
& Douglas 0. Kysar, The Joint Failure of Economic Theory and Egal Regulation, in SMOKING:
RISK, PERCEPTION, & POLICY 229, 230 (Paul Slovic ed., 2001)).
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by third parties,
the suits being brought by cities against gun industry actors
had begun to unveil what could also be framed as a disinformation plus path242
dependence strategy on the part of the gun industry.
Finally, while our current
dependence on a carbon-based economy is certainly more complex than
dependence on nicotine or weapons, the fossil fuel industries have employed a
similar disinformation plus path-dependence strategy.243
Tort law's disruption function of bringing wrongful conduct and resulting
harms to light, as well as allowing litigants, judges, juries, and society to
undertake a close examination of such conduct and resulting harms, is becoming
244
ever more essential in an era of uncertainty and potentially unlimited harm.
The disruption function is particularly vital given that legislative and
administrative officials are often without the resources or political will to address
245
such harms.
Judges such as Cardozo, Traynor, and those assigned to the

241. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7902, 7903 (2012) (prohibiting nearly all civil liability actions against
manufacturers and sellers of firearms and their trade associations based on "the criminal or unlawful
misuse" of guns).
242. Depositions and internal documents revealed that the gun industry knew that its products
were being channeled into a black market for deadly weapons, which was self-fueling as inner cities
increasingly became plagued by gun violence and guns consequently became part of the culture. See
Thomas 0. McGarity et al., The Truth About Torts: Lawyers, Guns, and Money 7-8 (CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM WHITE PAPER #603, 2006), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/
articles/TruthAboutTortsImmunity.pdf (citing People v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, Inc., No.

4095 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1999); Declaration of Robert A. Ricker in Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to
&

Defendant Manufacturer's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 1, People v. Arcadia Machine
Tool, Inc. No. 4095, available at http://www.cbc.ca/disclosure/archives/030218_guns/documents/
ricker affidavit.pdf; BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS, FOLLOWING THE GUN:
ENFORCING FEDERAL LAWS AGAINST FIREARMS TRAFFICKERS x, xi, 5, 10, 12, 13 tbl. 3 (June
3000), available at http://www.atftreas.gov/pub/fire-explopub/pdf/followingtheguninternet.pdf;
Legal Action Project of the Brady Ctr. To Prevent Gun Violence, Reforming the Gun Industry:
People of the State of California v. Arcadia Machine & Tools, Inc., http://www.gunlawsuits.org/
docket/cities/cityview.php?RecordNo=13; Fox Butterfield, Gun Flow to Criminals Laid to Tiny

FractionofDealers, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1999, at A14)
243. See generally NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A
HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL
WARMING 169-215 (2010) (describing efforts to discredit science behind climate change to the

public).
It bears mention that, across industries, the tort reform campaign has become part of the
disinformation prong of their strategies. See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 71, at 52 (noting that
the tort reform campaign has "shaped common sense less by rigorous arguments and systematic
measurements than by skillful rhetoric, alluring narratives, and consistent convictions," and that
"remarkable encapsulizations of ideological and moral critiques of the modern tort regime persist in
'tort tales,' anecdotes and horror stories about civil litigation in the United States").
244. See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 168 at 352, 378 ("Society today faces realistic threats of
unlimited harm.").
245. Constitutional law largely leaves harms caused by corporate conduct unaddressed
because of the highly limiting "state action" requirement. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419

U.S.

345, 349

(1974)

(citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.

1

(1948))

("In 1883 this

Court . . . affirmed the essential dichotomy set forth in th[e Fourteenth] Amendment between
deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful, against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield."). Cf
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tobacco and gun industry cases were faced with new types of misconduct and
harms as a result of the post-industrial era of market manipulation and mass
production. Similarly, society is currently faced with new types of misconduct
and harms as a result of manipulation of societal cognition and rapid scientific
and technological developments.2 46
Importantly, these developments present risks that are foreseeable at a
247
general level, but often not foreseen in their particular manifestation.
After
all, the specific long-term effects of technological manipulations of our
environment are often uncertain.248 Furthermore, in many cases-including that
of e-cigarettes and their nicotine delivery product predecessors governmental
authorities neither investigate nor prepare for risks to human health and the
environment in time to avert disastrous consequences.249 As Professor David
Owen has powerfully stated:
Mankind now has crossed the Rubicon into a brand new world,
by altering the rudiments of matter and life-smashing and
tearing apart atoms, the building blocks of the universe; reengineering the foundations of plant and animal life; remaking
(through cloning, cell manipulation, synthetic biology, etc.)
animals and, increasingly, humans themselves. In such a world,
where humans bend nature so far and fundamentally that they
may be said to be 'playing God,' such conduct undoubtedly
will sometimes accidentally produce harmful consequences
impossible to predict. Such consequences might be labeled
foreseeably unforeseeable-the inevitable yet unknowable
consequences of monkeying with nature in fundamental
250
ways.
This path-breaking technology and science applied in the commercial
context by private actors certainly may yield benefits.251 This technology is also
often quite remarkable as an indication of what human intelligence and ingenuity

Michael L. Rustad, Twenty-First-Century Tort Theories: The Internalist/ExternalistDebate, 88 IND.
L.J. 419, 420 (2013) (citing Marshall S. Shapo, Changing Frontier in Torts: Vistasfor the 70's, 22
STAN. L. REV. 330, 335 (1970)) (arguing for "public policy-based torts that would check the private
party much like constitutional law cases of that era checked abuses of government power").
246. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
247. David G. Owen, Bending Nature, Bending Law, 92 FL. L. REv. 569, 574 (2010).
248. Id. at 578-79.
249. See, e.g., Sokol, supra note 26, at 83-84 (citing Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, §§ 101-106, 123 Stat. 1776, 1783-1842 (June 22, 2009) (codified
at 21 U.S.C. §§387a-387u (2012).
250. See Owen, supra note 247, at 580 (citing Hannah Devlin, Chinese Researchers Clone
Tiny the Mouse from Skin Cells, TIMES ONLINE (July 24, 2009, 12:00 AM), available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tto/science/genetics/articlel967409.ece).
251. See id. at 570.
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can achieve.252 However, this type of path-breaking technology and science is
often coupled with a massive marketing campaign that manipulates societal
cognition by highlighting the perceived benefits, while failing to disclose the
potential risks, and even sometimes questioning or directly countering evidence
of threats.253
The tort system has allowed society to examine this complex balance in a
limited way, by focusing on the individual or individuals harmed and addressing
their case or cases, but in the process also considering carefully, in a relatively
quiet space, the legal limits on activities and resulting harm that society may
want to impose. Doing so as a matter of tort law does not mean it will go
beyond that tort law may serve only to express societal outrage and provide
redress in the particular individual case, or it may also serve to communicate the
254
need for action by the non-judicial branches of state or federal government.
Because tort law comprises general principles of social responsibility and is
state-based, multiple judges, litigants, and citizens serving as jurors are able to
consider and perhaps disagree about whether and the extent to which these longstanding principles apply to actors, activities, and harms in society.25
This
unique feature of tort law brings to it a dynamism that has made it a vital tool for
securing redress for new sorts of harms,256 a necessary part of which, in this era
of widespread harms, is calling the public's attention to certain private conduct
and the resulting harms. Although calling the public's attention to certain
conduct and its resulting harms is, of course, not sufficient to address public
health and environmental crises; it is nevertheless essential. Tort law may lead
to needed further public health and safety protections by deterring similar
conduct in the future, by acting as a prod 25 7 to legislators or administrative
agencies to more comprehensively regulate a given industry or business activity,
or some combination thereof.
However, though tort law may, and often does, provide these much needed
further protections, this Article's argument is that it need not do so in order to be
legitimate, justifiable, and essential. Rather, tort law must be permitted to
continue to do at least this much in order to address the complaint of the
individual or individuals in a given case. To achieve this in the current era of
expansive corporate activity, power, and resulting widespread harms, tort law

252. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, at 443 (Cal. 1944); see also supra
notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., Ewing & Kysar, supra note 168 at 375, 378 (discussing how the judiciary
should explore the problem of climate change litigation within the existing tort framework).
254. See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 168, at 356 ("Entertaining the substance of boundarypushing causes of action also gives tort an opportunity to fulfill a crucial institutional role too often
neglected both by dominant theories of tort law's purposes and by institutional competence analyses
that compare tort law with regulation 'proper.' In entertaining and adjudicating tort disputes, courts
can, do, and should interact with the other branches of government.").
255. See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 168, at 355-56.
256. See id.
257. See id.
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and
dispensing
with
the
moral/individual
necessarily
requires
instrumental/public dichotomy and making room for the hybrid disruption
function. If limits on tort law, such as preemption, prevent it from serving the
disruption, and perhaps other individual/public hybrid functions, tort law will be
rendered virtually powerless as a result of being placed in the catch-22 created
by this false dichotomy.
For example, tort litigation, in significant part, led Congress to enact
legislation giving the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products.25 However,
as noted above, recently, in response to declining cigarette sales, the three largest
tobacco product companies in this country introduced their own brands of ecigarettes.25 9 Undoubtedly, these tobacco product companies will maintain that
this manifestation of their disinformation plus path-dependence strategy is not
currently subject to governmental regulatory authority, as they did in the case of
conventional cigarettes .260

Although some medical and public health experts may be right in stating that
e-cigarettes are less harmful because they do not contain tobacco, it is impossible
to know this until at least two very significant inquiries are explored. 261 First, it
is essential that the companies disclose all of the ingredients in the vapor being
inhaled and exhaled by e-cigarettes. Secondly, independent medical and public
health experts must inquire into the impact of vaping e-cigarettes on users,
particularly young users. For example, do e-cigarettes provide a way to use
nicotine in public places without giving up tobacco products? Do e-cigarettes
normalize cigarette smoking in the eyes of young children and adolescents who
might otherwise have seen such activity as marginalized as a result of the indoor
bans that are now commonplace throughout the nation? 262
If the FDA's authority to regulate e-cigarettes is successfully challenged, the
tort system will in all likelihood provide an essential role in disrupting the
industry's ongoing manipulation of societal cognition regarding e-cigarettes by
helping to answer these and other questions, as well as unearthing new questions
and further vital information.
VI. CONCLUSION

Calls for limiting the tort system in response to its increased use to
address harms caused by corporate activities, both of which the harms and the
activities-are often widespread, are largely based on the moral/individual and

258. See, e.g., Sokol, supra note 26, at 93 ("Largely as a result of documents uncovered in
state tort litigation . . it became clear that the tobacco industry had been implementing . . . a
'disinformation plus path dependence' strategy.").
259. See supra note 99-111 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 10 1-154 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 135-136, 141 and accompanying text; see also supra note 101.
262. See supra Section II.B.
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instrumental/public dichotomy that places tort law in a catch-22.263 This catch22 threatens to disempower tort law in the current era of systemic corporate
activities and resulting widespread harms by confining tort law to the
moral/individual side of this dichotomy. This is highly problematic because the
dichotomy is sorely misguided. Tort law is not amenable to two poles, as it
recognizes individual harms whether unique or experienced broadly as public
harms, but in a single case.
The disruption function of tort law provides plaintiffs with a unique
legal venue to publicly voice their claims that they have been wrongfully harmed
and that the defendants should be held accountable.
The tort system
accomplishes this by providing not only the plaintiffs, but also the general
public, with the opportunity to examine closely the activities of the defendants,
the harms suffered by the plaintiffs, and the connection between the two. The
public then has the opportunity to determine whether the defendants should be
held responsible for those harms in that case. In the process, it provides the
public both with much needed information through the powerful civil discovery
system, and with the space necessary to reflect on whether the alleged wrongful
conduct and resulting harms should be addressed by the tort system and perhaps
also more broadly by other branches or levels of government.
Accordingly, the two sides of the dichotomy dominating tort law theory and
policy need not, and should not, be understood as competing. In fact, public
health and environmental tort litigation is a natural development of the
traditional common law of torts in response to new risks and the harms resulting
264
from their realization.
Consequently, there is no call for uncertainty about the
capacity of the tort system to play a vital role in addressing these harms. Since
the Industrial Revolution, individuals are increasingly subjected to injuries
caused by highly complex business activities that are often not well understood
outside the industry, and cause public health and environmental disasters from
which entire communities suffer at the local, national, and global levels. The
nature of the harms complained of, and for which redress is sought, does not
change the individual case-based nature of the tort system.265 However, this
nature does reflect the fact that the harms that are now most pressing and
devastating are experienced by many individuals, and are often caused by
powerful corporate actors with significant control over the information about
their activities and, relatedly, with great influence on our policy and culture. It is
already clear that there is a very rich potential of tort litigation based on
widespread harms, and it should be allowed to continue playing itself out. The
hybrid disruption function of tort law, which reveals the tort function dichotomy
as fallacious, should thus be embraced.

263. See supra notes 79-80.
264. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 12-13, 64-70 and accompanying text.
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